linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] fscrypt: support trusted keys

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Date:   Wed, 18 Aug 2021 10:23:35 +0530
From:   Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc:     Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
        Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>,
        kernel <kernel@...gutronix.de>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org,
        "open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE" 
        <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] fscrypt: support trusted keys

On Tue, 17 Aug 2021 at 19:54, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 2021-08-17 at 16:13 +0200, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> > On 17.08.21 15:55, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > I have no opinion as to whether this is/isn't a valid usecase.
> >
> > So you'd be fine with merging trusted key support as is and leave encrypted
> > key support to someone who has a valid use case and wants to argue
> > in its favor?
>
> That decision as to whether it makes sense to support trusted keys
> directly, based on the new trust sources, is a decision left up to the
> maintainer(s) of the new usecase and the new trust sources maintainer
> Jarkko.
>

I would be in favor of supporting the use of trusted keys directly
when it comes to TEE as a trust source.

-Sumit

> thanks,
>
> Mimi
>