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Message-ID: <AM6PR08MB4376F90B594C5134302A830AF7309@AM6PR08MB4376.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com>
Date:   Tue, 15 Jun 2021 06:43:09 +0000
From:   Justin He <Justin.He@....com>
To:     Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>,
        Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@...omium.org>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
CC:     "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
        "Ahmed S. Darwish" <a.darwish@...utronix.de>,
        "linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH RFCv3 2/3] lib/vsprintf.c: make %pD print full path for
 file

Hi Rasmus

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>
> Sent: Saturday, June 12, 2021 5:28 AM
> To: Justin He <Justin.He@....com>; Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>; Steven
> Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>; Sergey Senozhatsky
> <senozhatsky@...omium.org>; Andy Shevchenko
> <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>; Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>;
> Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>; Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-
> foundation.org>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>; Eric Biggers
> <ebiggers@...gle.com>; Ahmed S. Darwish <a.darwish@...utronix.de>; linux-
> doc@...r.kernel.org; linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org; linux-
> fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
> Subject: Re: [PATCH RFCv3 2/3] lib/vsprintf.c: make %pD print full path for
> file
>
> On 11/06/2021 17.59, Jia He wrote:
> > We have '%pD' for printing a filename. It may not be perfect (by
> > default it only prints one component.)
> >
> > As suggested by Linus at [1]:
> > A dentry has a parent, but at the same time, a dentry really does
> > inherently have "one name" (and given just the dentry pointers, you
> > can't show mount-related parenthood, so in many ways the "show just
> > one name" makes sense for "%pd" in ways it doesn't necessarily for
> > "%pD"). But while a dentry arguably has that "one primary component",
> > a _file_ is certainly not exclusively about that last component.
> >
> > Hence change the behavior of '%pD' to print full path of that file.
> >
> > Things become more complicated when spec.precision and spec.field_width
> > is added in. string_truncate() is to handle the small space case for
> > '%pD' precision and field_width.
> >
> > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wimsMqGdzik187YWLb-
> ru+iktb4MYbMQG1rnZ81dXYFVg@...l.gmail.com/
> >
> > Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Jia He <justin.he@....com>
> > ---
> >  Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst |  5 ++-
> >  lib/vsprintf.c                            | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++--
> >  2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst
> b/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst
> > index f063a384c7c8..95ba14dc529b 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst
> > @@ -408,12 +408,13 @@ dentry names
> >  ::
> >
> >     %pd{,2,3,4}
> > -   %pD{,2,3,4}
> > +   %pD
> >
> >  For printing dentry name; if we race with :c:func:`d_move`, the name
> might
> >  be a mix of old and new ones, but it won't oops.  %pd dentry is a safer
> >  equivalent of %s dentry->d_name.name we used to use, %pd<n> prints ``n``
> > -last components.  %pD does the same thing for struct file.
> > +last components.  %pD prints full file path together with mount-related
> > +parenthood.
> >
> >  Passed by reference.
> >
> > diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
> > index f0c35d9b65bf..317b65280252 100644
> > --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> > +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
> > @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
> >  #include <linux/string.h>
> >  #include <linux/ctype.h>
> >  #include <linux/kernel.h>
> > +#include <linux/dcache.h>
> >  #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
> >  #include <linux/math64.h>
> >  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> > @@ -601,6 +602,20 @@ char *widen_string(char *buf, int n, char *end,
> struct printf_spec spec)
> >  }
> >
> >  /* Handle string from a well known address. */
> > +static char *string_truncate(char *buf, char *end, const char *s,
> > +                        u32 full_len, struct printf_spec spec)
> > +{
> > +   int lim = 0;
> > +
> > +   if (buf < end) {
>
> See below, I think the sole caller guarantees this,

Ok, will remove this check statement

>
> > +           if (spec.precision >= 0)
> > +                   lim = strlen(s) - min_t(int, spec.precision, strlen(s));
> > +
> > +           return widen_string(buf + full_len, full_len, end - lim, spec);
> > +   }
> > +
> > +   return buf;
>
> which is good because this would almost certainly be wrong (violating
> the "always forward buf appropriately regardless of whether you wrote
> something" rule).
>
> > +}
> >  static char *string_nocheck(char *buf, char *end, const char *s,
> >                         struct printf_spec spec)
> >  {
> > @@ -920,13 +935,37 @@ char *dentry_name(char *buf, char *end, const
> struct dentry *d, struct printf_sp
> >  }
> >
> >  static noinline_for_stack
> > -char *file_dentry_name(char *buf, char *end, const struct file *f,
> > +char *file_d_path_name(char *buf, char *end, const struct file *f,
> >                     struct printf_spec spec, const char *fmt)
> >  {
> > +   const struct path *path;
> > +   char *p;
> > +   int prepend_len, reserved_size, dpath_len;
> > +
> >     if (check_pointer(&buf, end, f, spec))
> >             return buf;
> >
> > -   return dentry_name(buf, end, f->f_path.dentry, spec, fmt);
> > +   path = &f->f_path;
> > +   if (check_pointer(&buf, end, path, spec))
> > +           return buf;
> > +
> > +   p = d_path_unsafe(path, buf, end - buf, &prepend_len);
>
> If I'm reading this right, you're using buf as scratch space to write
> however much of the path fits. Then [*]
>
> > +   /* Minus 1 byte for '\0' */
> > +   dpath_len = end - buf - prepend_len - 1;
> > +
> > +   reserved_size = max_t(int, dpath_len, spec.field_width);
> > +
> > +   /* no filling space at all */
> > +   if (buf >= end || !buf)
> > +           return buf + reserved_size;
>
> Why the !buf check? The only way we can have that is the snprintf(NULL,
> 0, ...) case of asking how much space we'd need to malloc, right? In
> which case end would be NULL+0 == NULL, so buf >= end automatically,
> regardless of how much have been "printed" before %pD.

My original purpose is to avoid any memory copy/move for kvasprintf->
vsnprintf(NULL, 0,...). But as you said, this can be folded into the case
buf >= end.
Do you think whether following case should be forbidden?:
vsnprintf(NULL, 8,...).
Sorry if it is too verbose. If above invoking is valid, !buf should
still be checked.

>
> > +
> > +   /* small space for long name */
> > +   if (buf < end && prepend_len < 0)
>
> So if we did an early return for buf >= end, we now know buf < end and
> hence the first part here is redundant.
>
> Anyway, as for [*]:
>
> > +           return string_truncate(buf, end, p, dpath_len, spec);
> > +
> > +   /* space is enough */
> > +   return string_nocheck(buf, end, p, spec);
>
> Now you're passing p to string_truncate or string_nocheck, while p
> points somewhere into buf itself. I can't convince myself that would be
> safe. At the very least, it deserves a couple of comments.

When code goes here, the buffer space must be as follows:
|.........|.........|
buf       p         end

So string_nocheck is safe because essential it would byte-to-byte copy p to buf.

But I agree comments are needed here.


--
Cheers,
Justin (Jia He)


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