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Message-Id: <162902762742251@kroah.com>
Date:   Sun, 15 Aug 2021 13:40:28 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
        torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     lwn@....net, jslaby@...e.cz,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 4.19.204

diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt
index e507a9e0421e..851a8abcadce 100644
--- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt
+++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt
@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ Shadow pages contain the following information:
     shadow pages) so role.quadrant takes values in the range 0..3.  Each
     quadrant maps 1GB virtual address space.
   role.access:
-    Inherited guest access permissions in the form uwx.  Note execute
-    permission is positive, not negative.
+    Inherited guest access permissions from the parent ptes in the form uwx.
+    Note execute permission is positive, not negative.
   role.invalid:
     The page is invalid and should not be used.  It is a root page that is
     currently pinned (by a cpu hardware register pointing to it); once it is
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 6d2670300d47..d4ffcafb8efa 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 19
-SUBLEVEL = 203
+SUBLEVEL = 204
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = "People's Front"
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
index 8220190b0605..9e15818de973 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ struct guest_walker {
 	gpa_t pte_gpa[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS];
 	pt_element_t __user *ptep_user[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS];
 	bool pte_writable[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS];
-	unsigned pt_access;
-	unsigned pte_access;
+	unsigned int pt_access[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS];
+	unsigned int pte_access;
 	gfn_t gfn;
 	struct x86_exception fault;
 };
@@ -388,13 +388,15 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
 		}
 
 		walker->ptes[walker->level - 1] = pte;
+
+		/* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker.  */
+		walker->pt_access[walker->level - 1] = FNAME(gpte_access)(pt_access ^ walk_nx_mask);
 	} while (!is_last_gpte(mmu, walker->level, pte));
 
 	pte_pkey = FNAME(gpte_pkeys)(vcpu, pte);
 	accessed_dirty = have_ad ? pte_access & PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK : 0;
 
 	/* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker.  */
-	walker->pt_access = FNAME(gpte_access)(pt_access ^ walk_nx_mask);
 	walker->pte_access = FNAME(gpte_access)(pte_access ^ walk_nx_mask);
 	errcode = permission_fault(vcpu, mmu, walker->pte_access, pte_pkey, access);
 	if (unlikely(errcode))
@@ -433,7 +435,8 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
 	}
 
 	pgprintk("%s: pte %llx pte_access %x pt_access %x\n",
-		 __func__, (u64)pte, walker->pte_access, walker->pt_access);
+		 __func__, (u64)pte, walker->pte_access,
+		 walker->pt_access[walker->level - 1]);
 	return 1;
 
 error:
@@ -602,7 +605,7 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr,
 {
 	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = NULL;
 	struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator it;
-	unsigned direct_access, access = gw->pt_access;
+	unsigned int direct_access, access;
 	int top_level, ret;
 	gfn_t gfn, base_gfn;
 
@@ -634,6 +637,7 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr,
 		sp = NULL;
 		if (!is_shadow_present_pte(*it.sptep)) {
 			table_gfn = gw->table_gfn[it.level - 2];
+			access = gw->pt_access[it.level - 2];
 			sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, table_gfn, addr, it.level-1,
 					      false, access);
 		}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index bd463d684237..72d729f34437 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1780,7 +1780,7 @@ static void __sev_asid_free(int asid)
 
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
 		sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
-		sd->sev_vmcbs[pos] = NULL;
+		sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = NULL;
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c
index c77c81eb7ab3..edb2215f9993 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c
@@ -1177,9 +1177,8 @@ static int xemaclite_of_probe(struct platform_device *ofdev)
 	}
 
 	dev_info(dev,
-		 "Xilinx EmacLite at 0x%08X mapped to 0x%08X, irq=%d\n",
-		 (unsigned int __force)ndev->mem_start,
-		 (unsigned int __force)lp->base_addr, ndev->irq);
+		 "Xilinx EmacLite at 0x%08X mapped to 0x%p, irq=%d\n",
+		 (unsigned int __force)ndev->mem_start, lp->base_addr, ndev->irq);
 	return 0;
 
 error:
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c
index 3e014ecffef8..1af47aaa7ba5 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static struct channel *ppp_find_channel(struct ppp_net *pn, int unit);
 static int ppp_connect_channel(struct channel *pch, int unit);
 static int ppp_disconnect_channel(struct channel *pch);
 static void ppp_destroy_channel(struct channel *pch);
-static int unit_get(struct idr *p, void *ptr);
+static int unit_get(struct idr *p, void *ptr, int min);
 static int unit_set(struct idr *p, void *ptr, int n);
 static void unit_put(struct idr *p, int n);
 static void *unit_find(struct idr *p, int n);
@@ -963,9 +963,20 @@ static int ppp_unit_register(struct ppp *ppp, int unit, bool ifname_is_set)
 	mutex_lock(&pn->all_ppp_mutex);
 
 	if (unit < 0) {
-		ret = unit_get(&pn->units_idr, ppp);
+		ret = unit_get(&pn->units_idr, ppp, 0);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto err;
+		if (!ifname_is_set) {
+			while (1) {
+				snprintf(ppp->dev->name, IFNAMSIZ, "ppp%i", ret);
+				if (!__dev_get_by_name(ppp->ppp_net, ppp->dev->name))
+					break;
+				unit_put(&pn->units_idr, ret);
+				ret = unit_get(&pn->units_idr, ppp, ret + 1);
+				if (ret < 0)
+					goto err;
+			}
+		}
 	} else {
 		/* Caller asked for a specific unit number. Fail with -EEXIST
 		 * if unavailable. For backward compatibility, return -EEXIST
@@ -3252,9 +3263,9 @@ static int unit_set(struct idr *p, void *ptr, int n)
 }
 
 /* get new free unit number and associate pointer with it */
-static int unit_get(struct idr *p, void *ptr)
+static int unit_get(struct idr *p, void *ptr, int min)
 {
-	return idr_alloc(p, ptr, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
+	return idr_alloc(p, ptr, min, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
 }
 
 /* put unit number back to a pool */
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/ehci-pci.c b/drivers/usb/host/ehci-pci.c
index fcfad5c298a9..56e6fd0f0482 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/ehci-pci.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/ehci-pci.c
@@ -298,6 +298,9 @@ static int ehci_pci_setup(struct usb_hcd *hcd)
 	if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_STMICRO
 	    && pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_STMICRO_USB_HOST)
 		;	/* ConneXT has no sbrn register */
+	else if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_HUAWEI
+			 && pdev->device == 0xa239)
+		;	/* HUAWEI Kunpeng920 USB EHCI has no sbrn register */
 	else
 		pci_read_config_byte(pdev, 0x60, &ehci->sbrn);
 
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 741f40cd955e..edd397fa2991 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1799,6 +1799,20 @@ void drop_collected_mounts(struct vfsmount *mnt)
 	namespace_unlock();
 }
 
+static bool has_locked_children(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct mount *child;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
+		if (!is_subdir(child->mnt_mountpoint, dentry))
+			continue;
+
+		if (child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
 /**
  * clone_private_mount - create a private clone of a path
  *
@@ -1813,14 +1827,27 @@ struct vfsmount *clone_private_mount(const struct path *path)
 	struct mount *old_mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
 	struct mount *new_mnt;
 
+	down_read(&namespace_sem);
 	if (IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(old_mnt))
-		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		goto invalid;
+
+	if (!check_mnt(old_mnt))
+		goto invalid;
+
+	if (has_locked_children(old_mnt, path->dentry))
+		goto invalid;
 
 	new_mnt = clone_mnt(old_mnt, path->dentry, CL_PRIVATE);
+	up_read(&namespace_sem);
+
 	if (IS_ERR(new_mnt))
 		return ERR_CAST(new_mnt);
 
 	return &new_mnt->mnt;
+
+invalid:
+	up_read(&namespace_sem);
+	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(clone_private_mount);
 
@@ -2136,19 +2163,6 @@ static int do_change_type(struct path *path, int ms_flags)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static bool has_locked_children(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	struct mount *child;
-	list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
-		if (!is_subdir(child->mnt_mountpoint, dentry))
-			continue;
-
-		if (child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
-			return true;
-	}
-	return false;
-}
-
 /*
  * do loopback mount.
  */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 4ce032c4acd0..2bf83305e5ab 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2812,6 +2812,27 @@ struct bpf_sanitize_info {
 	bool mask_to_left;
 };
 
+static struct bpf_verifier_state *
+sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+			  const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+			  u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx)
+{
+	struct bpf_verifier_state *branch;
+	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
+
+	branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true);
+	if (branch && insn) {
+		regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs;
+		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
+			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
+		} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
+			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
+			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg);
+		}
+	}
+	return branch;
+}
+
 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			    struct bpf_insn *insn,
 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
@@ -2895,12 +2916,26 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		tmp = *dst_reg;
 		*dst_reg = *ptr_reg;
 	}
-	ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, true);
+	ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1,
+					env->insn_idx);
 	if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret)
 		*dst_reg = tmp;
 	return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0;
 }
 
+static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
+
+	/* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the
+	 * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in
+	 * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still
+	 * rewrite/sanitize them.
+	 */
+	if (!vstate->speculative)
+		env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = true;
+}
+
 static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason,
 			const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
@@ -4275,14 +4310,28 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		 tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off))
 		pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg->var_off.value,
 				       opcode);
+
 	if (pred == 1) {
-		/* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through */
+		/* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push
+		 * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative
+		 * execution.
+		 */
+		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
+		    !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1,
+					       *insn_idx))
+			return -EFAULT;
 		*insn_idx += insn->off;
 		return 0;
 	} else if (pred == 0) {
-		/* only follow fall-through branch, since
-		 * that's where the program will go
+		/* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the
+		 * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for
+		 * simulation under speculative execution.
 		 */
+		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
+		    !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn,
+					       *insn_idx + insn->off + 1,
+					       *insn_idx))
+			return -EFAULT;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -5254,7 +5303,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		}
 
 		regs = cur_regs(env);
-		env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = true;
+		sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
 
 		if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
 			err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
@@ -5472,7 +5521,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 					return err;
 
 				env->insn_idx++;
-				env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = true;
+				sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
 			} else {
 				verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
@@ -5690,6 +5739,7 @@ static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len,
 				u32 off, u32 cnt)
 {
 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
+	bool old_seen = old_data[off].seen;
 	int i;
 
 	if (cnt == 1)
@@ -5701,8 +5751,10 @@ static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len,
 	memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
 	memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
 	       sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
-	for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++)
-		new_data[i].seen = true;
+	for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) {
+		/* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */
+		new_data[i].seen = old_seen;
+	}
 	env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
 	vfree(old_data);
 	return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
index 6d2a69652c39..bbde8d3d6c8a 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
@@ -2790,6 +2790,12 @@ static struct hist_field *parse_unary(struct hist_trigger_data *hist_data,
 		ret = PTR_ERR(operand1);
 		goto free;
 	}
+	if (operand1->flags & HIST_FIELD_FL_STRING) {
+		/* String type can not be the operand of unary operator. */
+		destroy_hist_field(operand1, 0);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto free;
+	}
 
 	expr->flags |= operand1->flags &
 		(HIST_FIELD_FL_TIMESTAMP | HIST_FIELD_FL_TIMESTAMP_USECS);
@@ -2890,6 +2896,10 @@ static struct hist_field *parse_expr(struct hist_trigger_data *hist_data,
 		operand1 = NULL;
 		goto free;
 	}
+	if (operand1->flags & HIST_FIELD_FL_STRING) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto free;
+	}
 
 	/* rest of string could be another expression e.g. b+c in a+b+c */
 	operand_flags = 0;
@@ -2899,6 +2909,10 @@ static struct hist_field *parse_expr(struct hist_trigger_data *hist_data,
 		operand2 = NULL;
 		goto free;
 	}
+	if (operand2->flags & HIST_FIELD_FL_STRING) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto free;
+	}
 
 	ret = check_expr_operands(operand1, operand2);
 	if (ret)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
index b44324530948..c7d17781dbfe 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -2792,6 +2792,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_7, 0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R7 invalid mem access 'inv'",
+		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 		.result = ACCEPT,
 		.retval = 0,
 	},

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