linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.4 73/85] arm64: vdso: Avoid ISB after reading from cntvct

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Date:   Tue, 10 Aug 2021 19:30:46 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Chanho Park <chanho61.park@...sung.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 73/85] arm64: vdso: Avoid ISB after reading from cntvct_el0

From: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>

commit 77ec462536a13d4b428a1eead725c4818a49f0b1 upstream.

We can avoid the expensive ISB instruction after reading the counter in
the vDSO gettime functions by creating a fake address hazard against a
dummy stack read, just like we do inside the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210318170738.7756-5-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chanho Park <chanho61.park@...sung.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/arch_timer.h        |   21 ---------------------
 arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h           |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h |    6 +-----
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/arch_timer.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/arch_timer.h
@@ -165,25 +165,6 @@ static inline void arch_timer_set_cntkct
 	isb();
 }
 
-/*
- * Ensure that reads of the counter are treated the same as memory reads
- * for the purposes of ordering by subsequent memory barriers.
- *
- * This insanity brought to you by speculative system register reads,
- * out-of-order memory accesses, sequence locks and Thomas Gleixner.
- *
- * http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2019-February/631195.html
- */
-#define arch_counter_enforce_ordering(val) do {				\
-	u64 tmp, _val = (val);						\
-									\
-	asm volatile(							\
-	"	eor	%0, %1, %1\n"					\
-	"	add	%0, sp, %0\n"					\
-	"	ldr	xzr, [%0]"					\
-	: "=r" (tmp) : "r" (_val));					\
-} while (0)
-
 static __always_inline u64 __arch_counter_get_cntpct_stable(void)
 {
 	u64 cnt;
@@ -224,8 +205,6 @@ static __always_inline u64 __arch_counte
 	return cnt;
 }
 
-#undef arch_counter_enforce_ordering
-
 static inline int arch_timer_arch_init(void)
 {
 	return 0;
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -57,6 +57,25 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_
 	return mask;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Ensure that reads of the counter are treated the same as memory reads
+ * for the purposes of ordering by subsequent memory barriers.
+ *
+ * This insanity brought to you by speculative system register reads,
+ * out-of-order memory accesses, sequence locks and Thomas Gleixner.
+ *
+ * http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2019-February/631195.html
+ */
+#define arch_counter_enforce_ordering(val) do {				\
+	u64 tmp, _val = (val);						\
+									\
+	asm volatile(							\
+	"	eor	%0, %1, %1\n"					\
+	"	add	%0, sp, %0\n"					\
+	"	ldr	xzr, [%0]"					\
+	: "=r" (tmp) : "r" (_val));					\
+} while (0)
+
 #define __smp_mb()	dmb(ish)
 #define __smp_rmb()	dmb(ishld)
 #define __smp_wmb()	dmb(ishst)
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h
@@ -85,11 +85,7 @@ static __always_inline u64 __arch_get_hw
 	 */
 	isb();
 	asm volatile("mrs %0, cntvct_el0" : "=r" (res) :: "memory");
-	/*
-	 * This isb() is required to prevent that the seq lock is
-	 * speculated.#
-	 */
-	isb();
+	arch_counter_enforce_ordering(res);
 
 	return res;
 }