linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH RFC] KVM: nSVM: Fix L1 state corruption upon return from SMM

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Message-ID: <568fceb7f01d328f880af656bc79ead3eebdfc26.camel@redhat.com>
Date:   Wed, 23 Jun 2021 17:06:21 +0300
From:   Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
To:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Cathy Avery <cavery@...hat.com>,
        Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito <eesposit@...hat.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] KVM: nSVM: Fix L1 state corruption upon return from
 SMM

On Wed, 2021-06-23 at 15:21 +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 23/06/21 15:01, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> > I did some homework on this now and I would like to share few my
> > thoughts on this:
> > 
> > First of all my attention caught the way we intercept the #SMI
> > (this isn't 100% related to the bug but still worth talking about
> > IMHO)
> > 
> > A. Bare metal: Looks like SVM allows to intercept SMI, with
> > SVM_EXIT_SMI,
> >   with an intention of then entering the BIOS SMM handler manually
> > using the SMM_CTL msr.
> 
> ... or just using STGI, which is what happens for KVM.  This is in
> the 
> manual: "The hypervisor may respond to the #VMEXIT(SMI) by executing
> the 
> STGI instruction, which causes the pending SMI to be taken
> immediately".

Right, I didn't notice that, that makes sense.
Thanks for the explanation!

> 
> It *should* work for KVM to just not intercept SMI, but it adds more 
> complexity for no particular gain.

It would be nice to do so to increase testing coverage of running
a nested KVM. I'll add a hack for that in my nested kernel.

> 
> >   On bare metal we do set the INTERCEPT_SMI but we emulate the exit
> > as a nop.
> >   I guess on bare metal there are some undocumented bits that BIOS
> > set which
> >   make the CPU to ignore that SMI intercept and still take the #SMI
> > handler,
> >   normally but I wonder if we could still break some motherboard
> >   code due to that.
> > 
> > B. Nested: If #SMI is intercepted, then it causes nested VMEXIT.
> >   Since KVM does enable SMI intercept, when it runs nested it means
> > that all SMIs
> >   that nested KVM gets are emulated as NOP, and L1's SMI handler is
> > not run.
> 
> No, this is incorrect.  Note that svm_check_nested_events does not
> clear 
> smi_pending the way vmx_check_nested_events does it for nmi_pending. 
> So 
> the interrupt is still there and will be injected on the next STGI.
I din't check the code, but just assumed that same issue should be
present. Now it makes sense. I totally forgot about STGI.


Thanks,
	Best regards,
		Maxim Levitsky

> 
> Paolo
> 
> > 
> > About the issue that was fixed in this patch. Let me try to
> > understand how
> > it would work on bare metal:
> > 
> > 1. A guest is entered. Host state is saved to VM_HSAVE_PA area (or
> > stashed somewhere
> >    in the CPU)
> > 
> > 2. #SMI (without intercept) happens
> > 
> > 3. CPU has to exit SVM, and start running the host SMI handler, it
> > loads the SMM
> >      state without touching the VM_HSAVE_PA runs the SMI handler,
> > then once it RSMs,
> >      it restores the guest state from SMM area and continues the
> > guest
> > 
> > 4. Once a normal VMexit happens, the host state is restored from
> > VM_HSAVE_PA
> > 
> > So host state indeed can't be saved to VMC01.
> > 
> > I to be honest think would prefer not to use the L1's hsave area
> > but rather add back our
> > 'hsave' in KVM and store there the L1 host state on the nested
> > entry always.
> > 
> > This way we will avoid touching the vmcb01 at all and both solve
> > the issue and
> > reduce code complexity.
> > (copying of L1 host state to what basically is L1 guest state area
> > and back
> > even has a comment to explain why it (was) possible to do so.
> > (before you discovered that this doesn't work with SMM).
> > 
> > Thanks again for fixing this bug!
> > 
> > Best regards,
> >         Maxim Levitsky
> > 
>