linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] ima: Support euid keyword for buffer measurement

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Message-ID: <2996f5ae-d76f-5fc9-bf90-857d4fc6644a@linux.microsoft.com>
Date:   Tue, 6 Jul 2021 12:29:47 -0700
From:   Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>
To:     Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>, zohar@...ux.ibm.com
Cc:     tusharsu@...ux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: Support euid keyword for buffer measurement

On 7/5/2021 4:56 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:

Hi Roberto,

> This patch makes the 'euid' keyword available for buffer measurement rules,
> in the same way as for other rules. Currently, there is only support for
> the 'uid' keyword.
> 
> With this change, buffer measurement (or non-measurement) can depend also
> on the process effective UID.

Who (kernel component) will be using this?

Maybe you could make this change as part of the patch set in which the 
above "euid" support will be used.

thanks,
  -lakshmi

> 
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> ---
>   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 +++++++++++-
>   1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index fd5d46e511f1..fdaa030fb04b 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -480,6 +480,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
>   	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
>   		return false;
>   
> +	if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
> +		if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
> +			if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid)
> +			    && !rule->uid_op(cred->suid, rule->uid)
> +			    && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
> +				return false;
> +		} else if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid))
> +			return false;
> +	}
> +
>   	switch (rule->func) {
>   	case KEY_CHECK:
>   		if (!rule->keyrings)
> @@ -1153,7 +1163,7 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>   		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
>   			return false;
>   
> -		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
> +		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
>   				     IMA_LABEL))
>   			return false;
>   
>