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Message-ID: <87zgvpqb00.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au>
Date:   Thu, 17 Jun 2021 16:08:15 +1000
From:   Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, stable@...r.kernel.org,
        Breno Leitão <leitao@...ian.org>,
        Nayna Jain <nayna@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@...il.com>,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
        Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: nx: Fix memcpy() over-reading in nonce

Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> writes:
> Fix typo in memcpy() where size should be CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE.
>
> Fixes: 030f4e968741 ("crypto: nx - Fix reentrancy bugs")
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>

Thanks.

> ---
>  drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
> index 13f518802343..6120e350ff71 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
> @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static int ctr3686_aes_nx_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
>  	struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
>  	u8 iv[16];
>  
> -	memcpy(iv, nx_ctx->priv.ctr.nonce, CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE);
> +	memcpy(iv, nx_ctx->priv.ctr.nonce, CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
>  	memcpy(iv + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE, req->iv, CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE);
>  	iv[12] = iv[13] = iv[14] = 0;
>  	iv[15] = 1;

Where IV_SIZE is 8 and NONCE_SIZE is 4.

And iv is 16 bytes, so it's not a buffer overflow.

But priv.ctr.nonce is 4 bytes, and at the end of the struct, so it reads
4 bytes past the end of the nx_crypto_ctx, which is not good.

But then immediately overwrites whatever it read with req->iv.

So seems pretty harmless in practice?

cheers

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