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Message-Id: <20210819002109.534600-8-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 20:21:04 -0400
From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
To: keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
zohar@...ux.ibm.com, dhowells@...hat.com, dwmw2@...radead.org,
herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, davem@...emloft.net,
jarkko@...nel.org, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com
Cc: eric.snowberg@...cle.com, keescook@...omium.org,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
scott.branden@...adcom.com, weiyongjun1@...wei.com,
nayna@...ux.ibm.com, ebiggers@...gle.com, ardb@...nel.org,
nramas@...ux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@...hat.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com, pjones@...hat.com,
konrad.wilk@...cle.com
Subject: [PATCH v4 07/12] KEYS: Introduce link restriction to include builtin, secondary and mok keys
Introduce a new link restriction that includes the trusted builtin,
secondary and mok keys. The restriction is based on the key to be added
being vouched for by a key in any of these three keyrings.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
---
v3: Initial version
v4: moved code under CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MOK_KEYRING
---
certs/system_keyring.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
include/keys/system_keyring.h | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
index 94af3fe107b4..a75c815a42c8 100644
--- a/certs/system_keyring.c
+++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
@@ -99,6 +99,29 @@ void __init set_mok_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
{
mok_trusted_keys = keyring;
}
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_ca_trusted
+ *
+ * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
+ * being vouched for by a key in either the built-in, the secondary, or
+ * the mok keyrings.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_ca_trusted(
+ struct key *dest_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *restrict_key)
+{
+ if (mok_trusted_keys && type == &key_type_keyring &&
+ dest_keyring == secondary_trusted_keys &&
+ payload == &mok_trusted_keys->payload)
+ /* Allow the mok keyring to be added to the secondary */
+ return 0;
+
+ return restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(dest_keyring, type,
+ payload, restrict_key);
+}
#endif
/*
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 059e32e36b3a..8cc9606a6cab 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -39,8 +39,14 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MOK_KEYRING
+extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_ca_trusted(
+ struct key *dest_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *restrict_key);
extern void __init set_mok_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring);
#else
+#define restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_ca_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
static inline void __init set_mok_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
{
}
--
2.18.4
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