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Message-Id: <1624032777-7013-6-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 2021 12:12:50 -0400
From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@...cle.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
Cc: ross.philipson@...cle.com, dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com,
tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de, hpa@...or.com,
luto@...capital.net, trenchboot-devel@...glegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 05/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub
The Secure Launch (SL) stub provides the entry point for Intel TXT (and
later AMD SKINIT) to vector to during the late launch. The symbol
sl_stub_entry is that entry point and its offset into the kernel is
conveyed to the launching code using the MLE (Measured Launch
Environment) header in the structure named mle_header. The offset of the
MLE header is set in the kernel_info. The routine sl_stub contains the
very early late launch setup code responsible for setting up the basic
environment to allow the normal kernel startup_32 code to proceed. It is
also responsible for properly waking and handling the APs on Intel
platforms. The routine sl_main which runs after entering 64b mode is
responsible for measuring configuration and module information before
it is used like the boot params, the kernel command line, the TXT heap,
an external initramfs, etc.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@...cle.com>
---
Documentation/x86/boot.rst | 13 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 3 +-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 37 ++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 11 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S | 33 ++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c | 523 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S | 667 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 19 +
8 files changed, 1305 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/boot.rst b/Documentation/x86/boot.rst
index fc84491..7623f60 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/boot.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/boot.rst
@@ -1026,6 +1026,19 @@ Offset/size: 0x000c/4
This field contains maximal allowed type for setup_data and setup_indirect structs.
+============ =================
+Field name: mle_header_offset
+Offset/size: 0x0010/4
+============ =================
+
+ This field contains the offset to the Secure Launch Measured Launch Environment
+ (MLE) header. This offset is used to locate information needed during a secure
+ late launch using Intel TXT. If the offset is zero, the kernel does not have
+ Secure Launch capabilities. The MLE entry point is called from TXT on the BSP
+ following a success measured launch. The specific state of the processors is
+ outlined in the TXT Software Development Guide, the latest can be found here:
+ https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/guides/intel-txt-software-development-guide.pdf
+
The Image Checksum
==================
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index 059d49a..1fe55a5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += $(obj)/acpi.o
vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += $(obj)/efi_thunk_$(BITS).o
efi-obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) = $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
-vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += $(obj)/early_sha1.o $(obj)/early_sha256.o
+vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += $(obj)/early_sha1.o $(obj)/early_sha256.o \
+ $(obj)/sl_main.o $(obj)/sl_stub.o
$(obj)/vmlinux: $(vmlinux-objs-y) $(efi-obj-y) FORCE
$(call if_changed,ld)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index a2347de..b35e072 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -498,6 +498,17 @@ trampoline_return:
pushq $0
popfq
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
+ pushq %rsi
+
+ /* Ensure the relocation region coverd by a PMR */
+ movq %rbx, %rdi
+ movl $(_bss - startup_32), %esi
+ callq sl_check_region
+
+ popq %rsi
+#endif
+
/*
* Copy the compressed kernel to the end of our buffer
* where decompression in place becomes safe.
@@ -556,6 +567,32 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated)
shrq $3, %rcx
rep stosq
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
+ /*
+ * Have to do the final early sl stub work in 64b area.
+ *
+ * *********** NOTE ***********
+ *
+ * Several boot params get used before we get a chance to measure
+ * them in this call. This is a known issue and we currently don't
+ * have a solution. The scratch field doesn't matter. There is no
+ * obvious way to do anything about the use of kernel_alignment or
+ * init_size though these seem low risk with all the PMR and overlap
+ * checks in place.
+ */
+ pushq %rsi
+
+ movq %rsi, %rdi
+ callq sl_main
+
+ /* Ensure the decompression location is coverd by a PMR */
+ movq %rbp, %rdi
+ movq output_len(%rip), %rsi
+ callq sl_check_region
+
+ popq %rsi
+#endif
+
/*
* If running as an SEV guest, the encryption mask is required in the
* page-table setup code below. When the guest also has SEV-ES enabled
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
index e366907..f935468 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/slaunch.h>
#include <generated/utsrelease.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
@@ -840,6 +841,16 @@ void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
return;
}
+ /*
+ * If a secure launch is in progress, KASLR cannot be used
+ * since knowing the exact location of things is a crucial
+ * part of the secure launch.
+ */
+ if (slaunch_get_cpu_type() & SL_CPU_INTEL) {
+ warn("KASLR disabled: by Secure Launch");
+ return;
+ }
+
boot_params->hdr.loadflags |= KASLR_FLAG;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
index c18f071..91914eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
@@ -28,6 +28,39 @@ SYM_DATA_START(kernel_info)
/* Maximal allowed type for setup_data and setup_indirect structs. */
.long SETUP_TYPE_MAX
+ /* Offset to the MLE header structure */
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH)
+ .long rva(mle_header)
+#else
+ .long 0
+#endif
+
kernel_info_var_len_data:
/* Empty for time being... */
SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(kernel_info, SYM_L_LOCAL, kernel_info_end)
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH)
+ /*
+ * The MLE Header per the TXT Specification, section 2.1
+ * MLE capabilities, see table 4. Capabilities set:
+ * bit 0: Support for GETSEC[WAKEUP] for RLP wakeup
+ * bit 1: Support for RLP wakeup using MONITOR address
+ * bit 5: TPM 1.2 family: Details/authorities PCR usage support
+ * bit 9: Supported format of TPM 2.0 event log - TCG compliant
+ */
+SYM_DATA_START(mle_header)
+ .long 0x9082ac5a /* UUID0 */
+ .long 0x74a7476f /* UUID1 */
+ .long 0xa2555c0f /* UUID2 */
+ .long 0x42b651cb /* UUID3 */
+ .long 0x00000034 /* MLE header size */
+ .long 0x00020002 /* MLE version 2.2 */
+ .long rva(sl_stub_entry) /* Linear entry point of MLE (virt. address) */
+ .long 0x00000000 /* First valid page of MLE */
+ .long 0x00000000 /* Offset within binary of first byte of MLE */
+ .long rva(_edata) /* Offset within binary of last byte + 1 of MLE */
+ .long 0x00000223 /* Bit vector of MLE-supported capabilities */
+ .long 0x00000000 /* Starting linear address of command line (unused) */
+ .long 0x00000000 /* Ending linear address of command line (unused) */
+SYM_DATA_END(mle_header)
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..64ada2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,523 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Secure Launch early measurement and validation routines.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <asm/segment.h>
+#include <asm/boot.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/io.h>
+#include <asm/mtrr.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
+#include <linux/slaunch.h>
+#include <crypto/sha1.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "early_sha1.h"
+
+#define CAPS_VARIABLE_MTRR_COUNT_MASK 0xff
+
+#define SL_TPM12_LOG 1
+#define SL_TPM20_LOG 2
+
+#define SL_TPM20_MAX_ALGS 2
+
+#define SL_MAX_EVENT_DATA 64
+#define SL_TPM12_LOG_SIZE (sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event) + \
+ SL_MAX_EVENT_DATA)
+#define SL_TPM20_LOG_SIZE (sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head) + \
+ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + \
+ sizeof(struct tcg_event_field) + \
+ SL_MAX_EVENT_DATA)
+
+static void *evtlog_base;
+static u32 evtlog_size;
+static struct txt_heap_event_log_pointer2_1_element *log20_elem;
+static u32 tpm_log_ver = SL_TPM12_LOG;
+struct tcg_efi_specid_event_algs tpm_algs[SL_TPM20_MAX_ALGS] = {0};
+
+#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH_ALT_PCR19)
+static u32 pcr_config = SL_DEF_CONFIG_PCR18;
+#else
+static u32 pcr_config = SL_ALT_CONFIG_PCR19;
+#endif
+
+#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH_ALT_PCR20)
+static u32 pcr_image = SL_DEF_IMAGE_PCR17;
+#else
+static u32 pcr_image = SL_ALT_IMAGE_PCR20;
+#endif
+
+extern u32 sl_cpu_type;
+extern u32 sl_mle_start;
+
+u32 slaunch_get_cpu_type(void)
+{
+ return sl_cpu_type;
+}
+
+static u64 sl_txt_read(u32 reg)
+{
+ return readq((void *)(u64)(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + reg));
+}
+
+static void sl_txt_write(u32 reg, u64 val)
+{
+ writeq(val, (void *)(u64)(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + reg));
+}
+
+static void __noreturn sl_txt_reset(u64 error)
+{
+ /* Reading the E2STS register acts as a barrier for TXT registers */
+ sl_txt_write(TXT_CR_ERRORCODE, error);
+ sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_E2STS);
+ sl_txt_write(TXT_CR_CMD_UNLOCK_MEM_CONFIG, 1);
+ sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_E2STS);
+ sl_txt_write(TXT_CR_CMD_RESET, 1);
+
+ for ( ; ; )
+ asm volatile ("hlt");
+
+ unreachable();
+}
+
+static u64 sl_rdmsr(u32 reg)
+{
+ u64 lo, hi;
+
+ asm volatile ("rdmsr" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) : "c" (reg));
+
+ return (hi << 32) | lo;
+}
+
+static void sl_check_pmr_coverage(void *base, u32 size, bool allow_hi)
+{
+ void *end = base + size;
+ struct txt_os_sinit_data *os_sinit_data;
+ void *txt_heap;
+
+ if (!(sl_cpu_type & SL_CPU_INTEL))
+ return;
+
+ txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
+ os_sinit_data = txt_os_sinit_data_start(txt_heap);
+
+ if ((end >= (void *)0x100000000ULL) &&
+ (base < (void *)0x100000000ULL))
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_REGION_STRADDLE_4GB);
+
+ /*
+ * Note that the late stub code validates that the hi PMR covers
+ * all memory above 4G. At this point the code can only check that
+ * regions are within the hi PMR but that is sufficient.
+ */
+ if ((end > (void *)0x100000000ULL) &&
+ (base >= (void *)0x100000000ULL)) {
+ if (allow_hi) {
+ if (end >= (void *)(os_sinit_data->vtd_pmr_hi_base +
+ os_sinit_data->vtd_pmr_hi_size))
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_BUFFER_BEYOND_PMR);
+ } else
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_REGION_ABOVE_4GB);
+ }
+
+ if (end >= (void *)os_sinit_data->vtd_pmr_lo_size)
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_BUFFER_BEYOND_PMR);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Some MSRs are modified by the pre-launch code including the MTRRs.
+ * The early MLE code has to restore these values. This code validates
+ * the values after they are measured.
+ */
+static void sl_txt_validate_msrs(struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data)
+{
+ u64 mtrr_caps, mtrr_def_type, mtrr_var, misc_en_msr;
+ u32 vcnt, i;
+ struct txt_mtrr_state *saved_bsp_mtrrs =
+ &(os_mle_data->saved_bsp_mtrrs);
+
+ mtrr_caps = sl_rdmsr(MSR_MTRRcap);
+ vcnt = (u32)(mtrr_caps & CAPS_VARIABLE_MTRR_COUNT_MASK);
+
+ if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_vcnt > vcnt)
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_VCNT);
+ if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_vcnt > TXT_OS_MLE_MAX_VARIABLE_MTRRS)
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_VCNT);
+
+ mtrr_def_type = sl_rdmsr(MSR_MTRRdefType);
+ if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->default_mem_type != mtrr_def_type)
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_DEF_TYPE);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_vcnt; i++) {
+ mtrr_var = sl_rdmsr(MTRRphysBase_MSR(i));
+ if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_pair[i].mtrr_physbase != mtrr_var)
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_BASE);
+ mtrr_var = sl_rdmsr(MTRRphysMask_MSR(i));
+ if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_pair[i].mtrr_physmask != mtrr_var)
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_MASK);
+ }
+
+ misc_en_msr = sl_rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE);
+ if (os_mle_data->saved_misc_enable_msr != misc_en_msr)
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MSR_INV_MISC_EN);
+}
+
+static void sl_find_event_log(void)
+{
+ struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data;
+ struct txt_os_sinit_data *os_sinit_data;
+ void *txt_heap;
+
+ txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
+
+ os_mle_data = txt_os_mle_data_start(txt_heap);
+ evtlog_base = (void *)os_mle_data->evtlog_addr;
+ evtlog_size = os_mle_data->evtlog_size;
+
+ /*
+ * For TPM 2.0, the event log 2.1 extended data structure has to also
+ * be located and fixed up.
+ */
+ os_sinit_data = txt_os_sinit_data_start(txt_heap);
+
+ /*
+ * Only support version 6 and later that properly handle the
+ * list of ExtDataElements in the OS-SINIT structure.
+ */
+ if (os_sinit_data->version < 6)
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_OS_SINIT_BAD_VERSION);
+
+ /* Find the TPM2.0 logging extended heap element */
+ log20_elem = tpm20_find_log2_1_element(os_sinit_data);
+
+ /* If found, this implies TPM20 log and family */
+ if (log20_elem)
+ tpm_log_ver = SL_TPM20_LOG;
+}
+
+static void sl_validate_event_log_buffer(void)
+{
+ void *mle_base = (void *)(u64)sl_mle_start;
+ void *mle_end;
+ struct txt_os_sinit_data *os_sinit_data;
+ void *txt_heap;
+ void *txt_heap_end;
+ void *evtlog_end;
+
+ if ((u64)evtlog_size > (LLONG_MAX - (u64)evtlog_base))
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_INTEGER_OVERFLOW);
+ evtlog_end = evtlog_base + evtlog_size;
+
+ txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
+ txt_heap_end = txt_heap + sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_SIZE);
+ os_sinit_data = txt_os_sinit_data_start(txt_heap);
+
+ mle_end = mle_base + os_sinit_data->mle_size;
+
+ /*
+ * This check is to ensure the event log buffer does not overlap with
+ * the MLE image.
+ */
+ if ((evtlog_base >= mle_end) &&
+ (evtlog_end > mle_end))
+ goto pmr_check; /* above */
+
+ if ((evtlog_end <= mle_base) &&
+ (evtlog_base < mle_base))
+ goto pmr_check; /* below */
+
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MLE_BUFFER_OVERLAP);
+
+pmr_check:
+ /*
+ * The TXT heap is protected by the DPR. If the TPM event log is
+ * inside the TXT heap, there is no need for a PMR check.
+ */
+ if ((evtlog_base > txt_heap) &&
+ (evtlog_end < txt_heap_end))
+ return;
+
+ sl_check_pmr_coverage(evtlog_base, evtlog_size, true);
+}
+
+static void sl_find_event_log_algorithms(void)
+{
+ struct tcg_efi_specid_event_head *efi_head =
+ (struct tcg_efi_specid_event_head *)(evtlog_base +
+ log20_elem->first_record_offset +
+ sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event));
+
+ if (efi_head->num_algs == 0 || efi_head->num_algs > 2)
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_NUMBER_ALGS);
+
+ memcpy(&tpm_algs[0], &efi_head->digest_sizes[0],
+ sizeof(struct tcg_efi_specid_event_algs) * efi_head->num_algs);
+}
+
+static void sl_tpm12_log_event(u32 pcr, u32 event_type,
+ const u8 *data, u32 length,
+ const u8 *event_data, u32 event_size)
+{
+ struct tcg_pcr_event *pcr_event;
+ struct sha1_state sctx = {0};
+ u32 total_size;
+ u8 log_buf[SL_TPM12_LOG_SIZE] = {0};
+ u8 sha1_hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = {0};
+
+ pcr_event = (struct tcg_pcr_event *)log_buf;
+ pcr_event->pcr_idx = pcr;
+ pcr_event->event_type = event_type;
+ if (length > 0) {
+ early_sha1_init(&sctx);
+ early_sha1_update(&sctx, data, length);
+ early_sha1_final(&sctx, &sha1_hash[0]);
+ memcpy(&pcr_event->digest[0], &sha1_hash[0], SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ }
+ pcr_event->event_size = event_size;
+ if (event_size > 0)
+ memcpy((u8 *)pcr_event + sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event),
+ event_data, event_size);
+
+ total_size = sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event) + event_size;
+
+ if (tpm12_log_event(evtlog_base, evtlog_size, total_size, pcr_event))
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_LOGGING_FAILED);
+}
+
+static void sl_tpm20_log_event(u32 pcr, u32 event_type,
+ const u8 *data, u32 length,
+ const u8 *event_data, u32 event_size)
+{
+ struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *head;
+ struct tcg_event_field *event;
+ struct sha1_state sctx1 = {0};
+ struct sha256_state sctx256 = {0};
+ u32 total_size;
+ u16 *alg_ptr;
+ u8 *dgst_ptr;
+ u8 log_buf[SL_TPM20_LOG_SIZE] = {0};
+ u8 sha1_hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = {0};
+ u8 sha256_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE] = {0};
+
+ head = (struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *)log_buf;
+ head->pcr_idx = pcr;
+ head->event_type = event_type;
+ total_size = sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head);
+ alg_ptr = (u16 *)(log_buf + sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head));
+
+ for ( ; head->count < 2; head->count++) {
+ if (!tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id)
+ break;
+
+ *alg_ptr = tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id;
+ dgst_ptr = (u8 *)alg_ptr + sizeof(u16);
+
+ if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA256 &&
+ length) {
+ sha256_init(&sctx256);
+ sha256_update(&sctx256, data, length);
+ sha256_final(&sctx256, &sha256_hash[0]);
+ } else if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA1 &&
+ length) {
+ early_sha1_init(&sctx1);
+ early_sha1_update(&sctx1, data, length);
+ early_sha1_final(&sctx1, &sha1_hash[0]);
+ }
+
+ if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA256) {
+ memcpy(dgst_ptr, &sha256_hash[0], SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ total_size += SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16);
+ alg_ptr = (u16 *)((u8 *)alg_ptr + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16));
+ } else if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA1) {
+ memcpy(dgst_ptr, &sha1_hash[0], SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ total_size += SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16);
+ alg_ptr = (u16 *)((u8 *)alg_ptr + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16));
+ } else
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+ }
+
+ event = (struct tcg_event_field *)(log_buf + total_size);
+ event->event_size = event_size;
+ if (event_size > 0)
+ memcpy((u8 *)event + sizeof(struct tcg_event_field),
+ event_data, event_size);
+ total_size += sizeof(struct tcg_event_field) + event_size;
+
+ if (tpm20_log_event(log20_elem, evtlog_base, evtlog_size,
+ total_size, &log_buf[0]))
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_LOGGING_FAILED);
+}
+
+static void sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(u32 pcr, u32 type,
+ const u8 *data, u32 length, const char *desc)
+{
+ if (tpm_log_ver == SL_TPM20_LOG)
+ sl_tpm20_log_event(pcr, type, data, length,
+ (const u8 *)desc, strlen(desc));
+ else
+ sl_tpm12_log_event(pcr, type, data, length,
+ (const u8 *)desc, strlen(desc));
+}
+
+asmlinkage __visible void sl_check_region(void *base, u32 size)
+{
+ sl_check_pmr_coverage(base, size, false);
+}
+
+asmlinkage __visible void sl_main(void *bootparams)
+{
+ struct boot_params *bp;
+ struct setup_data *data;
+ struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data;
+ struct txt_os_mle_data os_mle_tmp = {0};
+ const char *signature;
+ unsigned long mmap = 0;
+ void *txt_heap;
+ u32 data_count;
+
+ /*
+ * Currently only Intel TXT is supported for Secure Launch. Testing
+ * this value also indicates that the kernel was booted successfully
+ * through the Secure Launch entry point and is in SMX mode.
+ */
+ if (!(sl_cpu_type & SL_CPU_INTEL))
+ return;
+
+ /* Locate the TPM event log. */
+ sl_find_event_log();
+
+ /* Validate the location of the event log buffer before using it */
+ sl_validate_event_log_buffer();
+
+ /*
+ * Find the TPM hash algorithms used by the ACM and recorded in the
+ * event log.
+ */
+ if (tpm_log_ver == SL_TPM20_LOG)
+ sl_find_event_log_algorithms();
+
+ /* Sanitize them before measuring */
+ boot_params = (struct boot_params *)bootparams;
+ sanitize_boot_params(boot_params);
+
+ /* Place event log NO_ACTION tags before and after measurements */
+ sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(17, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH_START, NULL, 0, "");
+
+ sl_check_pmr_coverage(bootparams, PAGE_SIZE, false);
+
+ /* Measure the zero page/boot params */
+ sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(pcr_config, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
+ bootparams, PAGE_SIZE,
+ "Measured boot parameters");
+
+ /* Now safe to use boot params */
+ bp = (struct boot_params *)bootparams;
+
+ /* Measure the command line */
+ if (bp->hdr.cmdline_size > 0) {
+ u64 cmdline = (u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr;
+
+ if (bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr > 0)
+ cmdline = cmdline | ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
+
+ sl_check_pmr_coverage((void *)cmdline,
+ bp->hdr.cmdline_size, true);
+
+ sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(pcr_config, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
+ (u8 *)cmdline,
+ bp->hdr.cmdline_size,
+ "Measured Kernel command line");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Measuring the boot params measured the fixed e820 memory map.
+ * Measure any setup_data entries including e820 extended entries.
+ */
+ data = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)bp->hdr.setup_data;
+ while (data) {
+ sl_check_pmr_coverage(((u8 *)data) + sizeof(struct setup_data),
+ data->len, true);
+
+ sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(pcr_config, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
+ ((u8 *)data) + sizeof(struct setup_data),
+ data->len,
+ "Measured Kernel setup_data");
+
+ data = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)data->next;
+ }
+
+ /* If bootloader was EFI, measure the memory map passed across */
+ signature =
+ (const char *)&bp->efi_info.efi_loader_signature;
+
+ if (!strncmp(signature, EFI32_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4))
+ mmap = bp->efi_info.efi_memmap;
+ else if (!strncmp(signature, EFI64_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4))
+ mmap = (bp->efi_info.efi_memmap |
+ ((u64)bp->efi_info.efi_memmap_hi << 32));
+
+ if (mmap)
+ sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(pcr_config, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
+ (void *)mmap,
+ bp->efi_info.efi_memmap_size,
+ "Measured EFI memory map");
+
+ /* Measure any external initrd */
+ if (bp->hdr.ramdisk_image != 0 && bp->hdr.ramdisk_size != 0) {
+ u64 ramdisk = (u64)bp->hdr.ramdisk_image;
+
+ if (bp->ext_ramdisk_size > 0)
+ sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_INITRD_TOO_BIG);
+
+ if (bp->ext_ramdisk_image > 0)
+ ramdisk = ramdisk |
+ ((u64)bp->ext_ramdisk_image << 32);
+
+ sl_check_pmr_coverage((void *)ramdisk,
+ bp->hdr.ramdisk_size, true);
+
+ sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(pcr_image, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
+ (u8 *)(ramdisk),
+ bp->hdr.ramdisk_size,
+ "Measured initramfs");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Some extra work to do on Intel, have to measure the OS-MLE
+ * heap area.
+ */
+ txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
+ os_mle_data = txt_os_mle_data_start(txt_heap);
+
+ /* Measure only portions of OS-MLE data, not addresses/sizes etc. */
+ os_mle_tmp.version = os_mle_data->version;
+ os_mle_tmp.saved_misc_enable_msr = os_mle_data->saved_misc_enable_msr;
+ os_mle_tmp.saved_bsp_mtrrs = os_mle_data->saved_bsp_mtrrs;
+
+ /* No PMR check is needed, the TXT heap is covered by the DPR */
+
+ sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(pcr_config, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
+ (u8 *)&os_mle_tmp,
+ sizeof(struct txt_os_mle_data),
+ "Measured TXT OS-MLE data");
+
+ sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(17, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH_END, NULL, 0, "");
+
+ /*
+ * Now that the OS-MLE data is measured, ensure the MTRR and
+ * misc enable MSRs are what we expect.
+ */
+ sl_txt_validate_msrs(os_mle_data);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..311539c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S
@@ -0,0 +1,667 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+/*
+ * Secure Launch protected mode entry point.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
+ */
+ .code32
+ .text
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/segment.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+#include <asm/page_types.h>
+#include <asm/irq_vectors.h>
+#include <linux/slaunch.h>
+
+/* Can't include apiddef.h in asm */
+#define XAPIC_ENABLE (1 << 11)
+#define X2APIC_ENABLE (1 << 10)
+
+/* Can't include traps.h in asm */
+#define X86_TRAP_NMI 2
+
+/* Can't include mtrr.h in asm */
+#define MTRRphysBase0 0x200
+
+#define IDT_VECTOR_LO_BITS 0
+#define IDT_VECTOR_HI_BITS 6
+
+/*
+ * See the comment in head_64.S for detailed informatoin on what this macro
+ * is used for.
+ */
+#define rva(X) ((X) - sl_stub_entry)
+
+/*
+ * The GETSEC op code is open coded because older versions of
+ * GCC do not support the getsec mnemonic.
+ */
+.macro GETSEC leaf
+ pushl %ebx
+ xorl %ebx, %ebx /* Must be zero for SMCTRL */
+ movl \leaf, %eax /* Leaf function */
+ .byte 0x0f, 0x37 /* GETSEC opcode */
+ popl %ebx
+.endm
+
+.macro TXT_RESET error
+ /*
+ * Set a sticky error value and reset. Note the movs to %eax act as
+ * TXT register barriers.
+ */
+ movl \error, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_ERRORCODE)
+ movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_E2STS), %eax
+ movl $1, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_CMD_NO_SECRETS)
+ movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_E2STS), %eax
+ movl $1, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_CMD_UNLOCK_MEM_CONFIG)
+ movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_E2STS), %eax
+ movl $1, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_CMD_RESET)
+1:
+ hlt
+ jmp 1b
+.endm
+
+ .code32
+SYM_FUNC_START(sl_stub_entry)
+ cli
+ cld
+
+ /*
+ * On entry, %ebx has the entry abs offset to sl_stub_entry. This
+ * will be correctly scaled using the rva macro and avoid causing
+ * relocations. Only %cs and %ds segments are known good.
+ */
+
+ /* Load GDT, set segment regs and lret to __SL32_CS */
+ leal rva(sl_gdt_desc)(%ebx), %eax
+ addl %eax, 2(%eax)
+ lgdt (%eax)
+
+ movl $(__SL32_DS), %eax
+ movw %ax, %ds
+ movw %ax, %es
+ movw %ax, %fs
+ movw %ax, %gs
+ movw %ax, %ss
+
+ /*
+ * Now that %ss is known good, take the first stack for the BSP. The
+ * AP stacks are only used on Intel.
+ */
+ leal rva(sl_stacks_end)(%ebx), %esp
+
+ leal rva(.Lsl_cs)(%ebx), %eax
+ pushl $(__SL32_CS)
+ pushl %eax
+ lret
+
+.Lsl_cs:
+ /* Save our base pointer reg */
+ pushl %ebx
+
+ /* Now see if it is GenuineIntel. CPUID 0 returns the manufacturer */
+ xorl %eax, %eax
+ cpuid
+ cmpl $(INTEL_CPUID_MFGID_EBX), %ebx
+ jnz .Ldo_unknown_cpu
+ cmpl $(INTEL_CPUID_MFGID_EDX), %edx
+ jnz .Ldo_unknown_cpu
+ cmpl $(INTEL_CPUID_MFGID_ECX), %ecx
+ jnz .Ldo_unknown_cpu
+
+ popl %ebx
+
+ /* Know it is Intel */
+ movl $(SL_CPU_INTEL), rva(sl_cpu_type)(%ebx)
+
+ /* Increment CPU count for BSP */
+ incl rva(sl_txt_cpu_count)(%ebx)
+
+ /* Enable SMI with GETSEC[SMCTRL] */
+ GETSEC $(SMX_X86_GETSEC_SMCTRL)
+
+ /* IRET-to-self can be used to enable NMIs which SENTER disabled */
+ leal rva(.Lnmi_enabled)(%ebx), %eax
+ pushfl
+ pushl $(__SL32_CS)
+ pushl %eax
+ iret
+
+.Lnmi_enabled:
+ /* Clear the TXT error registers for a clean start of day */
+ movl $0, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_ERRORCODE)
+ movl $0xffffffff, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_ESTS)
+
+ /* On Intel, the zero page address is passed in the TXT heap */
+ /* Read physical base of heap into EAX */
+ movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE), %eax
+ /* Read the size of the BIOS data into ECX (first 8 bytes) */
+ movl (%eax), %ecx
+ /* Skip over BIOS data and size of OS to MLE data section */
+ leal 8(%eax, %ecx), %eax
+
+ /* Need to verify the values in the OS-MLE struct passed in */
+ call sl_txt_verify_os_mle_struct
+
+ /*
+ * Get the boot params address from the heap. Note %esi and %ebx MUST
+ * be preserved across calls and operations.
+ */
+ movl SL_boot_params_addr(%eax), %esi
+
+ /* Save %ebx so the APs can find their way home */
+ movl %ebx, (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_EBX)(%eax)
+
+ /* Fetch the AP wake code block address from the heap */
+ movl SL_ap_wake_block(%eax), %edi
+ movl %edi, rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx)
+
+ /* Store the offset in the AP wake block to the jmp address */
+ movl $(sl_ap_jmp_offset - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), \
+ (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_JMP_OFFSET)(%eax)
+
+ /* %eax still is the base of the OS-MLE block, save it */
+ pushl %eax
+
+ /* Relocate the AP wake code to the safe block */
+ call sl_txt_reloc_ap_wake
+
+ /*
+ * Wake up all APs that are blocked in the ACM and wait for them to
+ * halt. This should be done before restoring the MTRRs so the ACM is
+ * still properly in WB memory.
+ */
+ call sl_txt_wake_aps
+
+ /*
+ * Pop OS-MLE base address (was in %eax above) for call to load
+ * MTRRs/MISC MSR
+ */
+ popl %edi
+ call sl_txt_load_regs
+
+ jmp .Lcpu_setup_done
+
+.Ldo_unknown_cpu:
+ /* Non-Intel CPUs are not yet supported */
+ ud2
+
+.Lcpu_setup_done:
+ /*
+ * Don't enable MCE at this point. The kernel will enable
+ * it on the BSP later when it is ready.
+ */
+
+ /* Done, jump to normal 32b pm entry */
+ jmp startup_32
+SYM_FUNC_END(sl_stub_entry)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap)
+ /* %ecx: buffer begin %edx: buffer end */
+ /* %ebx: MLE begin %edi: MLE end */
+
+ cmpl %edi, %ecx
+ jb .Lnext_check
+ cmpl %edi, %edx
+ jbe .Lnext_check
+ jmp .Lvalid /* Buffer above MLE */
+
+.Lnext_check:
+ cmpl %ebx, %edx
+ ja .Linvalid
+ cmpl %ebx, %ecx
+ jae .Linvalid
+ jmp .Lvalid /* Buffer below MLE */
+
+.Linvalid:
+ TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_MLE_BUFFER_OVERLAP)
+
+.Lvalid:
+ ret
+SYM_FUNC_END(sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_verify_os_mle_struct)
+ /*
+ * %eax points to the base of the OS-MLE struct. Need to also
+ * read some values from the OS-SINIT struct too.
+ */
+ movl -8(%eax), %ecx
+ /* Skip over OS to MLE data section and size of OS-SINIT structure */
+ leal (%eax, %ecx), %edx
+
+ /* Save MLE image base for sl_main's use */
+ movl %ebx, rva(sl_mle_start)(%ebx)
+
+ /* Verify the value of the low PMR base. It should always be 0. */
+ movl SL_vtd_pmr_lo_base(%edx), %esi
+ cmpl $0, %esi
+ jz .Lvalid_pmr_base
+ TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_LO_PMR_BASE)
+
+.Lvalid_pmr_base:
+ /* Grab some values from OS-SINIT structure */
+ movl SL_mle_size(%edx), %edi
+ addl %ebx, %edi
+ jc .Loverflow_detected
+ movl SL_vtd_pmr_lo_size(%edx), %esi
+
+ /* Check the AP wake block */
+ movl SL_ap_wake_block(%eax), %ecx
+ movl SL_ap_wake_block_size(%eax), %edx
+ addl %ecx, %edx
+ jc .Loverflow_detected
+ call sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap
+ cmpl %esi, %edx
+ ja .Lbuffer_beyond_pmr
+
+ /* Check the boot params */
+ movl SL_boot_params_addr(%eax), %ecx
+ movl $(PAGE_SIZE), %edx
+ addl %ecx, %edx
+ jc .Loverflow_detected
+ call sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap
+ cmpl %esi, %edx
+ ja .Lbuffer_beyond_pmr
+
+ /* Check that the AP wake block is big enough */
+ cmpl $(sl_txt_ap_wake_end - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), \
+ SL_ap_wake_block_size(%eax)
+ jae .Lwake_block_ok
+ TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_WAKE_BLOCK_TOO_SMALL)
+
+.Lwake_block_ok:
+ ret
+
+.Loverflow_detected:
+ TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_INTEGER_OVERFLOW)
+
+.Lbuffer_beyond_pmr:
+ TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_BUFFER_BEYOND_PMR)
+SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_verify_os_mle_struct)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_ap_entry)
+ cli
+ cld
+ /*
+ * The %cs and %ds segments are known good after waking the AP.
+ * First order of business is to find where we are and
+ * save it in %ebx.
+ */
+
+ /* Read physical base of heap into EAX */
+ movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE), %eax
+ /* Read the size of the BIOS data into ECX (first 8 bytes) */
+ movl (%eax), %ecx
+ /* Skip over BIOS data and size of OS to MLE data section */
+ leal 8(%eax, %ecx), %eax
+
+ /* Saved %ebx from the BSP and stash OS-MLE pointer */
+ movl (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_EBX)(%eax), %ebx
+ /* Save OS-MLE base in %edi for call to sl_txt_load_regs */
+ movl %eax, %edi
+
+ /* Lock and get our stack index */
+ movl $1, %ecx
+.Lspin:
+ xorl %eax, %eax
+ lock cmpxchgl %ecx, rva(sl_txt_spin_lock)(%ebx)
+ pause
+ jnz .Lspin
+
+ /* Increment the stack index and use the next value inside lock */
+ incl rva(sl_txt_stack_index)(%ebx)
+ movl rva(sl_txt_stack_index)(%ebx), %eax
+
+ /* Unlock */
+ movl $0, rva(sl_txt_spin_lock)(%ebx)
+
+ /* Location of the relocated AP wake block */
+ movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %ecx
+
+ /* Load reloc GDT, set segment regs and lret to __SL32_CS */
+ lgdt (sl_ap_gdt_desc - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ecx)
+
+ movl $(__SL32_DS), %edx
+ movw %dx, %ds
+ movw %dx, %es
+ movw %dx, %fs
+ movw %dx, %gs
+ movw %dx, %ss
+
+ /* Load our reloc AP stack */
+ movl $(TXT_BOOT_STACK_SIZE), %edx
+ mull %edx
+ leal (sl_stacks_end - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ecx), %esp
+ subl %eax, %esp
+
+ /* Switch to AP code segment */
+ leal rva(.Lsl_ap_cs)(%ebx), %eax
+ pushl $(__SL32_CS)
+ pushl %eax
+ lret
+
+.Lsl_ap_cs:
+ /* Load the relocated AP IDT */
+ lidt (sl_ap_idt_desc - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ecx)
+
+ /* Fixup MTRRs and misc enable MSR on APs too */
+ call sl_txt_load_regs
+
+ /* Enable SMI with GETSEC[SMCTRL] */
+ GETSEC $(SMX_X86_GETSEC_SMCTRL)
+
+ /* IRET-to-self can be used to enable NMIs which SENTER disabled */
+ leal rva(.Lnmi_enabled_ap)(%ebx), %eax
+ pushfl
+ pushl $(__SL32_CS)
+ pushl %eax
+ iret
+
+.Lnmi_enabled_ap:
+ /* Put APs in X2APIC mode like the BSP */
+ movl $(MSR_IA32_APICBASE), %ecx
+ rdmsr
+ orl $(XAPIC_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE), %eax
+ wrmsr
+
+ /*
+ * Basically done, increment the CPU count and jump off to the AP
+ * wake block to wait.
+ */
+ lock incl rva(sl_txt_cpu_count)(%ebx)
+
+ movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %eax
+ jmp *%eax
+SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_ap_entry)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_reloc_ap_wake)
+ /* Save boot params register */
+ pushl %esi
+
+ movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %edi
+
+ /* Fixup AP IDT and GDT descriptor before relocating */
+ leal rva(sl_ap_idt_desc)(%ebx), %eax
+ addl %edi, 2(%eax)
+ leal rva(sl_ap_gdt_desc)(%ebx), %eax
+ addl %edi, 2(%eax)
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the AP wake code and AP GDT/IDT to the protected wake block
+ * provided by the loader. Destination already in %edi.
+ */
+ movl $(sl_txt_ap_wake_end - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %ecx
+ leal rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ebx), %esi
+ rep movsb
+
+ /* Setup the IDT for the APs to use in the relocation block */
+ movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %ecx
+ addl $(sl_ap_idt - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %ecx
+ xorl %edx, %edx
+
+ /* Form the default reset vector relocation address */
+ movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %esi
+ addl $(sl_txt_int_reset - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %esi
+
+1:
+ cmpw $(NR_VECTORS), %dx
+ jz .Lap_idt_done
+
+ cmpw $(X86_TRAP_NMI), %dx
+ jz 2f
+
+ /* Load all other fixed vectors with reset handler */
+ movl %esi, %eax
+ movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_LO_BITS)(%ecx)
+ shrl $16, %eax
+ movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_HI_BITS)(%ecx)
+ jmp 3f
+
+2:
+ /* Load single wake NMI IPI vector at the relocation address */
+ movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %eax
+ addl $(sl_txt_int_ipi_wake - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %eax
+ movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_LO_BITS)(%ecx)
+ shrl $16, %eax
+ movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_HI_BITS)(%ecx)
+
+3:
+ incw %dx
+ addl $8, %ecx
+ jmp 1b
+
+.Lap_idt_done:
+ popl %esi
+ ret
+SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_reloc_ap_wake)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_load_regs)
+ /* Save base pointer register */
+ pushl %ebx
+
+ /*
+ * On Intel, the original variable MTRRs and Misc Enable MSR are
+ * restored on the BSP at early boot. Each AP will also restore
+ * its MTRRs and Misc Enable MSR.
+ */
+ pushl %edi
+ addl $(SL_saved_bsp_mtrrs), %edi
+ movl (%edi), %ebx
+ pushl %ebx /* default_mem_type lo */
+ addl $4, %edi
+ movl (%edi), %ebx
+ pushl %ebx /* default_mem_type hi */
+ addl $4, %edi
+ movl (%edi), %ebx /* mtrr_vcnt lo, don't care about hi part */
+ addl $8, %edi /* now at MTRR pair array */
+ /* Write the variable MTRRs */
+ movl $(MTRRphysBase0), %ecx
+1:
+ cmpl $0, %ebx
+ jz 2f
+
+ movl (%edi), %eax /* MTRRphysBaseX lo */
+ addl $4, %edi
+ movl (%edi), %edx /* MTRRphysBaseX hi */
+ wrmsr
+ addl $4, %edi
+ incl %ecx
+ movl (%edi), %eax /* MTRRphysMaskX lo */
+ addl $4, %edi
+ movl (%edi), %edx /* MTRRphysMaskX hi */
+ wrmsr
+ addl $4, %edi
+ incl %ecx
+
+ decl %ebx
+ jmp 1b
+2:
+ /* Write the default MTRR register */
+ popl %edx
+ popl %eax
+ movl $(MSR_MTRRdefType), %ecx
+ wrmsr
+
+ /* Return to beginning and write the misc enable msr */
+ popl %edi
+ addl $(SL_saved_misc_enable_msr), %edi
+ movl (%edi), %eax /* saved_misc_enable_msr lo */
+ addl $4, %edi
+ movl (%edi), %edx /* saved_misc_enable_msr hi */
+ movl $(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE), %ecx
+ wrmsr
+
+ popl %ebx
+ ret
+SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_load_regs)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_wake_aps)
+ /* Save boot params register */
+ pushl %esi
+
+ /* First setup the MLE join structure and load it into TXT reg */
+ leal rva(sl_gdt)(%ebx), %eax
+ leal rva(sl_txt_ap_entry)(%ebx), %ecx
+ leal rva(sl_smx_rlp_mle_join)(%ebx), %edx
+ movl %eax, SL_rlp_gdt_base(%edx)
+ movl %ecx, SL_rlp_entry_point(%edx)
+ movl %edx, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_MLE_JOIN)
+
+ /* Another TXT heap walk to find various values needed to wake APs */
+ movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE), %eax
+ /* At BIOS data size, find the number of logical processors */
+ movl (SL_num_logical_procs + 8)(%eax), %edx
+ /* Skip over BIOS data */
+ movl (%eax), %ecx
+ addl %ecx, %eax
+ /* Skip over OS to MLE */
+ movl (%eax), %ecx
+ addl %ecx, %eax
+ /* At OS-SNIT size, get capabilities to know how to wake up the APs */
+ movl (SL_capabilities + 8)(%eax), %esi
+ /* Skip over OS to SNIT */
+ movl (%eax), %ecx
+ addl %ecx, %eax
+ /* At SINIT-MLE size, get the AP wake MONITOR address */
+ movl (SL_rlp_wakeup_addr + 8)(%eax), %edi
+
+ /* Determine how to wake up the APs */
+ testl $(1 << TXT_SINIT_MLE_CAP_WAKE_MONITOR), %esi
+ jz .Lwake_getsec
+
+ /* Wake using MWAIT MONITOR */
+ movl $1, (%edi)
+ jmp .Laps_awake
+
+.Lwake_getsec:
+ /* Wake using GETSEC(WAKEUP) */
+ GETSEC $(SMX_X86_GETSEC_WAKEUP)
+
+.Laps_awake:
+ /*
+ * All of the APs are woken up and rendesvous in the relocated wake
+ * block starting at sl_txt_ap_wake_begin. Wait for all of them to
+ * halt.
+ */
+ pause
+ cmpl rva(sl_txt_cpu_count)(%ebx), %edx
+ jne .Laps_awake
+
+ popl %esi
+ ret
+SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_wake_aps)
+
+/* This is the beginning of the relocated AP wake code block */
+ .global sl_txt_ap_wake_begin
+sl_txt_ap_wake_begin:
+
+ /*
+ * Wait for NMI IPI in the relocated AP wake block which was provided
+ * and protected in the memory map by the prelaunch code. Leave all
+ * other interrupts masked since we do not expect anything but an NMI.
+ */
+ xorl %edx, %edx
+
+1:
+ hlt
+ testl %edx, %edx
+ jz 1b
+
+ /*
+ * This is the long absolute jump to the 32b Secure Launch protected
+ * mode stub code in the rmpiggy. The jump address will be fixed in
+ * the SMP boot code when the first AP is brought up. This whole area
+ * is provided and protected in the memory map by the prelaunch code.
+ */
+ .byte 0xea
+sl_ap_jmp_offset:
+ .long 0x00000000
+ .word __SL32_CS
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_int_ipi_wake)
+ movl $1, %edx
+
+ /* NMI context, just IRET */
+ iret
+SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_int_ipi_wake)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_int_reset)
+ TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_INV_AP_INTERRUPT)
+SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_int_reset)
+
+ .balign 8
+SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_idt_desc)
+ .word sl_ap_idt_end - sl_ap_idt - 1 /* Limit */
+ .long sl_ap_idt - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin /* Base */
+SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_idt_desc, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_idt_desc_end)
+
+ .balign 8
+SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_idt)
+ .rept NR_VECTORS
+ .word 0x0000 /* Offset 15 to 0 */
+ .word __SL32_CS /* Segment selector */
+ .word 0x8e00 /* Present, DPL=0, 32b Vector, Interrupt */
+ .word 0x0000 /* Offset 31 to 16 */
+ .endr
+SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_idt, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_idt_end)
+
+ .balign 8
+SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_gdt_desc)
+ .word sl_ap_gdt_end - sl_ap_gdt - 1
+ .long sl_ap_gdt - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin
+SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_gdt_desc, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_gdt_desc_end)
+
+ .balign 8
+SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_gdt)
+ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* NULL */
+ .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* __SL32_CS */
+ .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* __SL32_DS */
+SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_gdt, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_gdt_end)
+
+ /* Small stacks for BSP and APs to work with */
+ .balign 4
+SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_stacks)
+ .fill (TXT_MAX_CPUS * TXT_BOOT_STACK_SIZE), 1, 0
+SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_stacks, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_stacks_end)
+
+/* This is the end of the relocated AP wake code block */
+ .global sl_txt_ap_wake_end
+sl_txt_ap_wake_end:
+
+ .data
+ .balign 8
+SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_gdt_desc)
+ .word sl_gdt_end - sl_gdt - 1
+ .long sl_gdt - sl_gdt_desc
+SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_gdt_desc, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_gdt_desc_end)
+
+ .balign 8
+SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_gdt)
+ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* NULL */
+ .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* __SL32_CS */
+ .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* __SL32_DS */
+SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_gdt, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_gdt_end)
+
+ .balign 8
+SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_smx_rlp_mle_join)
+ .long sl_gdt_end - sl_gdt - 1 /* GDT limit */
+ .long 0x00000000 /* GDT base */
+ .long __SL32_CS /* Seg Sel - CS (DS, ES, SS = seg_sel+8) */
+ .long 0x00000000 /* Entry point physical address */
+SYM_DATA_END(sl_smx_rlp_mle_join)
+
+SYM_DATA(sl_cpu_type, .long 0x00000000)
+
+SYM_DATA(sl_mle_start, .long 0x00000000)
+
+SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_spin_lock, .long 0x00000000)
+
+SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_stack_index, .long 0x00000000)
+
+SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_cpu_count, .long 0x00000000)
+
+SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_ap_wake_block, .long 0x00000000)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index ecd3fd6..b665c51 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/hardirq.h>
#include <linux/suspend.h>
#include <linux/kbuild.h>
+#include <linux/slaunch.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/sigframe.h>
@@ -93,4 +94,22 @@ static void __used common(void)
OFFSET(TSS_sp0, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp0);
OFFSET(TSS_sp1, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp1);
OFFSET(TSS_sp2, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp2);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
+ BLANK();
+ OFFSET(SL_boot_params_addr, txt_os_mle_data, boot_params_addr);
+ OFFSET(SL_saved_misc_enable_msr, txt_os_mle_data, saved_misc_enable_msr);
+ OFFSET(SL_saved_bsp_mtrrs, txt_os_mle_data, saved_bsp_mtrrs);
+ OFFSET(SL_ap_wake_block, txt_os_mle_data, ap_wake_block);
+ OFFSET(SL_ap_wake_block_size, txt_os_mle_data, ap_wake_block_size);
+ OFFSET(SL_mle_scratch, txt_os_mle_data, mle_scratch);
+ OFFSET(SL_num_logical_procs, txt_bios_data, num_logical_procs);
+ OFFSET(SL_capabilities, txt_os_sinit_data, capabilities);
+ OFFSET(SL_mle_size, txt_os_sinit_data, mle_size);
+ OFFSET(SL_vtd_pmr_lo_base, txt_os_sinit_data, vtd_pmr_lo_base);
+ OFFSET(SL_vtd_pmr_lo_size, txt_os_sinit_data, vtd_pmr_lo_size);
+ OFFSET(SL_rlp_wakeup_addr, txt_sinit_mle_data, rlp_wakeup_addr);
+ OFFSET(SL_rlp_gdt_base, smx_rlp_mle_join, rlp_gdt_base);
+ OFFSET(SL_rlp_entry_point, smx_rlp_mle_join, rlp_entry_point);
+#endif
}
--
1.8.3.1
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