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Message-ID: <CAEXW_YTMGvTEjHmC4pbdNTt99J545htb4cnkNbBcMY1jSe_24A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2021 07:31:59 -0400
From: Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>
To: Josh Don <joshdon@...gle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Hyser,Chris" <chris.hyser@...cle.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@...aro.org>,
Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@....com>,
Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Aubrey Li <aubrey.intel@...il.com>,
Xiangling Kong <xiangling@...gle.com>,
Benjamin Segall <bsegall@...gle.com>,
Vineeth Pillai <vineethrp@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 18/19] sched: prctl() core-scheduling interface
On Mon, Jun 14, 2021 at 7:36 PM Josh Don <joshdon@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Apr 22, 2021 at 5:36 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> wrote:
> >
> > From: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@...cle.com>
> >
> > This patch provides support for setting and copying core scheduling
> > 'task cookies' between threads (PID), processes (TGID), and process
> > groups (PGID).
>
> [snip]
>
> Internally, we have lots of trusted processes that don't have a
> security need for coresched cookies. However, these processes could
> still decide to create cookies for themselves, which will degrade
> machine capacity and performance for other jobs on the machine.
>
> Any thoughts on whether it would be desirable to have the ability to
> restrict use of SCHED_CORE_CREATE? Perhaps a new SCHED_CORE capability
> would be appropriate?
Hi,
Maybe a capability may not work because then other users who don't
care for the issue you mention will be required to manage/assign the
capability as well?
How about you use seccomp to filter the prctl based on the PID, and
CREATE command?
-Joel
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