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Message-ID: <CAA03e5Fc6zbLGmjnSZRWH6K+qbBF4JKR+=JMmEmGPPXfAs4mmw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 13 Jul 2021 16:24:28 -0700
From:   Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>
To:     Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
Cc:     kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, Lars Bull <larsbull@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] KVM, SEV: Add support for SEV local migration

On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 9:59 AM Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> Local migration provides a low-cost mechanism for userspace VMM upgrades.
> It is an alternative to traditional (i.e., remote) live migration. Whereas
> remote migration handles move a guest to a new host, local migration only
> handles moving a guest to a new userspace VMM within a host.
>
> For SEV to work with local migration, contents of the SEV info struct
> such as the ASID (used to index the encryption key in the AMD SP) and
> the list
> of memory regions need to be transferred to the target VM. Adds
> commands for sending and receiving the sev info.
>
> To avoid exposing this internal state to userspace and prevent other
> processes from importing state they shouldn't have access to, the send
> returns a token to userspace that is handed off to the target VM. The
> target passes in this token to receive the sent state. The token is only
> valid for one-time use. Functionality on the source becomes limited
> after
> send has been performed. If the source is destroyed before the target
> has
> received, the token becomes invalid.
>
> The target is expected to be initialized (sev_guest_init), but not
> launched
> state (sev_launch_start) when performing receive. Once the target has
> received, it will be in a launched state and will not need to perform
> the
> typical SEV launch commands.
>
> Co-developed-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
> Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@...hat.com>
> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>
> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>
> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
> Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
>
> ---
>  .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst        |  43 +++
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c                        | 270 +++++++++++++++++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h                        |   1 +
>  include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                      |  12 +
>  4 files changed, 317 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> index 5ec8a1902e15..0f9030e3dcfe 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> @@ -427,6 +427,49 @@ issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution.
>
>  Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
>
> +10. KVM_SEV_LOCAL_SEND
> +----------------------------------
> +
> +The KVM_SEV_LOCAL_SEND command is used to stage the VM's SEV info
> +for the purposes of migrating memory to a new local VM while using the same SEV
> +key. If the source VM is destroyed before the staged info has been received by
> +the target, the info is lost. Once the info has been staged, only commands
> +KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT, and KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT
> +can be used by the source.
> +
> +Parameters (out): struct kvm_sev_local_send
> +
> +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
> +
> +::
> +
> +    struct kvm_sev_local_send {
> +        __u64 info_token;    /* token referencing the staged info */
> +    };
> +
> +11. KVM_SEV_LOCAL_RECEIVE
> +-------------------------------------
> +
> +The KVM_SEV_LOCAL_RECEIVE command is used to transfer staged SEV
> +info to a target VM from some source VM. SEV on the target VM should be active
> +when receive is performed, but not yet launched and without any pinned memory.
> +The launch commands should be skipped after receive because they should have
> +already been performed on the source.
> +
> +Parameters (in/out): struct kvm_sev_local_receive
> +
> +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
> +
> +::
> +
> +    struct kvm_sev_local_receive {
> +        __u64 info_token;    /* token referencing the staged info */
> +        __u32 handle;        /* guest handle */
> +    };
> +
> +On success, the 'handle' field contains the handle for this SEV guest.
> +
> +
>  References
>  ==========
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 5af46ff6ec48..7c33ad2b910d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
>  #include <linux/psp-sev.h>
>  #include <linux/pagemap.h>
>  #include <linux/swap.h>
> +#include <linux/random.h>
>  #include <linux/misc_cgroup.h>
>  #include <linux/processor.h>
>  #include <linux/trace_events.h>
> @@ -57,6 +58,8 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
>  #define sev_es_enabled false
>  #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
>
> +#define MAX_RAND_RETRY    3
> +
>  static u8 sev_enc_bit;
>  static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
>  static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
> @@ -74,6 +77,22 @@ struct enc_region {
>         unsigned long size;
>  };
>
> +struct sev_info_migration_node {
> +       struct hlist_node hnode;
> +       u64 token;
> +       bool valid;
> +
> +       unsigned int asid;
> +       unsigned int handle;
> +       unsigned long pages_locked;
> +       struct list_head regions_list;
> +       struct misc_cg *misc_cg;
> +};
> +
> +#define SEV_INFO_MIGRATION_HASH_BITS    7
> +static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(sev_info_migration_hash, SEV_INFO_MIGRATION_HASH_BITS);
> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
> +
>  /* Called with the sev_bitmap_lock held, or on shutdown  */
>  static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
>  {
> @@ -1094,6 +1113,185 @@ static int sev_get_attestation_report(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>         return ret;
>  }
>
> +static struct sev_info_migration_node *find_migration_info(unsigned long token)
> +{
> +       struct sev_info_migration_node *entry;
> +
> +       hash_for_each_possible(sev_info_migration_hash, entry, hnode, token) {
> +               if (entry->token == token)
> +                       return entry;
> +       }
> +
> +       return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Places @entry into the |sev_info_migration_hash|. Returns 0 if successful
> + * and ownership of @entry is transferred to the hashmap.
> + */
> +static int place_migration_node(struct sev_info_migration_node *entry)
> +{
> +       u64 token = 0;
> +       unsigned int retries;
> +       int ret = -EFAULT;
> +
> +       /*
> +        * Generate a token associated with this VM's SEV info that userspace
> +        * can use to import on the other side. We use 0 to indicate a not-
> +        * present token. The token cannot collide with other existing ones, so
> +        * reroll a few times until we get a valid token. In the unlikely event
> +        * we're having trouble generating a unique token, give up and let
> +        * userspace retry if it needs to.
> +        */
> +       spin_lock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
> +       for (retries = 0; retries < MAX_RAND_RETRY; retries++)  {
> +               get_random_bytes((void *)&token, sizeof(token));
> +
> +               if (find_migration_info(token))
> +                       continue;
> +
> +               entry->token = token;
> +               entry->valid = true;
> +
> +               hash_add(sev_info_migration_hash, &entry->hnode, token);
> +               ret = 0;
> +               goto out;
> +       }
> +
> +out:
> +       spin_unlock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
> +       return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_local_send(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> +{
> +       struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +       struct sev_info_migration_node *entry;
> +       struct kvm_sev_local_send params;
> +       u64 token;
> +       int ret = -EFAULT;
> +
> +       if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> +               return -ENOTTY;
> +
> +       if (sev->es_active)
> +               return -EPERM;
> +
> +       if (sev->info_token != 0)
> +               return -EEXIST;
> +
> +       if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
> +                          sizeof(params)))
> +               return -EFAULT;
> +
> +       entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
> +       if (!entry)
> +               return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +       entry->asid = sev->asid;
> +       entry->handle = sev->handle;
> +       entry->pages_locked = sev->pages_locked;
> +       entry->misc_cg = sev->misc_cg;
> +
> +       INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->regions_list);
> +       list_replace_init(&sev->regions_list, &entry->regions_list);
> +
> +       if (place_migration_node(entry))
> +               goto e_listdel;
> +
> +       token = entry->token;
> +
> +       params.info_token = token;
> +       if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params,
> +                        sizeof(params)))
> +               goto e_hashdel;
> +
> +       sev->info_token = token;
> +
> +       return 0;
> +
> +e_hashdel:
> +       spin_lock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
> +       hash_del(&entry->hnode);
> +       spin_unlock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
> +
> +e_listdel:
> +       list_replace_init(&entry->regions_list, &sev->regions_list);
> +
> +       kfree(entry);
> +
> +       return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_local_receive(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> +{
> +       struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +       struct sev_info_migration_node *entry;
> +       struct kvm_sev_local_receive params;
> +       struct kvm_sev_info old_info;
> +
> +       if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> +               return -ENOTTY;
> +
> +       if (sev->es_active)
> +               return -EPERM;
> +
> +       if (sev->handle != 0)
> +               return -EPERM;
> +
> +       if (!list_empty(&sev->regions_list))
> +               return -EPERM;
> +
> +       if (copy_from_user(&params,
> +                          (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
> +                          sizeof(params)))
> +               return -EFAULT;
> +
> +       spin_lock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
> +       entry = find_migration_info(params.info_token);
> +       if (!entry || !entry->valid)
> +               goto err_unlock;
> +
> +       memcpy(&old_info, sev, sizeof(old_info));
> +
> +       /*
> +        * The source VM always frees @entry On the target we simply
> +        * mark the token as invalid to notify the source the sev info
> +        * has been moved successfully.
> +        */
> +       entry->valid = false;
> +       sev->active = true;
> +       sev->asid = entry->asid;
> +       sev->handle = entry->handle;
> +       sev->pages_locked = entry->pages_locked;
> +       sev->misc_cg = entry->misc_cg;
> +
> +       INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
> +       list_replace_init(&entry->regions_list, &sev->regions_list);
> +
> +       spin_unlock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
> +
> +       params.handle = sev->handle;
> +
> +       if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params,
> +                        sizeof(params)))
> +               goto err_unwind;
> +
> +       sev_asid_free(&old_info);
> +       return 0;
> +
> +err_unwind:
> +       spin_lock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
> +       list_replace_init(&sev->regions_list, &entry->regions_list);
> +       entry->valid = true;
> +       memcpy(sev, &old_info, sizeof(*sev));
> +
> +err_unlock:
> +       spin_unlock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
> +
> +       return -EFAULT;
> +}
> +
>  /* Userspace wants to query session length. */
>  static int
>  __sev_send_start_query_session_length(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
> @@ -1513,6 +1711,18 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>                 goto out;
>         }
>
> +       /*
> +        * If this VM has started exporting its SEV contents to another VM,
> +        * it's not allowed to do any more SEV operations that may modify the
> +        * SEV state.
> +        */
> +       if (to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.info_token &&
> +           sev_cmd.id != KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT &&
> +           sev_cmd.id != KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT) {
> +               r = -EPERM;
> +               goto out;
> +       }
> +
>         switch (sev_cmd.id) {
>         case KVM_SEV_ES_INIT:
>                 if (!sev_es_enabled) {
> @@ -1553,6 +1763,12 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>         case KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
>                 r = sev_get_attestation_report(kvm, &sev_cmd);
>                 break;
> +       case KVM_SEV_LOCAL_SEND:
> +               r = sev_local_send(kvm, &sev_cmd);
> +               break;
> +       case KVM_SEV_LOCAL_RECEIVE:
> +               r = sev_local_receive(kvm, &sev_cmd);
> +               break;
>         case KVM_SEV_SEND_START:
>                 r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
>                 break;
> @@ -1786,6 +2002,8 @@ static void __unregister_region_list_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
>  void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
>  {
>         struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +       struct sev_info_migration_node *entry = NULL;
> +       bool info_migrated = false;
>
>         if (!sev_guest(kvm))
>                 return;
> @@ -1796,25 +2014,59 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
>                 return;
>         }
>
> +       /*
> +        * If userspace has requested that we migrate the SEV info to a new VM,
> +        * then we own and must remove an entry node in the tracking data
> +        * structure. Whether we clean up the data in our SEV info struct and
> +        * entry node depends on whether userspace has done the migration,
> +        * which transfers ownership to a new VM. We can identify that
> +        * migration has occurred by checking if the node is marked invalid.
> +        */
> +       if (sev->info_token != 0) {
> +               spin_lock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
> +               entry = find_migration_info(sev->info_token);
> +               if (entry) {
> +                       info_migrated = !entry->valid;
> +                       hash_del(&entry->hnode);
> +               } else
> +                       WARN(1,
> +                            "SEV VM was marked for export, but does not have associated export node.\n");
> +               spin_unlock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
> +       }
> +
>         mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
>
>         /*
> -        * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
> -        * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
> -        * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
> +        * Adding memory regions after a local send has started
> +        * is dangerous.
>          */
> -       wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
> +       if (sev->info_token != 0 && !list_empty(&sev->regions_list)) {
> +               WARN(1,
> +                    "Source SEV regions list non-empty after export request. List is not expected to be modified after export request.\n");
> +               __unregister_region_list_locked(kvm, &sev->regions_list);
> +       }
>
>         /*
> -        * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
> -        * then lets unpin all the registered memory.
> +        * If userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory
> +        * regions then lets unpin all the registered memory.
>          */
> -       __unregister_region_list_locked(kvm, &sev->regions_list);
> +       if (entry)
> +               __unregister_region_list_locked(kvm, &entry->regions_list);
>
>         mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
>
> -       sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
> -       sev_asid_free(sev);
> +       /*
> +        * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
> +        * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
> +        * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
> +        */
> +       wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
> +       if (!info_migrated) {
> +               sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
> +               sev_asid_free(sev);
> +       }
> +
> +       kfree(entry);
>  }
>
>  void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 70419e417c0d..1ae8fe623c70 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
>         u64 ap_jump_table;      /* SEV-ES AP Jump Table address */
>         struct kvm *enc_context_owner; /* Owner of copied encryption context */
>         struct misc_cg *misc_cg; /* For misc cgroup accounting */
> +       u64 info_token; /* Token for SEV info local migration */
>  };
>
>  struct kvm_svm {
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> index 79d9c44d1ad7..b317d4b2507d 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> @@ -1678,6 +1678,9 @@ enum sev_cmd_id {
>         KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT,
>         /* Guest Migration Extension */
>         KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL,
> +       /* Local migration commands */
> +       KVM_SEV_LOCAL_SEND,
> +       KVM_SEV_LOCAL_RECEIVE,
>
>         KVM_SEV_NR_MAX,
>  };
> @@ -1775,6 +1778,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data {
>         __u32 trans_len;
>  };
>
> +struct kvm_sev_local_send {
> +       __u64 info_token;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_local_receive {
> +       __u64 info_token;
> +       __u32 handle;
> +};
> +
>  #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU    (1 << 0)
>  #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3         (1 << 1)
>  #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX       (1 << 2)
> --
> 2.32.0.288.g62a8d224e6-goog

Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>

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