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Message-ID: <8df2845d-ee90-56d0-1228-adebb103ec37@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2021 23:02:16 +0800
From: Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@...il.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, kys@...rosoft.com,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/13] x86/HV: Add new hvcall guest address host
visibility support
On 7/29/2021 10:09 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 7/29/21 6:01 AM, Tianyu Lan wrote:
>> On 7/29/2021 1:06 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
>>> On 7/28/21 7:52 AM, Tianyu Lan wrote:
>>>> @@ -1986,7 +1988,9 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long
>>>> addr, int numpages, bool enc)
>>>> int ret;
>>>> /* Nothing to do if memory encryption is not active */
>>>> - if (!mem_encrypt_active())
>>>> + if (hv_is_isolation_supported())
>>>> + return hv_set_mem_enc(addr, numpages, enc);
>>>> + else if (!mem_encrypt_active())
>>>> return 0;
>>>
>>> One more thing. If you're going to be patching generic code, please
>>> start using feature checks that can get optimized away at runtime.
>>> hv_is_isolation_supported() doesn't look like the world's cheapest
>>> check. It can't be inlined and costs at least a function call.
>>
>> Yes, you are right. How about adding a static branch key for the check
>> of isolation VM? This may reduce the check cost.
>
> I don't think you need a static key.
>
> There are basically three choices:
> 1. Use an existing X86_FEATURE bit. I think there's already one for
> when you are running under a hypervisor. It's not super precise,
> but it's better than what you have.
> 2. Define a new X86_FEATURE bit for when you are running under
> Hyper-V.
> 3. Define a new X86_FEATURE bit specifically for Hyper-V isolation VM
> support. This particular feature might be a little uncommon to
> deserve its own bit.
>
> I'd probably just do #2.
>
There is x86_hyper_type to identify hypervisor type and we may check
this variable after checking X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR.
static inline bool hv_is_isolation_supported(void)
{
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
return 0;
if (x86_hyper_type != X86_HYPER_MS_HYPERV)
return 0;
// out of line function call:
return __hv_is_isolation_supported();
}
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