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Message-ID: <5592d8ff-e2c3-6474-4a10-96abe1962d6f@amd.com>
Date:   Mon, 12 Jul 2021 11:11:54 -0500
From:   Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     brijesh.singh@....com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, tony.luck@...el.com,
        npmccallum@...hat.com, brijesh.ksingh@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the
 RMP fault for user address



On 7/12/21 11:00 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 7/12/21 8:43 AM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>>>> +    /*
>>>> +     * The backing page level is higher than the RMP page level,
>>>> request
>>>> +     * to split the page.
>>>> +     */
>>>> +    if (level > rmp_level)
>>>> +        return RMP_FAULT_PAGE_SPLIT;
>>>
>>> This can theoretically trigger on a hugetlbfs page.  Right?
>>
>> Yes, theoretically.
>>
>> In the current implementation, the VMM is enlightened to not use the
>> hugetlbfs for backing page when creating the SEV-SNP guests.
> 
> "The VMM"?

I was meaning a userspace qemu.

> 
> We try to write kernel code so that it "works" and doesn't do unexpected
> things with whatever userspace might throw at it.  This seems to be
> written with an assumption that no VMM will ever use hugetlbfs with SEV-SNP.
> 
> That worries me.  Not only because someone is sure to try it, but it's
> the kind of assumption that an attacker or a fuzzer might try.
> 
> Could you please test this kernel code in practice with hugetblfs?

Yes, I will make sure that hugetlbfs path is tested in non-RFC version.


> 
>>> I also suspect you can just set VM_FAULT_SIGBUS and let the do_sigbus()
>>> call later on in the function do its work.
>>>>    +static int handle_split_page_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT))
>>>> +        return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
>>>> +
>>>> +    __split_huge_pmd(vmf->vma, vmf->pmd, vmf->address, false, NULL);
>>>> +    return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>
>>> What will this do when you hand it a hugetlbfs page?
>>
>> VMM is updated to not use the hugetlbfs when creating SEV-SNP guests.
>> So, we should not run into it.
> 
> Please fix this code to handle hugetlbfs along with any other non-THP
> source of level>0 mappings.  DAX comes to mind.  "Handle" can mean
> rejecting these.  You don't have to find some way to split them and make
> the VM work, just fail safely, ideally as early as possible.
> 
> To me, this is a fundamental requirement before this code can be accepted.

Understood, if userspace decided to use the hugetlbfs backing pages then 
I believe earliest we can detect is when we go about adding the pages in 
the RMP table. I'll add a check, and fail the page state change.

-Brijesh

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