linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] fscrypt: support trusted keys

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Message-ID: <d4f5c2593380c82ceebae2c8782a1c440b35f165.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Wed, 11 Aug 2021 07:34:18 -0400
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Cc:     Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>,
        "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
        Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>, kernel@...gutronix.de,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] fscrypt: support trusted keys

On Wed, 2021-08-11 at 03:17 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 02:27:24PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 12:21:40AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 11:46:49AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > > On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 09:06:36PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > I don't think this is right, or at least it does not follow the pattern
> > > > > > > in [*]. I.e. you should rather use trusted key to seal your fscrypt key.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > What's the benefit of the extra layer of indirection over just using a "trusted"
> > > > > > key directly?  The use case for "encrypted" keys is not at all clear to me.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Because it is more robust to be able to use small amount of trusted keys,
> > > > > which are not entirely software based.
> > > > > 
> > > > > And since it's also a pattern on existing kernel features utilizing trusted
> > > > > keys, the pressure here to explain why break the pattern, should be on the
> > > > > side of the one who breaks it.
> > > > 
> > > > This is a new feature, so it's on the person proposing the feature to explain
> > > > why it's useful.  The purpose of "encrypted" keys is not at all clear, and the
> > > > documentation for them is heavily misleading.  E.g.:
> > > > 
> > > >     "user space sees, stores, and loads only encrypted blobs"
> > > >     (Not necessarily true, as I've explained previously.)
> > > > 
> > > >     "Encrypted keys do not depend on a trust source" ...  "The main disadvantage
> > > >     of encrypted keys is that if they are not rooted in a trusted key"
> > > >     (Not necessarily true, and in fact it seems they're only useful when they
> > > >     *do* depend on a trust source.  At least that's the use case that is being
> > > >     proposed here, IIUC.)
> > > > 
> > > > I do see a possible use for the layer of indirection that "encrypted" keys are,
> > > > which is that it would reduce the overhead of having lots of keys be directly
> > > > encrypted by the TPM/TEE/CAAM.  Is this the use case?  If so, it needs to be
> > > > explained.
> > > 
> > > If trusted keys are used directly, it's an introduction of a bottleneck.
> > > If they are used indirectly, you can still choose to have one trusted
> > > key per fscrypt key.
> > > 
> > > Thus, it's obviously a bad idea to use them directly.
> > 
> > So actually explain that in the documentation.  It's not obvious at all.  And
> > does this imply that the support for trusted keys in dm-crypt is a mistake?
> 
> Looking at dm-crypt implementation, you can choose to use 'encrypted' key
> type, which you can seal with a trusted key.
> 
> Note: I have not been involved when the feature was added to dm-crypt.

At least for TPM 1.2,  "trusted" keys may be sealed to a PCR and then
extended to prevent subsequent usage.  For example, in the initramfs
all of the "encrypted" keys could be decrypted by a single "trusted"
key, before extending the PCR.

Mimi