linux-kernel - [PATCH] ibmvfc: fix command state accounting and stale response detection

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20210716205220.1101150-1-tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Fri, 16 Jul 2021 14:52:20 -0600
From:   Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     james.bottomley@...senpartnership.com
Cc:     martin.petersen@...cle.com, linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org,
        linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        brking@...ux.ibm.com, Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@...ux.ibm.com>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] ibmvfc: fix command state accounting and stale response detection

Prior to commit 1f4a4a19508d ("scsi: ibmvfc: Complete commands outside
the host/queue lock") responses to commands were completed sequentially
with the host lock held such that a command had a basic binary state of
active or free. It was therefore a simple affair of ensuring the
assocaiated ibmvfc_event to a VIOS response was valid by testing that it
was not already free. The lock relexation work to complete commands
outside the lock inadverdently made it a trinary command state such that
a command is either in flight, received and being completed, or
completed and now free. This breaks the stale command detection logic as
a command may be still marked active and been placed on the delayed
completion list when a second stale response for the same command
arrives. This can lead to double completions and list corruption. This
issue was exposed by a recent VIOS regression were a missing memory
barrier could occasionally result in the ibmvfc client receiveing a
duplicate response for the same command.

Fix the issue by introducing the atomic ibmvfc_event.active to track the
trinary state of a command. The state is explicitly set to 1 when a
command is successfully sent. The CRQ response handlers use
atomic_dec_if_positive() to test for stale responses and correctly
transition to the completion state when a active command is received.
Finally, atomic_dec_and_test() is used to sanity check transistions
when commands are freed as a result of a completion, or moved to the
purge list as a result of error handling or adapter reset.

Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Fixes: 1f4a4a19508d ("scsi: ibmvfc: Complete commands outside the host/queue lock")
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@...ux.ibm.com>
---
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.h |  1 +
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c b/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c
index bee1bec49c09..935b01ee44b7 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c
@@ -807,6 +807,13 @@ static int ibmvfc_init_event_pool(struct ibmvfc_host *vhost,
 	for (i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
 		struct ibmvfc_event *evt = &pool->events[i];
 
+		/*
+		 * evt->active states
+		 *  1 = in flight
+		 *  0 = being completed
+		 * -1 = free/freed
+		 */
+		atomic_set(&evt->active, -1);
 		atomic_set(&evt->free, 1);
 		evt->crq.valid = 0x80;
 		evt->crq.ioba = cpu_to_be64(pool->iu_token + (sizeof(*evt->xfer_iu) * i));
@@ -1017,6 +1024,7 @@ static void ibmvfc_free_event(struct ibmvfc_event *evt)
 
 	BUG_ON(!ibmvfc_valid_event(pool, evt));
 	BUG_ON(atomic_inc_return(&evt->free) != 1);
+	BUG_ON(atomic_dec_and_test(&evt->active));
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&evt->queue->l_lock, flags);
 	list_add_tail(&evt->queue_list, &evt->queue->free);
@@ -1072,6 +1080,12 @@ static void ibmvfc_complete_purge(struct list_head *purge_list)
  **/
 static void ibmvfc_fail_request(struct ibmvfc_event *evt, int error_code)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Anything we are failing should still be active. Otherwise, it
+	 * implies we already got a response for the command and are doing
+	 * something bad like double completing it.
+	 */
+	BUG_ON(!atomic_dec_and_test(&evt->active));
 	if (evt->cmnd) {
 		evt->cmnd->result = (error_code << 16);
 		evt->done = ibmvfc_scsi_eh_done;
@@ -1723,6 +1737,7 @@ static int ibmvfc_send_event(struct ibmvfc_event *evt,
 
 		evt->done(evt);
 	} else {
+		atomic_set(&evt->active, 1);
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&evt->queue->l_lock, flags);
 		ibmvfc_trc_start(evt);
 	}
@@ -3251,7 +3266,7 @@ static void ibmvfc_handle_crq(struct ibmvfc_crq *crq, struct ibmvfc_host *vhost,
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(atomic_read(&evt->free))) {
+	if (unlikely(atomic_dec_if_positive(&evt->active))) {
 		dev_err(vhost->dev, "Received duplicate correlation_token 0x%08llx!\n",
 			crq->ioba);
 		return;
@@ -3778,7 +3793,7 @@ static void ibmvfc_handle_scrq(struct ibmvfc_crq *crq, struct ibmvfc_host *vhost
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(atomic_read(&evt->free))) {
+	if (unlikely(atomic_dec_if_positive(&evt->active))) {
 		dev_err(vhost->dev, "Received duplicate correlation_token 0x%08llx!\n",
 			crq->ioba);
 		return;
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.h b/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.h
index 4f0f3baefae4..92fb889d7eb0 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.h
+++ b/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.h
@@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ struct ibmvfc_event {
 	struct ibmvfc_target *tgt;
 	struct scsi_cmnd *cmnd;
 	atomic_t free;
+	atomic_t active;
 	union ibmvfc_iu *xfer_iu;
 	void (*done)(struct ibmvfc_event *evt);
 	void (*_done)(struct ibmvfc_event *evt);
-- 
2.27.0