linux-kernel - Re: [RFCv2 1/9] tcp: authopt: Initial support and key management

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Message-ID: <785d945e-c0d2-fee5-39d8-99dc06a074f1@gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 12 Aug 2021 22:46:48 +0300
From:   Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@...il.com>
To:     Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@...il.com>
Cc:     Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.co.jp>,
        David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>,
        Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@...gle.com>,
        Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@...sta.com>,
        Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com>,
        Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@...le.com>,
        Ivan Delalande <colona@...sta.com>,
        Priyaranjan Jha <priyarjha@...gle.com>,
        Menglong Dong <dong.menglong@....com.cn>,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Dmitry Safonov <dima@...sta.com>
Subject: Re: [RFCv2 1/9] tcp: authopt: Initial support and key management

On 8/11/21 11:29 AM, Leonard Crestez wrote:
> On 8/10/21 11:41 PM, Dmitry Safonov wrote:
>> On Tue, 10 Aug 2021 at 02:50, Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@...il.com> 
>>> +       /* If an old value exists for same local_id it is deleted */
>>> +       key_info = __tcp_authopt_key_info_lookup(sk, info, 
>>> opt.local_id);
>>> +       if (key_info)
>>> +               tcp_authopt_key_del(sk, info, key_info);
>>> +       key_info = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*key_info), GFP_KERNEL | 
>>> __GFP_ZERO);
>>> +       if (!key_info)
>>> +               return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> 1. You don't need sock_kmalloc() together with tcp_authopt_key_del().
>>      It just frees the memory and allocates it back straight away - no
>> sense in doing that.
> 
> The list is scanned in multiple places in later commits using nothing 
> but an rcu_read_lock, this means that keys can't be updated in-place.
> 
>> 2. I think RFC says you must not allow a user to change an existing key:
>>> MKT parameters are not changed. Instead, new MKTs can be installed, 
>>> and a connection
>>> can change which MKT it uses.
>>
>> IIUC, it means that one can't just change an existing MKT, but one can
>> remove and later
>> add MKT with the same (send_id, recv_id, src_addr/port, dst_addr/port).
>>
>> So, a reasonable thing to do:
>> if (key_info)
>>      return -EEXIST.
> 
> You're right, making the user delete keys explicitly is better.

On a second thought this might be required to mark keys as "send-only" 
and "recv-only" atomically.

Separately from RFC5925 some vendors implement a "keychain" model based 
on RFC8177 where each key has a distinct "accept-lifetime" and a 
"send-lifetime". This could be implemented by adding flags 
"expired_for_send" and "expired_for_recv" but requires the ability to 
set an expiration mark without the key ever being deleted.

--
Regards,
Leonard