linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4 3/6] x86/sev-es: Split up runtime #VC handler for correct state tracking

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Message-ID: <YMHnP1qgvznyYazv@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date:   Thu, 10 Jun 2021 12:19:43 +0200
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To:     Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>, hpa@...or.com,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com>,
        Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@...gle.com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Mike Stunes <mstunes@...are.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@...il.com>,
        Arvind Sankar <nivedita@...m.mit.edu>,
        linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 3/6] x86/sev-es: Split up runtime #VC handler for
 correct state tracking


Bah, I suppose the trouble is that this SEV crap requires PARAVIRT?

I should really get around to fixing noinstr validation with PARAVIRT on
:-(

On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 11:11:38AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:

> +static void vc_handle_from_kernel(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)

static noinstr ...

> +{
> +	irqentry_state_t irq_state = irqentry_nmi_enter(regs);
>  
> +	instrumentation_begin();
>  
> +	if (!vc_raw_handle_exception(regs, error_code)) {
>  		/* Show some debug info */
>  		show_regs(regs);
>  
> @@ -1434,7 +1400,59 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication)
>  		panic("Returned from Terminate-Request to Hypervisor\n");
>  	}
>  
> +	instrumentation_end();
> +	irqentry_nmi_exit(regs, irq_state);
> +}
> +
> +static void vc_handle_from_user(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)

static noinstr ...

> +{
> +	irqentry_state_t irq_state = irqentry_enter(regs);
> +
> +	instrumentation_begin();
> +
> +	if (!vc_raw_handle_exception(regs, error_code)) {
> +		/*
> +		 * Do not kill the machine if user-space triggered the
> +		 * exception. Send SIGBUS instead and let user-space deal with
> +		 * it.
> +		 */
> +		force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_OBJERR, (void __user *)0);
> +	}
> +
> +	instrumentation_end();
> +	irqentry_exit(regs, irq_state);
> +}

+ linebreak

> +/*
> + * Main #VC exception handler. It is called when the entry code was able to
> + * switch off the IST to a safe kernel stack.
> + *
> + * With the current implementation it is always possible to switch to a safe
> + * stack because #VC exceptions only happen at known places, like intercepted
> + * instructions or accesses to MMIO areas/IO ports. They can also happen with
> + * code instrumentation when the hypervisor intercepts #DB, but the critical
> + * paths are forbidden to be instrumented, so #DB exceptions currently also
> + * only happen in safe places.
> + */
> +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * Handle #DB before calling into !noinstr code to avoid recursive #DB.
> +	 */
> +	if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) {
> +		vc_handle_trap_db(regs);
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * This is invoked through an interrupt gate, so IRQs are disabled. The
> +	 * code below might walk page-tables for user or kernel addresses, so
> +	 * keep the IRQs disabled to protect us against concurrent TLB flushes.
> +	 */
> +
> +	if (user_mode(regs))
> +		vc_handle_from_user(regs, error_code);
> +	else
> +		vc_handle_from_kernel(regs, error_code);
>  }

#DB and MCE use idtentry_mce_db and split out in asm. When I look at
idtentry_vc, it appears to me that VC_SAFE_STACK already implies
from-user, or am I reading that wrong?

Ah, it appears you're muddling things up again by then also calling
safe_stack_ from exc_.

How about you don't do that and have exc_ call your new from_kernel
function, then we know that safe_stack_ is always from-user. Then also
maybe do:

	s/VS_SAFE_STACK/VC_USER/
	s/safe_stack_/noist_/

to match all the others (#DB/MCE).

Also, AFAICT, you don't actually need DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_IST, it doesn't
have an ASM counterpart.

So then you end up with something like:

DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC(exc_vc)
{
	if (unlikely(on_vc_fallback_stack(regs))) {
		instrumentation_begin();
		panic("boohooo\n");
		instrumentation_end();
	}

	vc_from_kernel();
}

DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_USER(exc_vc)
{
	vc_from_user();
}

Which is, I'm thinking, much simpler, no?