linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.13 138/175] scsi: ibmvfc: Fix command state accounting and stale response detection

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Message-Id: <20210810173005.487780743@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Tue, 10 Aug 2021 19:30:46 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@...cle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.13 138/175] scsi: ibmvfc: Fix command state accounting and stale response detection

From: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@...ux.ibm.com>

commit a264cf5e81c78e2b9918b8b9ef2ace9dde1850df upstream.

Prior to commit 1f4a4a19508d ("scsi: ibmvfc: Complete commands outside the
host/queue lock") responses to commands were completed sequentially with
the host lock held such that a command had a basic binary state of active
or free. It was therefore a simple affair of ensuring the assocaiated
ibmvfc_event to a VIOS response was valid by testing that it was not
already free. The lock relexation work to complete commands outside the
lock inadverdently made it a trinary command state such that a command is
either in flight, received and being completed, or completed and now
free. This breaks the stale command detection logic as a command may be
still marked active and been placed on the delayed completion list when a
second stale response for the same command arrives. This can lead to double
completions and list corruption. This issue was exposed by a recent VIOS
regression were a missing memory barrier could occasionally result in the
ibmvfc client receiving a duplicate response for the same command.

Fix the issue by introducing the atomic ibmvfc_event.active to track the
trinary state of a command. The state is explicitly set to 1 when a command
is successfully sent. The CRQ response handlers use
atomic_dec_if_positive() to test for stale responses and correctly
transition to the completion state when a active command is received.
Finally, atomic_dec_and_test() is used to sanity check transistions when
commands are freed as a result of a completion, or moved to the purge list
as a result of error handling or adapter reset.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210716205220.1101150-1-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: 1f4a4a19508d ("scsi: ibmvfc: Complete commands outside the host/queue lock")
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@...ux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@...cle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c |   19 +++++++++++++++++--
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c
@@ -804,6 +804,13 @@ static int ibmvfc_init_event_pool(struct
 	for (i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
 		struct ibmvfc_event *evt = &pool->events[i];

+		/*
+		 * evt->active states
+		 *  1 = in flight
+		 *  0 = being completed
+		 * -1 = free/freed
+		 */
+		atomic_set(&evt->active, -1);
 		atomic_set(&evt->free, 1);
 		evt->crq.valid = 0x80;
 		evt->crq.ioba = cpu_to_be64(pool->iu_token + (sizeof(*evt->xfer_iu) * i));
@@ -1014,6 +1021,7 @@ static void ibmvfc_free_event(struct ibm

 	BUG_ON(!ibmvfc_valid_event(pool, evt));
 	BUG_ON(atomic_inc_return(&evt->free) != 1);
+	BUG_ON(atomic_dec_and_test(&evt->active));

 	spin_lock_irqsave(&evt->queue->l_lock, flags);
 	list_add_tail(&evt->queue_list, &evt->queue->free);
@@ -1069,6 +1077,12 @@ static void ibmvfc_complete_purge(struct
  **/
 static void ibmvfc_fail_request(struct ibmvfc_event *evt, int error_code)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Anything we are failing should still be active. Otherwise, it
+	 * implies we already got a response for the command and are doing
+	 * something bad like double completing it.
+	 */
+	BUG_ON(!atomic_dec_and_test(&evt->active));
 	if (evt->cmnd) {
 		evt->cmnd->result = (error_code << 16);
 		evt->done = ibmvfc_scsi_eh_done;
@@ -1720,6 +1734,7 @@ static int ibmvfc_send_event(struct ibmv

 		evt->done(evt);
 	} else {
+		atomic_set(&evt->active, 1);
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&evt->queue->l_lock, flags);
 		ibmvfc_trc_start(evt);
 	}
@@ -3248,7 +3263,7 @@ static void ibmvfc_handle_crq(struct ibm
 		return;
 	}

-	if (unlikely(atomic_read(&evt->free))) {
+	if (unlikely(atomic_dec_if_positive(&evt->active))) {
 		dev_err(vhost->dev, "Received duplicate correlation_token 0x%08llx!\n",
 			crq->ioba);
 		return;
@@ -3775,7 +3790,7 @@ static void ibmvfc_handle_scrq(struct ib
 		return;
 	}

-	if (unlikely(atomic_read(&evt->free))) {
+	if (unlikely(atomic_dec_if_positive(&evt->active))) {
 		dev_err(vhost->dev, "Received duplicate correlation_token 0x%08llx!\n",
 			crq->ioba);
 		return;
--- a/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.h
+++ b/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.h
@@ -744,6 +744,7 @@ struct ibmvfc_event {
 	struct ibmvfc_target *tgt;
 	struct scsi_cmnd *cmnd;
 	atomic_t free;
+	atomic_t active;
 	union ibmvfc_iu *xfer_iu;
 	void (*done)(struct ibmvfc_event *evt);
 	void (*_done)(struct ibmvfc_event *evt);