linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 3/6] KVM: VMX: Detect Tertiary VM-Execution control when setup VMCS config

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Date:   Thu, 5 Aug 2021 22:35:31 +0000
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To:     Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@...el.com>
Cc:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        Kan Liang <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
        Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Robert Hu <robert.hu@...el.com>,
        Gao Chao <chao.gao@...el.com>,
        Robert Hoo <robert.hu@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/6] KVM: VMX: Detect Tertiary VM-Execution control
 when setup VMCS config

On Thu, Aug 05, 2021, Zeng Guang wrote:
> +u64 vmx_tertiary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)

Make this static and drop the declaration from vmx.h, there's no nested user (yet),
and I'm also working on a patch to rework how prepare_vmcs02_early() gets KVMs
desires without having to call these heleprs, i.e. I want to bury all of these in
vmx.c.

> +{
> +	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * Adjust a single secondary execution control bit to intercept/allow an
>   * instruction in the guest.  This is usually done based on whether or not a
> @@ -4319,6 +4354,9 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>  		secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx->secondary_exec_control);
>  	}
>  
> +	if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls())
> +		tertiary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_tertiary_exec_control(vmx));
> +
>  	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu)) {
>  		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, 0);
>  		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, 0);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> index 945c6639ce24..448006bd8fa7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> @@ -478,6 +478,7 @@ static inline u32 vmx_vmexit_ctrl(void)
>  
>  u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
>  u32 vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
> +u64 vmx_tertiary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
>  
>  static inline struct kvm_vmx *to_kvm_vmx(struct kvm *kvm)
>  {
> -- 
> 2.25.1
>