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Message-Id: <20210812021855.3083178-10-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Date:   Wed, 11 Aug 2021 22:18:50 -0400
From:   Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
To:     keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        zohar@...ux.ibm.com, dhowells@...hat.com, dwmw2@...radead.org,
        herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, davem@...emloft.net,
        jarkko@...nel.org, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com
Cc:     eric.snowberg@...cle.com, keescook@...omium.org,
        gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
        scott.branden@...adcom.com, weiyongjun1@...wei.com,
        nayna@...ux.ibm.com, ebiggers@...gle.com, ardb@...nel.org,
        nramas@...ux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@...hat.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com, pjones@...hat.com,
        glin@...e.com, konrad.wilk@...cle.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 09/14] KEYS: Introduce link restriction to include builtin, secondary and mok keys

Introduce a new link restriction that includes the trusted builtin,
secondary and mok keys. The restriction is based on the key to be added
being vouched for by a key in any of these three keyrings.

Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
---
v3: Initial version
---
 certs/system_keyring.c        | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/keys/system_keyring.h |  6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)

diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
index 2baf5447b116..cb773e09ea67 100644
--- a/certs/system_keyring.c
+++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
@@ -74,6 +74,29 @@ int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
 					  secondary_trusted_keys);
 }
 
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_ca_trusted
+ *
+ * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
+ * being vouched for by a key in either the built-in, the secondary, or
+ * the mok keyrings.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_ca_trusted(
+	struct key *dest_keyring,
+	const struct key_type *type,
+	const union key_payload *payload,
+	struct key *restrict_key)
+{
+	if (mok_trusted_keys && type == &key_type_keyring &&
+	    dest_keyring == secondary_trusted_keys &&
+	    payload == &mok_trusted_keys->payload)
+		/* Allow the mok keyring to be added to the secondary */
+		return 0;
+
+	return restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(dest_keyring, type,
+							      payload, restrict_key);
+}
+
 /**
  * Allocate a struct key_restriction for the "builtin and secondary trust"
  * keyring. Only for use in system_trusted_keyring_init().
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 4fe9cca58685..c9fcbfada567 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -34,9 +34,15 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
 	const struct key_type *type,
 	const union key_payload *payload,
 	struct key *restriction_key);
+extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_ca_trusted(
+	struct key *dest_keyring,
+	const struct key_type *type,
+	const union key_payload *payload,
+	struct key *restrict_key);
 extern void __init set_mok_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring);
 #else
 #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
+#define restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_ca_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
 static inline void __init set_mok_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
 {
 }
-- 
2.18.4

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