| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <YLkcUts9dWDkDKpY@zn.tnic>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 2021 20:15:46 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@...nel.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Raj Ashok <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2-fix-v2 1/1] x86: Introduce generic protected guest
abstractionn
>From f1e9f051c86b09fe660f49b0307bc7c6cec5e6f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 2021 20:03:31 +0200
Subject: Convert sme_active()
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 9c80c68d75b5..1bb9f22629fc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
-bool sme_active(void);
bool sev_active(void);
bool sev_es_active(void);
@@ -75,7 +74,6 @@ static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
-static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index c078b0d3ab0e..1d88232146ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
(unsigned long)page_list,
image->start,
image->preserve_context,
- sme_active());
+ protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT));
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
if (image->preserve_context)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
index c2cfa5e7c152..ce6f2b9a05c7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_4gb(void)
* buffers are allocated and used for devices that do not support
* the addressing range required for the encryption mask.
*/
- if (sme_active())
+ if (protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
swiotlb = 1;
return swiotlb;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 01a224fdb897..3aa2658ced52 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -1409,6 +1409,11 @@ bool sev_protected_guest_has(unsigned long flag)
case VM_MEM_ENCRYPT:
case VM_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE:
return true;
+ case VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+ return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
+ default:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return false;
}
return false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 667bba74e4c8..50ed2a768844 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC)
return false;
- if (sme_active()) {
+ if (protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
if (memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size))
return false;
@@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ pgprot_t __init early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(resource_size_t phys_addr,
encrypted_prot = true;
- if (sme_active()) {
+ if (protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
if (early_memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size))
encrypted_prot = false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 49d11bb6e02a..9b0cdac895ca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
struct boot_params *boot_data;
unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
- if (!sme_active())
+ if (!protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
/* Get the command line address before unmapping the real_mode_data */
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
struct boot_params *boot_data;
unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
- if (!sme_active())
+ if (!protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
__sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), true);
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
/*
* SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are
* times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The
- * sme_active() and sev_active() functions are used for this. When a
+ * protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT) and sev_active() functions are used for this. When a
* distinction isn't needed, the mem_encrypt_active() function can be used.
*
* The trampoline code is a good example for this requirement. Before
@@ -378,11 +378,6 @@ bool sev_active(void)
{
return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
}
-
-bool sme_active(void)
-{
- return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
-}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active);
/* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
@@ -405,7 +400,7 @@ bool amd_force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
* device does not support DMA to addresses that include the
* encryption mask.
*/
- if (sme_active()) {
+ if (protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask));
u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask,
dev->bus_dma_limit);
@@ -446,7 +441,7 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:");
/* Secure Memory Encryption */
- if (sme_active()) {
+ if (protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
/*
* SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV
* features below.
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
index da94fc2e9b56..286357956762 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
{
- if (sev_active() || sme_active())
+ if (sev_active() || protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return amd_force_dma_unencrypted(dev);
if (protected_guest_has(VM_MEM_ENCRYPT))
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index a9639f663d25..a92b49aa0d73 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
unsigned long pgtable_area_len;
unsigned long decrypted_base;
- if (!sme_active())
+ if (!protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
index 2e1c1bec0f9e..7f9a708986a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ void __init reserve_real_mode(void)
static void sme_sev_setup_real_mode(struct trampoline_header *th)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
- if (sme_active())
+ if (protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
th->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE;
if (sev_es_active()) {
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
* decrypted memory in order to bring up other processors
* successfully. This is not needed for SEV.
*/
- if (sme_active())
+ if (protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)base, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
memcpy(base, real_mode_blob, size);
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
index d006724f4dc2..3c2365f13cc3 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
@@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ static bool copy_device_table(void)
pr_err("The address of old device table is above 4G, not trustworthy!\n");
return false;
}
- old_devtb = (sme_active() && is_kdump_kernel())
+ old_devtb = (protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && is_kdump_kernel())
? (__force void *)ioremap_encrypted(old_devtb_phys,
dev_table_size)
: memremap(old_devtb_phys, dev_table_size, MEMREMAP_WB);
@@ -3022,7 +3022,7 @@ static int __init amd_iommu_init(void)
static bool amd_iommu_sme_check(void)
{
- if (!sme_active() || (boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17))
+ if (!protected_guest_has(VM_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT) || (boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17))
return true;
/* For Fam17h, a specific level of support is required */
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
Powered by blists - more mailing lists