linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] x86/entry/nmi: Switch to the entry stack before switching to the thread stack

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Message-ID: <0ef25497-2714-ea2d-3797-5dac64636640@linux.alibaba.com>
Date:   Wed, 2 Jun 2021 08:16:02 +0800
From:   Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...ux.alibaba.com>
To:     Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Arvind Sankar <nivedita@...m.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] x86/entry/nmi: Switch to the entry stack before
 switching to the thread stack



On 2021/6/2 01:05, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Tue,  1 Jun 2021 14:52:14 +0800
> Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com> wrote:
> 
>> From: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...ux.alibaba.com>
>>
>> Current kernel has no code to enforce data breakpoint not on the thread
>> stack.  If there is any data breakpoint on the top area of the thread
>> stack, there might be problem.
>>
>> For example, when NMI hits on userspace in this setting, the code copies
>> the exception frame from the NMI stack to the thread stack and it will
>> cause #DB and after #DB is handled, the not yet copied portion on the
>> NMI stack is in danger of corruption because the NMI is unmasked.
>>
>> Stashing the exception frame on the entry stack before touching the
>> entry stack can fix the problem.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...ux.alibaba.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S     | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c |  1 +
>>   2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> index a5f02d03c585..4190e668f346 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> @@ -1121,8 +1121,30 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi)
>>   	 *
>>   	 * We also must not push anything to the stack before switching
>>   	 * stacks lest we corrupt the "NMI executing" variable.
>> +	 *
>> +	 * Before switching to the thread stack, it switches to the entry
>> +	 * stack first lest there is any data breakpoint in the thread
>> +	 * stack and the iret of #DB will cause NMI unmasked before
>> +	 * finishing switching.
>>   	 */
>>   
>> +	/* Switch stack to entry stack */
>> +	movq	%rsp, %rdx
>> +	addq	$(+6*8			/* to NMI stack top */		\
>> +		  -EXCEPTION_STKSZ	/* to NMI stack bottom */	\
>> +		  -CPU_ENTRY_AREA_nmi_stack /* to entry area */		\
> 
> Just so that I understand this correctly. This "entry area" is not part
> of the NMI stack, but just at the bottom of it? That is, this part of
> the stack will never be touched by an NMI coming in from kernel space,
> correct?

The NMI stack, exception stacks, entry stack, TSS, GDT are part of this
"entry area" (struct cpu_entry_area).

> 
> -- Steve
> 
> 
>> +		  +CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack /* to entry stack bottom */\
>> +		  +SIZEOF_entry_stack	/* to entry stack top */	\
>> +		), %rsp
>> +
>> +	/* Stash exception frame and %rdx to entry stack */
>> +	pushq	5*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->ss */
>> +	pushq	4*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->rsp */
>> +	pushq	3*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->flags */
>> +	pushq	2*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->cs */
>> +	pushq	1*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->rip */
>> +	pushq	0*8(%rdx)	/* %rdx */
>> +
>>   	swapgs
>>   	cld
>>   	FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> index ecd3fd6993d1..dfafa0c7e887 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static void __used common(void)
>>   	OFFSET(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack, cpu_entry_area, entry_stack_page);
>>   	DEFINE(SIZEOF_entry_stack, sizeof(struct entry_stack));
>>   	DEFINE(MASK_entry_stack, (~(sizeof(struct entry_stack) - 1)));
>> +	OFFSET(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_nmi_stack, cpu_entry_area, estacks.NMI_stack);
>>   
>>   	/* Offset for fields in tss_struct */
>>   	OFFSET(TSS_sp0, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp0);