lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2021 09:31:53 +0800 From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com> To: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com> Cc: Like Xu <like.xu@...ux.intel.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>, Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>, Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@...el.com>, kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [RESEND PATCH v4 03/10] KVM: vmx/pmu: Add MSR_ARCH_LBR_DEPTH emulation for Arch LBR On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 11:03:39AM -0700, Jim Mattson wrote: > On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 1:16 AM Like Xu <like.xu@...ux.intel.com> wrote: > > > > The number of Arch LBR entries available for recording operations > > is dictated by the value in MSR_ARCH_LBR_DEPTH.DEPTH. The supported > > LBR depth values can be found in CPUID.(EAX=01CH, ECX=0):EAX[7:0] > > and for each bit "n" set in this field, the MSR_ARCH_LBR_DEPTH.DEPTH > > value of "8*(n+1)" is supported. > > > > On a guest write to MSR_ARCH_LBR_DEPTH, all LBR entries are reset to 0. > > KVM emulates the reset behavior by introducing lbr_desc->arch_lbr_reset. > > KVM writes the guest requested value to the native ARCH_LBR_DEPTH MSR > > (this is safe because the two values will be the same) when the Arch LBR > > records MSRs are pass-through to the guest. > > > > Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@...ux.intel.com> > > --- > > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 3 +++ > > 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c > > index 9efc1a6b8693..d9c9cb6c9a4b 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c > > @@ -220,6 +220,9 @@ static bool intel_is_valid_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr) > > case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL: > > ret = pmu->version > 1; > > break; > > + case MSR_ARCH_LBR_DEPTH: > > + ret = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR); > > + break; > > This doesn't seem like a very safe test, since userspace can provide > whatever CPUID tables it likes. You should definitely think about > hardening this code against a malicious userspace. > > When you add a new guest MSR, it should be enumerated by > KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST. Otherwise, userspace will not save/restore the > MSR value on suspend/resume. Thanks Jim! Will improve this part in next version.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists