linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 3/4] crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator

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Message-ID: <85A1078F-B8E1-4E5F-A59A-23BDFB750C83@sigma-star.at>
Date:   Wed, 11 Aug 2021 10:43:01 +0000
From:   David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
To:     Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
Cc:     Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@....com>,
        Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, kernel@...gutronix.de,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>,
        Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
        Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
        Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@....com>,
        Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator

Hi Ahmad,

> On 11.08.2021, at 12:22, Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de> wrote:
>
>> Since you already assert that MAX_BLOB_SIZE <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN
>> in security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c, this will never
>> be an issue for CAAM-based trusted-keys though.
> I omitted checks in code, which are verified at compile-time.
> Would you prefer a runtime check to be added as well?

I’d say the compile-time check suffices, unless this is intended
to be used outside of trusted-keys. But I don’t think this is very likely…

Cheers,
David