| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 06:35:25 -0700
From: Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, tony.luck@...el.com,
npmccallum@...hat.com, brijesh.ksingh@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 20/40] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and
VMCB memory allocation SNP safe
On Wed, Jul 7, 2021 at 11:38 AM Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com> wrote:
>
> When SEV-SNP is globally enabled on a system, the VMRUN instruction
> performs additional security checks on AVIC backing, VMSA, and VMCB page.
> On a successful VMRUN, these pages are marked "in-use" by the
> hardware in the RMP entry, and any attempt to modify the RMP entry for
> these pages will result in page-fault (RMP violation check).
>
> While performing the RMP check, hardware will try to create a 2MB TLB
> entry for the large page accesses. When it does this, it first reads
> the RMP for the base of 2MB region and verifies that all this memory is
> safe. If AVIC backing, VMSA, and VMCB memory happen to be the base of
> 2MB region, then RMP check will fail because of the "in-use" marking for
> the base entry of this 2MB region.
>
> e.g.
>
> 1. A VMCB was allocated on 2MB-aligned address.
> 2. The VMRUN instruction marks this RMP entry as "in-use".
> 3. Another process allocated some other page of memory that happened to be
> within the same 2MB region.
> 4. That process tried to write its page using physmap.
>
> If the physmap entry in step #4 uses a large (1G/2M) page, then the
> hardware will attempt to create a 2M TLB entry. The hardware will find
> that the "in-use" bit is set in the RMP entry (because it was a
> VMCB page) and will cause an RMP violation check.
>
> See APM2 section 15.36.12 for more information on VMRUN checks when
> SEV-SNP is globally active.
>
> A generic allocator can return a page which are 2M aligned and will not
> be safe to be used when SEV-SNP is globally enabled. Add a
> snp_safe_alloc_page() helper that can be used for allocating the
> SNP safe memory. The helper allocated 2 pages and splits them into order-1
> allocation. It frees one page and keeps one of the page which is not
> 2M aligned.
>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Co-developed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>
The original version of this patch had this tag. I think it got
dropped on accident.
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 5 ++++-
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +
> 5 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 55efbacfc244..188110ab2c02 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1383,6 +1383,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
> int (*complete_emulated_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err);
>
> void (*vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
> + void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> };
>
> struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> index c0ebef560bd1..d4c77f66d7d5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> @@ -2441,7 +2441,10 @@ int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int timer_advance_ns)
>
> vcpu->arch.apic = apic;
>
> - apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (kvm_x86_ops.alloc_apic_backing_page)
> + apic->regs = kvm_x86_ops.alloc_apic_backing_page(vcpu);
> + else
> + apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> if (!apic->regs) {
> printk(KERN_ERR "malloc apic regs error for vcpu %x\n",
> vcpu->vcpu_id);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index b8505710c36b..411ed72f63af 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -2692,3 +2692,30 @@ void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
> break;
> }
> }
> +
> +struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + unsigned long pfn;
> + struct page *p;
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
> + return alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> +
> + p = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO, 1);
> + if (!p)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + /* split the page order */
> + split_page(p, 1);
> +
> + /* Find a non-2M aligned page */
> + pfn = page_to_pfn(p);
> + if (IS_ALIGNED(__pfn_to_phys(pfn), PMD_SIZE)) {
> + pfn++;
> + __free_page(p);
> + } else {
> + __free_page(pfn_to_page(pfn + 1));
> + }
> +
> + return pfn_to_page(pfn);
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 2acf187a3100..a7adf6ca1713 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ static int svm_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> svm = to_svm(vcpu);
>
> err = -ENOMEM;
> - vmcb01_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> + vmcb01_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
> if (!vmcb01_page)
> goto out;
>
> @@ -1345,7 +1345,7 @@ static int svm_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
> * the encrypted register state of the guest.
> */
> - vmsa_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> + vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
> if (!vmsa_page)
> goto error_free_vmcb_page;
>
> @@ -4439,6 +4439,16 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static void *svm_alloc_apic_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + struct page *page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
> +
> + if (!page)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + return page_address(page);
> +}
> +
> static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .hardware_unsetup = svm_hardware_teardown,
> .hardware_enable = svm_hardware_enable,
> @@ -4564,6 +4574,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .complete_emulated_msr = svm_complete_emulated_msr,
>
> .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
> +
> + .alloc_apic_backing_page = svm_alloc_apic_backing_page,
> };
>
> static struct kvm_x86_init_ops svm_init_ops __initdata = {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 5f874168551b..1175edb02d33 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -554,6 +554,7 @@ void sev_es_create_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
> void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
> void sev_es_prepare_guest_switch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned int cpu);
> void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
> +struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>
> /* vmenter.S */
>
> --
> 2.17.1
>
>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists