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Date: Fri, 6 Aug 2021 17:12:19 +0200
From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@....com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>,
Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@....com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, kernel@...gutronix.de,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
Steffen Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@...gutronix.de>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based
trusted keys
Dear trusted key maintainers,
On 21.07.21 18:48, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> Series applies on top of
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210721160258.7024-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de/T/#u
>
> v2 -> v3:
> - Split off first Kconfig preparation patch. It fixes a regression,
> so sent that out, so it can be applied separately (Sumit)
> - Split off second key import patch. I'll send that out separately
> as it's a development aid and not required within the CAAM series
> - add MAINTAINERS entry
Gentle ping. I'd appreciate feedback on this series.
Cheers,
Ahmad
>
> v1 -> v2:
> - Added new commit to make trusted key Kconfig option independent
> of TPM and added new Kconfig file for trusted keys
> - Add new commit for importing existing key material
> - Allow users to force use of kernel RNG (Jarkko)
> - Enforce maximum keymod size (Horia)
> - Use append_seq_(in|out)_ptr_intlen instead of append_seq_(in|out)_ptr
> (Horia)
> - Make blobifier handle private to CAAM glue code file (Horia)
> - Extend trusted keys documentation for CAAM
> - Rebased and updated original cover letter:
>
> The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
> built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
>
> Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique
> never-disclosed device-specific key.
>
> There has been multiple discussions on how to represent this within the kernel:
>
> The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
> built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
>
> Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique
> never-disclosed device-specific key. There has been multiple
> discussions on how to represent this within the kernel:
>
> - [RFC] crypto: caam - add red blobifier
> Steffen implemented[1] a PoC sysfs driver to start a discussion on how to
> best integrate the blob mechanism.
> Mimi suggested that it could be used to implement trusted keys.
> Trusted keys back then were a TPM-only feature.
>
> - security/keys/secure_key: Adds the secure key support based on CAAM.
> Udit added[2] a new "secure" key type with the CAAM as backend. The key
> material stays within the kernel only.
> Mimi and James agreed that this needs a generic interface, not specific
> to CAAM. Mimi suggested trusted keys. Jan noted that this could serve as
> basis for TEE-backed keys.
>
> - [RFC] drivers: crypto: caam: key: Add caam_tk key type
> Franck added[3] a new "caam_tk" key type based on Udit's work. This time
> it uses CAAM "black blobs" instead of "red blobs", so key material stays
> within the CAAM and isn't exposed to kernel in plaintext.
> James voiced the opinion that there should be just one user-facing generic
> wrap/unwrap key type with multiple possible handlers.
> David suggested trusted keys.
>
> - Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
> Sumit reworked[4] trusted keys to support multiple possible backends with
> one chosen at boot time and added a new TEE backend along with TPM.
> This now sits in Jarkko's master branch to be sent out for v5.13
>
> This patch series builds on top of Sumit's rework to have the CAAM as yet another
> trusted key backend.
>
> The CAAM bits are based on Steffen's initial patch from 2015. His work had been
> used in the field for some years now, so I preferred not to deviate too much from it.
>
> This series has been tested with dmcrypt[5] on an i.MX6DL.
>
> Looking forward to your feedback.
>
> Cheers,
> Ahmad
>
> [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/1447082306-19946-2-git-send-email-s.trumtrar@pengutronix.de/
> [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20180723111432.26830-1-udit.agarwal@nxp.com/
> [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1551456599-10603-2-git-send-email-franck.lenormand@nxp.com/
> [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1604419306-26105-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org/
> [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210122084321.24012-2-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de/
>
> ---
> To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
> To: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@....com>
> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> To: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>
> To: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
> To: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
> To: James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
> Cc: Steffen Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@...gutronix.de>
> Cc: Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>
> Cc: Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>
> Cc: David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
> Cc: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@....com>
> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
> Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: keyrings@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
>
> Ahmad Fatoum (4):
> KEYS: trusted: allow users to use kernel RNG for key material
> KEYS: trusted: allow trust sources to use kernel RNG for key material
> crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator
> KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
>
> Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +-
> Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 60 +++-
> MAINTAINERS | 9 +-
> drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig | 3 +-
> drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile | 1 +-
> drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c | 230 +++++++++++++++-
> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 2 +-
> include/keys/trusted_caam.h | 11 +-
> include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h | 56 ++++-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 11 +-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 +-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 74 +++++-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 23 +-
> 13 files changed, 477 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c
> create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_caam.h
> create mode 100644 include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h
> create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
>
> base-commit: 97408d81ed533b953326c580ff2c3f1948b3fcee
>
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