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Date:   Tue, 13 Jul 2021 19:57:40 -0400
From:   Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad@...nok.org>
To:     Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>
Cc:     Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@...onical.com>, will@...nel.org,
        "open list:AMD IOMMU (AMD-VI)" <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] iommu/amd: Enable swiotlb if any device supports iommu
 v2 and uses identity mapping

On Thu, Jul 08, 2021 at 03:43:42PM +0100, Robin Murphy wrote:
> On 2021-07-08 14:57, Kai-Heng Feng wrote:
> > On Thu, Jul 8, 2021 at 6:18 PM Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com> wrote:
> > > 
> > > On 2021-07-08 10:28, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Jul 08, 2021 at 03:42:32PM +0800, Kai-Heng Feng wrote:
> > > > > @@ -344,6 +344,9 @@ static int iommu_init_device(struct device *dev)
> > > > > 
> > > > >               iommu = amd_iommu_rlookup_table[dev_data->devid];
> > > > >               dev_data->iommu_v2 = iommu->is_iommu_v2;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +            if (dev_data->iommu_v2)
> > > > > +                    swiotlb = 1;
> > > > 
> > > > This looks like the big hammer, as it will affect all other systems
> > > > where the AMD GPUs are in their own group.
> > > > 
> > > > What is needed here is an explicit check whether a non-iommu-v2 device
> > > > is direct-mapped because it shares a group with the GPU, and only enable
> > > > swiotlb in this case.
> > > 
> > > Right, it's basically about whether any DMA-limited device might at any
> > > time end up in an IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY domain. And given the
> > > possibility of device hotplug and the user being silly with the sysfs
> > > interface, I don't think we can categorically determine that at boot time.
> > > 
> > > Also note that Intel systems are likely to be similarly affected (in
> > > fact intel-iommu doesn't even have the iommu_default_passthough() check
> > > so it's probably even easier to blow up).
> > 
> > swiotlb is enabled by pci_swiotlb_detect_4gb() and intel-iommu doesn't
> > disable it.
> 
> Oh, right... I did say I found this dance hard to follow. Clearly I
> shouldn't have trusted what I thought I remembered from looking at it
> yesterday :)
> 
> Also not helped by the fact that it sets iommu_detected which *does* disable
> SWIOTLB, but only on IA-64.
> 
> > I wonder if we can take the same approach in amd-iommu?
> 
> Certainly if there's a precedent for leaving SWIOTLB enabled even if it
> *might* be redundant, that seems like the easiest option (it's what we do on
> arm64 too, but then we have system topologies where some devices may not be
> behind IOMMUs even when others are). More fun would be to try to bring it up
> at the first sign of IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY if it was disabled previously,
> but I don't have the highest hope of that being practical.

<scratches his head>
It is kind of silly to enable SWIOTLB which will just eat 64MB of memory
"just in case".

The SWIOTLB does have support to do late initialization (xen-pcifront
does that for example - so if you add devices that can't do 64-bit it
will allocate something like 4MB).

Would that be a better choice going forward - that is allocate this
under those conditions?
> 
> Robin.

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