linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.10 123/146] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <20210621154919.218967475@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon, 21 Jun 2021 18:15:53 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Rik van Riel <riel@...riel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10 123/146] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>

commit d8778e393afa421f1f117471144f8ce6deb6953a upstream.

Both Intel and AMD consider it to be architecturally valid for XRSTOR to
fail with #PF but nonetheless change the register state.  The actual
conditions under which this might occur are unclear [1], but it seems
plausible that this might be triggered if one sibling thread unmaps a page
and invalidates the shared TLB while another sibling thread is executing
XRSTOR on the page in question.

__fpu__restore_sig() can execute XRSTOR while the hardware registers
are preserved on behalf of a different victim task (using the
fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx mechanism), and, in theory, XRSTOR could fail but
modify the registers.

If this happens, then there is a window in which __fpu__restore_sig()
could schedule out and the victim task could schedule back in without
reloading its own FPU registers. This would result in part of the FPU
state that __fpu__restore_sig() was attempting to load leaking into the
victim task's user-visible state.

Invalidate preserved FPU registers on XRSTOR failure to prevent this
situation from corrupting any state.

[1] Frequent readers of the errata lists might imagine "complex
    microarchitectural conditions".

Fixes: 1d731e731c4c ("x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to __fpu__restore_sig()")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@...riel.com>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608144345.758116583@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
@@ -369,6 +369,25 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __use
 			fpregs_unlock();
 			return 0;
 		}
+
+		/*
+		 * The above did an FPU restore operation, restricted to
+		 * the user portion of the registers, and failed, but the
+		 * microcode might have modified the FPU registers
+		 * nevertheless.
+		 *
+		 * If the FPU registers do not belong to current, then
+		 * invalidate the FPU register state otherwise the task might
+		 * preempt current and return to user space with corrupted
+		 * FPU registers.
+		 *
+		 * In case current owns the FPU registers then no further
+		 * action is required. The fixup below will handle it
+		 * correctly.
+		 */
+		if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+			__cpu_invalidate_fpregs_state();
+
 		fpregs_unlock();
 	} else {
 		/*