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Message-ID: <e624f6a3-baab-d265-ca0a-e7d65ce4c6f5@amd.com>
Date:   Mon, 14 Jun 2021 15:50:58 -0500
From:   Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To:     "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>
Cc:     brijesh.singh@....com, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, tony.luck@...el.com,
        npmccallum@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request
 platform device


On 6/14/21 12:23 PM, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> * Brijesh Singh (brijesh.singh@....com) wrote:
>> I see that Tom answered few comments. I will cover others.
>>
>>
>> On 6/9/21 2:24 PM, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
>> + /*
>>>> +	 * The message sequence counter for the SNP guest request is a 64-bit value
>>>> +	 * but the version 2 of GHCB specification defines the 32-bit storage for the
>>>> +	 * it.
>>>> +	 */
>>>> +	if ((count + 1) >= INT_MAX)
>>>> +		return 0;
>>> Is that UINT_MAX?
>> Good catch. It should be UINT_MAX.
> OK, but I'm also confused by two things:
>   a) Why +1 given that Tom's reply says this gets incremented by 2 each
> time (once for the message, once for the reply)
>   b) Why >= ? I think here is count was INT_MAX-1 you'd skip to 0,
> skipping INT_MAX - is that what you want?

That's bug. I noticed it after you pointed the INT_MAX check and asked
question on why 2. I will fix in next iteration.


>>> +	/*
>>> +	 * The secret page contains the VM encryption key used for encrypting the
>>> +	 * messages between the guest and the PSP. The secrets page location is
>>> +	 * available either through the setup_data or EFI configuration table.
>>> +	 */
>>> +	if (hdr->cc_blob_address) {
>>> +		paddr = hdr->cc_blob_address;
>>> Can you trust the paddr the host has given you or do you need to do some
>>> form of validation?
>> The paddr is mapped encrypted. That means that data  in the paddr must
>> be encrypted either through the guest or PSP. After locating the paddr,
>> we perform a simply sanity check (32-bit magic string "AMDE"). See the
>> verify header check below. Unfortunately the secrets page itself does
>> not contain any magic key which we can use to ensure that
>> hdr->secret_paddr is actually pointing to the secrets pages but all of
>> these memory is accessed encrypted so its safe to access it. If VMM
>> lying to us that basically means guest will not be able to communicate
>> with the PSP and can't do the attestation etc.
> OK; that nails pretty much anything bad that can happen - I was just
> thinking if the host did something odd like give you an address in the
> middle of some other useful structure.
>
> Dave
>
>>> Dave
>>> +	} else if (efi_enabled(EFI_CONFIG_TABLES)) {
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
>>> +		paddr = cc_blob_phys;
>>> +#else
>>> +		return -ENODEV;
>>> +#endif
>>> +	} else {
>>> +		return -ENODEV;
>>> +	}
>>> +
>>> +	info = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*info), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>> +	if (!info)
>>> +		return -ENOMEM;
>>> +
>>> +	/* Verify the header that its a valid SEV_SNP CC header */
>>> +	if ((info->magic == CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC) &&
>>> +	    info->secrets_phys &&
>>> +	    (info->secrets_len == PAGE_SIZE)) {
>>> +		res->start = info->secrets_phys;
>>> +		res->end = info->secrets_phys + info->secrets_len;
>>> +		res->flags = IORESOURCE_MEM;
>>> +		snp_secrets_phys = info->secrets_phys;
>>> +		ret = 0;
>>> +	}
>>> +
>>> +	memunmap(info);
>>> +	return ret;
>>> +}
>>> +

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