linux-kernel - Re: [RFC v2 08/32] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest

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Date:   Tue, 8 Jun 2021 10:53:43 -0700
From:   Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@...nel.org>,
        Raj Ashok <ashok.raj@...el.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 08/32] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest

On 6/8/21 10:48 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 08, 2021, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 4/26/21 11:01 AM, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan wrote:
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
>>> +DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_virtualization_exception)
>>> +{
>>> +	struct ve_info ve;
>>> +	int ret;
>>> +
>>> +	RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't wake RCU");
>>> +
>>> +	/*
>>> +	 * Consume #VE info before re-enabling interrupts. It will be
>>> +	 * re-enabled after executing the TDGETVEINFO TDCALL.
>>> +	 */
>>> +	ret = tdg_get_ve_info(&ve);
>> Is it safe to have *anything* before the tdg_get_ve_info()?  For
>> instance, say that RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() triggers.  Will anything in there
>> do MMIO?
> I doubt it's safe, anything that's doing printing has the potential to trigger
> #VE.  Even if we can prove it's safe for all possible paths, I can't think of a
> reason to allow anything that's not absolutely necessary before retrieving the
> #VE info.

What about tracing?  Can I plop a kprobe in here or turn on ftrace?