lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <YPdOxrIA6o3uymq2@google.com>
Date:   Tue, 20 Jul 2021 22:31:34 +0000
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To:     Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, tony.luck@...el.com,
        npmccallum@...hat.com, brijesh.ksingh@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 37/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the
 RMP nested page fault

On Tue, Jul 20, 2021, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> 
> On 7/19/21 7:10 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 07, 2021, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> > > Follow the recommendation from APM2 section 15.36.10 and 15.36.11 to
> > > resolve the RMP violation encountered during the NPT table walk.
> > 
> > Heh, please elaborate on exactly what that recommendation is.  A recommendation
> > isn't exactly architectural, i.e. is subject to change :-)
> 
> I will try to expand it :)
> 
> > 
> > And, do we have to follow the APM's recommendation?
> 
> Yes, unless we want to be very strict on what a guest can do.
> 
> > Specifically, can KVM treat #NPF RMP violations as guest errors, or is that
> > not allowed by the GHCB spec?
> 
> The GHCB spec does not say anything about the #NPF RMP violation error. And
> not all #NPF RMP is a guest error (mainly those size mismatch etc).
> 
> > I.e. can we mandate accesses be preceded by page state change requests?
> 
> This is a good question, the GHCB spec does not enforce that a guest *must*
> use page state. If the page state changes is not done by the guest then it
> will cause #NPF and its up to the hypervisor to decide on what it wants to
> do.

Drat.  Is there any hope of pushing through a GHCB change to require the guest
to use PSC?

> > It would simplify KVM (albeit not much of a simplificiation) and would also
> > make debugging easier since transitions would require an explicit guest
> > request and guest bugs would result in errors instead of random
> > corruption/weirdness.
> 
> I am good with enforcing this from the KVM. But the question is, what fault
> we should inject in the guest when KVM detects that guest has issued the
> page state change.

Injecting a fault, at least from KVM, isn't an option since there's no architectural
behavior we can leverage.  E.g. a guest that isn't enlightened enough to properly
use PSC isn't going to do anything useful with a #MC or #VC.

Sadly, as is I think our only options are to either automatically convert RMP
entries as need, or to punt the exit to userspace.  Maybe we could do both, e.g.
have a module param to control the behavior?  The problem with punting to userspace
is that KVM would also need a way for userspace to fix the issue, otherwise we're
just taking longer to kill the guest :-/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ