| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <11822417-5931-b2d8-ae77-ec4a84b8b895@hartkopp.net>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2021 11:24:20 +0200
From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@...wei.com>
Cc: davem@...emloft.net, kuba@...nel.org, mkl@...gutronix.de,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-can@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] can: raw: fix raw_rcv panic for sock UAF
Answering myself ...
On 21.07.21 08:35, Oliver Hartkopp wrote:
>
>
> On 21.07.21 06:53, Greg KH wrote:
>> On Wed, Jul 21, 2021 at 09:09:37AM +0800, Ziyang Xuan wrote:
>>> We get a bug during ltp can_filter test as following.
>>>
>>> ===========================================
>>> [60919.264984] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference
>>> at 0000000000000010
>>> [60919.265223] PGD 8000003dda726067 P4D 8000003dda726067 PUD
>>> 3dda727067 PMD 0
>>> [60919.265443] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
>>> [60919.265550] CPU: 30 PID: 3638365 Comm: can_filter Kdump: loaded
>>> Tainted: G W 4.19.90+ #1
>
> This kernel version 4.19.90 is definitely outdated.
>
> Can you please check your issue with the latest uptream kernel as this
> problem should have been fixed with this patch:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=8d0caedb759683041d9db82069937525999ada53
>
> ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier")
>
> Thanks!
I think my hint had a wrong assumption. The suggestion to add some
locking seems correct.
>>> [60919.266068] RIP: 0010:selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x3e/0x200
>>> [60919.293289] RSP: 0018:ffff8d53bfc03cf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
>>> [60919.307140] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000001d RCX:
>>> 0000000000000007
>>> [60919.320756] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8d5104a8ed00 RDI:
>>> ffff8d53bfc03d30
>>> [60919.334319] RBP: ffff8d9338056800 R08: ffff8d53bfc29d80 R09:
>>> 0000000000000001
>>> [60919.347969] R10: ffff8d53bfc03ec0 R11: ffffb8526ef47c98 R12:
>>> ffff8d53bfc03d30
>>> [60919.350320] perf: interrupt took too long (3063 > 2500), lowering
>>> kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate to 65000
>>> [60919.361148] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8d53bcf90000 R15:
>>> 0000000000000000
>>> [60919.361151] FS: 00007fb78b6b3600(0000) GS:ffff8d53bfc00000(0000)
>>> knlGS:0000000000000000
>>> [60919.400812] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>>> [60919.413730] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000003e3f784006 CR4:
>>> 00000000007606e0
>>> [60919.426479] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
>>> 0000000000000000
>>> [60919.439339] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
>>> 0000000000000400
>>> [60919.451608] PKRU: 55555554
>>> [60919.463622] Call Trace:
>>> [60919.475617] <IRQ>
>>> [60919.487122] ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0
>>> [60919.498478] ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0
>>> [60919.509822] ? account_entity_enqueue+0xc5/0xf0
>>> [60919.520709] security_sock_rcv_skb+0x2a/0x40
>>> [60919.531413] sk_filter_trim_cap+0x47/0x1b0
>>> [60919.542178] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x38/0x1b0
>>> [60919.552444] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x17/0x30
>>> [60919.562477] raw_rcv+0x110/0x190 [can_raw]
>>> [60919.572539] can_rcv_filter+0xbc/0x1b0 [can]
>>> [60919.582173] can_receive+0x6b/0xb0 [can]
>>> [60919.591595] can_rcv+0x31/0x70 [can]
>>> [60919.600783] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x5a/0x80
>>> [60919.609864] process_backlog+0x9b/0x150
>>> [60919.618691] net_rx_action+0x156/0x400
>>> [60919.627310] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xa0
>>> [60919.635714] __do_softirq+0xe8/0x2e9
>>> [60919.644161] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40
>>> [60919.652154] </IRQ>
>>> [60919.659899] do_softirq.part.17+0x4f/0x60
>>> [60919.667475] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x60/0x70
>>> [60919.675089] __dev_queue_xmit+0x539/0x920
>>> [60919.682267] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
>>> [60919.689218] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
>>> [60919.695886] ? sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x211/0x230
>>> [60919.702395] ? can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can]
>>> [60919.708882] can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can]
>>> [60919.715037] raw_sendmsg+0x16d/0x268 [can_raw]
>>>
>>> It's because raw_setsockopt() concurrently with
>>> unregister_netdevice_many(). Concurrent scenario as following.
>>>
>>> cpu0 cpu1
>>> raw_bind
>>> raw_setsockopt unregister_netdevice_many
>>> unlist_netdevice
>>> dev_get_by_index raw_notifier
>>> raw_enable_filters ......
>>> can_rx_register
>>> can_rcv_list_find(..., net->can.rx_alldev_list)
>>>
>>> ......
>>>
>>> sock_close
>>> raw_release(sock_a)
>>>
>>> ......
>>>
>>> can_receive
>>> can_rcv_filter(net->can.rx_alldev_list, ...)
>>> raw_rcv(skb, sock_a)
>>> BUG
>>>
>>> After unlist_netdevice(), dev_get_by_index() return NULL in
>>> raw_setsockopt(). Function raw_enable_filters() will add sock
>>> and can_filter to net->can.rx_alldev_list.
Btw. this should not happen too!
dev_get_by_index() is executed depending on ro->ifindex which means
there should be a real network interface. When dev_get_by_index()
returns NULL this can considered to be wrong.
Adding a new filter to net->can.rx_alldev_list as a consequence is wrong
too.
>>> Then the sock is closed.
>>> Followed by, we sock_sendmsg() to a new vcan device use the same
>>> can_filter. Protocol stack match the old receiver whose sock has
>>> been released on net->can.rx_alldev_list in can_rcv_filter().
>>> Function raw_rcv() uses the freed sock. UAF BUG is triggered.
>>>
>>> We can find that the key issue is that net_device has not been
>>> protected in raw_setsockopt(). Use rtnl_lock to protect net_device
>>> in raw_setsockopt().
>>>
>>> Fixes: c18ce101f2e4 ("[CAN]: Add raw protocol")
>>> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@...wei.com>
Can you please resend the below patch as suggested by Greg KH and add my
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>
as it also adds the dev_get_by_index() return check.
diff --git a/net/can/raw.c b/net/can/raw.c
index ed4fcb7ab0c3..d3cbc32036c7 100644
--- a/net/can/raw.c
+++ b/net/can/raw.c
@@ -544,14 +544,18 @@ static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int
level, int optname,
} else if (count == 1) {
if (copy_from_sockptr(&sfilter, optval, sizeof(sfilter)))
return -EFAULT;
}
+ rtnl_lock();
lock_sock(sk);
- if (ro->bound && ro->ifindex)
+ if (ro->bound && ro->ifindex) {
dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), ro->ifindex);
+ if (!dev)
+ goto out_fil;
+ }
if (ro->bound) {
/* (try to) register the new filters */
if (count == 1)
err = raw_enable_filters(sock_net(sk), dev, sk,
@@ -586,10 +590,11 @@ static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int
level, int optname,
out_fil:
if (dev)
dev_put(dev);
release_sock(sk);
+ rtnl_unlock();
break;
case CAN_RAW_ERR_FILTER:
if (optlen != sizeof(err_mask))
@@ -598,14 +603,18 @@ static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int
level, int optname,
if (copy_from_sockptr(&err_mask, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
err_mask &= CAN_ERR_MASK;
+ rtnl_lock();
lock_sock(sk);
- if (ro->bound && ro->ifindex)
+ if (ro->bound && ro->ifindex) {
dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), ro->ifindex);
+ if (!dev)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
/* remove current error mask */
if (ro->bound) {
/* (try to) register the new err_mask */
err = raw_enable_errfilter(sock_net(sk), dev, sk,
@@ -625,10 +634,11 @@ static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int
level, int optname,
out_err:
if (dev)
dev_put(dev);
release_sock(sk);
+ rtnl_unlock();
break;
case CAN_RAW_LOOPBACK:
if (optlen != sizeof(ro->loopback))
Thanks for the finding!
Best regards,
Oliver
(..)
>>
>>
>> <formletter>
>>
>> This is not the correct way to submit patches for inclusion in the
>> stable kernel tree. Please read:
>>
>> https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/stable-kernel-rules.html
>> for how to do this properly.
>>
>> </formletter>
>>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists