linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] virtio: Force only split mode with protected guest

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Date:   Thu, 3 Jun 2021 09:36:05 +0800
From:   Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
To:     Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, mst@...hat.com
Cc:     virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org, hch@....de,
        m.szyprowski@...sung.com, robin.murphy@....com,
        iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org, x86@...nel.org,
        sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, jpoimboe@...hat.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] virtio: Force only split mode with protected guest


在 2021/6/3 上午8:41, Andi Kleen 写道:
> When running under TDX the virtio host is untrusted. The bulk
> of the kernel memory is encrypted and protected, but the virtio
> ring is in special shared memory that is shared with the
> untrusted host.
>
> This means virtio needs to be hardened against any attacks from
> the host through the ring. Of course it's impossible to prevent DOS
> (the host can chose at any time to stop doing IO), but there
> should be no buffer overruns or similar that might give access to
> any private memory in the guest.
>
> virtio has a lot of modes, most are difficult to harden.
>
> The best for hardening seems to be split mode without indirect
> descriptors. This also simplifies the hardening job because
> it's only a single code path.
>
> Only allow split mode when in a protected guest. Followon
> patches harden the split mode code paths, and we don't want
> an malicious host to force anything else. Also disallow
> indirect mode for similar reasons.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
> ---
>   drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c | 12 ++++++++++++
>   1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c
> index 71e16b53e9c1..f35629fa47b1 100644
> --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c
> +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>   #include <linux/module.h>
>   #include <linux/hrtimer.h>
>   #include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
> +#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
>   #include <xen/xen.h>
>   
>   #ifdef DEBUG
> @@ -2221,8 +2222,16 @@ void vring_transport_features(struct virtio_device *vdev)
>   	unsigned int i;
>   
>   	for (i = VIRTIO_TRANSPORT_F_START; i < VIRTIO_TRANSPORT_F_END; i++) {
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * In protected guest mode disallow packed or indirect
> +		 * because they ain't hardened.
> +		 */
> +
>   		switch (i) {
>   		case VIRTIO_RING_F_INDIRECT_DESC:
> +			if (protected_guest_has(VM_MEM_ENCRYPT))
> +				goto clear;


So we will see huge performance regression without indirect descriptor. 
We need to consider to address this.

Thanks


>   			break;
>   		case VIRTIO_RING_F_EVENT_IDX:
>   			break;
> @@ -2231,9 +2240,12 @@ void vring_transport_features(struct virtio_device *vdev)
>   		case VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM:
>   			break;
>   		case VIRTIO_F_RING_PACKED:
> +			if (protected_guest_has(VM_MEM_ENCRYPT))
> +				goto clear;
>   			break;
>   		case VIRTIO_F_ORDER_PLATFORM:
>   			break;
> +		clear:
>   		default:
>   			/* We don't understand this bit. */
>   			__virtio_clear_bit(vdev, i);