linux-kernel - Re: [RFC v2] /dev/iommu uAPI proposal

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20210713102607.3a886fee.alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Date:   Tue, 13 Jul 2021 10:26:07 -0600
From:   Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
To:     Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>
Cc:     "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@...el.com>,
        Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@...aro.org>,
        David Gibson <david@...son.dropbear.id.au>,
        Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
        "parav@...lanox.com" <parav@...lanox.com>,
        "Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult" <lkml@...ux.net>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Shenming Lu <lushenming@...wei.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Eric Auger <eric.auger@...hat.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        "Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
        "Liu, Yi L" <yi.l.liu@...el.com>, "Wu, Hao" <hao.wu@...el.com>,
        "Jiang, Dave" <dave.jiang@...el.com>,
        Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Kirti Wankhede <kwankhede@...dia.com>,
        Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>,
        "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        "iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org" <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2] /dev/iommu uAPI proposal

On Tue, 13 Jul 2021 09:55:03 -0300
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Jul 12, 2021 at 11:56:24PM +0000, Tian, Kevin wrote:
> 
> > Maybe I misunderstood your question. Are you specifically worried
> > about establishing the security context for a mdev vs. for its
> > parent?  
> 
> The way to think about the cookie, and the device bind/attach in
> general, is as taking control of a portion of the IOMMU routing:
> 
>  - RID
>  - RID + PASID
>  - "software"
> 
> For the first two there can be only one device attachment per value so
> the cookie is unambiguous.
> 
> For "software" the iommu layer has little to do with this - everything
> is constructed outside by the mdev. If the mdev wishes to communicate
> on /dev/iommu using the cookie then it has to do so using some iommufd
> api and we can convay the proper device at that point.
> 
> Kevin didn't show it, but along side the PCI attaches:
> 
>         struct iommu_attach_data * iommu_pci_device_attach(
>                 struct iommu_dev *dev, struct pci_device *pdev,
>                 u32 ioasid);
> 
> There would also be a software attach for mdev:
> 
>         struct iommu_attach_data * iommu_sw_device_attach(
>                 struct iommu_dev *dev, struct device *pdev, u32 ioasid);
> 
> Which does not connect anything to the iommu layer.
> 
> It would have to return something that allows querying the IO page
> table, and the mdev would use that API instead of vfio_pin_pages().


Quoting this proposal again:

> 1)  A successful binding call for the first device in the group creates 
>     the security context for the entire group, by:
> 
>     * Verifying group viability in a similar way as VFIO does;
> 
>     * Calling IOMMU-API to move the group into a block-dma state,
>       which makes all devices in the group attached to an block-dma
>       domain with an empty I/O page table;
> 
>     VFIO should not allow the user to mmap the MMIO bar of the bound
>     device until the binding call succeeds.

The attach step is irrelevant to my question, the bind step is where
the device/group gets into a secure state for device access.

So for IGD we have two scenarios, direct assignment and software mdevs.

AIUI the operation of VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMU_FD looks like this:

	iommu_ctx = iommu_ctx_fdget(iommu_fd);

	mdev = mdev_from_dev(vdev->dev);
	dev = mdev ? mdev_parent_dev(mdev) : vdev->dev;

	iommu_dev = iommu_register_device(iommu_ctx, dev, cookie);

In either case, this last line is either registering the IGD itself
(ie. the struct device representing PCI device 0000:00:02.0) or the
parent of the GVT-g mdev (ie. the struct device representing PCI device
0000:00:02.0).  They're the same!  AIUI, the cookie is simply an
arbitrary user generated value which they'll use to refer to this
device via the iommu_fd uAPI.

So what magic is iommu_register_device() doing to infer my intentions
as to whether I'm asking for the IGD RID to be isolated or I'm only
creating a software context for an mdev?  Thanks,

Alex