linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] s390x: KVM: accept STSI for CPU topology information

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Date:   Thu, 15 Jul 2021 13:37:04 +0200
From:   Pierre Morel <pmorel@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
        Cornelia Huck <cohuck@...hat.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        borntraeger@...ibm.com, frankja@...ux.ibm.com, thuth@...hat.com,
        imbrenda@...ux.ibm.com, hca@...ux.ibm.com, gor@...ux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] s390x: KVM: accept STSI for CPU topology
 information



On 7/15/21 12:19 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 15.07.21 12:16, Cornelia Huck wrote:
>> On Thu, Jul 15 2021, David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 15.07.21 11:30, Cornelia Huck wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Jul 15 2021, David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 14.07.21 17:25, Pierre Morel wrote:
>>>>>> STSI(15.1.x) gives information on the CPU configuration topology.
>>>>>> Let's accept the interception of STSI with the function code 15 and
>>>>>> let the userland part of the hypervisor handle it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@...ux.ibm.com>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>     arch/s390/kvm/priv.c | 11 ++++++++++-
>>>>>>     1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c b/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c
>>>>>> index 9928f785c677..4ab5f8b7780e 100644
>>>>>> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c
>>>>>> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c
>>>>>> @@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ static int handle_stsi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>>>>         if (vcpu->arch.sie_block->gpsw.mask & PSW_MASK_PSTATE)
>>>>>>             return kvm_s390_inject_program_int(vcpu, 
>>>>>> PGM_PRIVILEGED_OP);
>>>>>> -    if (fc > 3) {
>>>>>> +    if (fc > 3 && fc != 15) {
>>>>>>             kvm_s390_set_psw_cc(vcpu, 3);
>>>>>>             return 0;
>>>>>>         }
>>>>>> @@ -893,6 +893,15 @@ static int handle_stsi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>>>>                 goto out_no_data;
>>>>>>             handle_stsi_3_2_2(vcpu, (void *) mem);
>>>>>>             break;
>>>>>> +    case 15:
>>>>>> +        if (sel1 != 1 || sel2 < 2 || sel2 > 6)
>>>>>> +            goto out_no_data;
>>>>>> +        if (vcpu->kvm->arch.user_stsi) {
>>>>>> +            insert_stsi_usr_data(vcpu, operand2, ar, fc, sel1, 
>>>>>> sel2);
>>>>>> +            return -EREMOTE;
>>>>
>>>> This bypasses the trace event further down.
>>>>
>>>>>> +        }
>>>>>> +        kvm_s390_set_psw_cc(vcpu, 3);
>>>>>> +        return 0;
>>>>>>         }
>>>>>>         if (kvm_s390_pv_cpu_is_protected(vcpu)) {
>>>>>>             memcpy((void *)sida_origin(vcpu->arch.sie_block), 
>>>>>> (void *)mem,
>>>>> 3. User space awareness
>>>>>
>>>>> How can user space identify that we actually forward these intercepts?
>>>>> How can it enable them? The old KVM_CAP_S390_USER_STSI capability
>>>>> is not sufficient.
>>>>
>>>> Why do you think that it is not sufficient? USER_STSI basically says
>>>> "you may get an exit that tells you about a buffer to fill in some more
>>>> data for a stsi command, and we also tell you which call". If userspace
>>>> does not know what to add for a certain call, it is free to just do
>>>> nothing, and if it does not get some calls it would support, that 
>>>> should
>>>> not be a problem, either?
>>>
>>> If you migrate your VM from machine a to machine b, from kernel a to
>>> kernel b, and kernel b does not trigger exits to user space for fc=15,
>>> how could QEMU spot and catch the different capabilities to make sure
>>> the guest can continue using the feature?
>>
>> Wouldn't that imply that the USER_STSI feature, in the function-agnostic
>> way it is documented, was broken from the start?
> 
> Likely. We should have forwarded everything to user space most probably 
> and not try being smart in the kernel.
> 
>>
>> Hm. Maybe we need some kind of facility where userspace can query the
>> kernel and gets a list of the stsi subcodes it may get exits for, and
>> possibly fail to start the migration. Having a new capability to be
>> enabled for every new subcode feels like overkill. I don't think we can
>> pass a payload ("enable these subfunctions") to a cap.
> 
> Maybe a new capability that forwards everything to user space when 
> enabled, and lets user space handle errors.
> 
> Or a specialized one only to unlock fc=15.
> 

I think the lack of a good comment in patch 2/2 is the problem.
Facility 11 belong to CPU model and enables both the STSI 15 and the PFT 
instructions

Sorry about that.

-- 
Pierre Morel
IBM Lab Boeblingen