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Message-Id: <20210525125622.1203-1-xieyongji@bytedance.com>
Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 20:56:22 +0800
From: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@...edance.com>
To: amit@...nel.org, mst@...hat.com, jasowang@...hat.com
Cc: virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] virtio_console: Assure used length from device is limited
The buf->len might come from an untrusted device. This
ensures the value would not exceed the size of the buffer
to avoid data corruption or loss.
Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@...edance.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
---
drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/virtio_console.c b/drivers/char/virtio_console.c
index 1c40ca6d76ba..972b0cd15b87 100644
--- a/drivers/char/virtio_console.c
+++ b/drivers/char/virtio_console.c
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ static struct port_buffer *get_inbuf(struct port *port)
buf = virtqueue_get_buf(port->in_vq, &len);
if (buf) {
- buf->len = len;
+ buf->len = min_t(size_t, len, buf->size);
buf->offset = 0;
port->stats.bytes_received += len;
}
@@ -1709,7 +1709,7 @@ static void control_work_handler(struct work_struct *work)
while ((buf = virtqueue_get_buf(vq, &len))) {
spin_unlock(&portdev->c_ivq_lock);
- buf->len = len;
+ buf->len = min_t(size_t, len, buf->size);
buf->offset = 0;
handle_control_message(vq->vdev, portdev, buf);
--
2.11.0
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