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Message-Id: <20210820151933.22401-24-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Date:   Fri, 20 Aug 2021 10:19:18 -0500
From:   Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To:     x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, tony.luck@...el.com,
        marcorr@...gle.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: [PATCH Part1 v5 23/38] x86/head/64: set up a startup %gs for stack protector

From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>

As of commit 103a4908ad4d ("x86/head/64: Disable stack protection for
head$(BITS).o") kernel/head64.c is compiled with -fno-stack-protector
to allow a call to set_bringup_idt_handler(), which would otherwise
have stack protection enabled with CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG. While
sufficient for that case, this will still cause issues if we attempt to
call out to any external functions that were compiled with stack
protection enabled that in-turn make stack-protected calls, or if the
exception handlers set up by set_bringup_idt_handler() make calls to
stack-protected functions.

Subsequent patches for SEV-SNP CPUID validation support will introduce
both such cases. Attempting to disable stack protection for everything
in scope to address that is prohibitive since much of the code, like
SEV-ES #VC handler, is shared code that remains in use after boot and
could benefit from having stack protection enabled. Attempting to inline
calls is brittle and can quickly balloon out to library/helper code
where that's not really an option.

Instead, set up %gs to point a buffer that stack protector can use for
canary values when needed.

In doing so, it's likely we can stop using -no-stack-protector for
head64.c, but that hasn't been tested yet, and head32.c would need a
similar solution to be safe, so that is left as a potential follow-up.

Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 3e625c61f008..5abdfd0dbbc3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ endif
 # non-deterministic coverage.
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT		:= n
 
-CFLAGS_head$(BITS).o	+= -fno-stack-protector
+CFLAGS_head32.o		+= -fno-stack-protector
 
 CFLAGS_irq.o := -I $(srctree)/$(src)/../include/asm/trace
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index a1711c4594fa..f1b76a54c84e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ static struct desc_struct startup_gdt[GDT_ENTRIES] = {
 	[GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS]           = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc093, 0, 0xfffff),
 };
 
+/* For use by stack protector code before switching to virtual addresses */
+#if CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
+static char startup_gs_area[64];
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Address needs to be set at runtime because it references the startup_gdt
  * while the kernel still uses a direct mapping.
@@ -605,6 +610,8 @@ void early_setup_idt(void)
  */
 void __head startup_64_setup_env(unsigned long physbase)
 {
+	u64 gs_area = (u64)fixup_pointer(startup_gs_area, physbase);
+
 	/* Load GDT */
 	startup_gdt_descr.address = (unsigned long)fixup_pointer(startup_gdt, physbase);
 	native_load_gdt(&startup_gdt_descr);
@@ -614,5 +621,18 @@ void __head startup_64_setup_env(unsigned long physbase)
 		     "movl %%eax, %%ss\n"
 		     "movl %%eax, %%es\n" : : "a"(__KERNEL_DS) : "memory");
 
+	/*
+	 * GCC stack protection needs a place to store canary values. The
+	 * default is %gs:0x28, which is what the kernel currently uses.
+	 * Point GS base to a buffer that can be used for this purpose.
+	 * Note that newer GCCs now allow this location to be configured,
+	 * so if we change from the default in the future we need to ensure
+	 * that this buffer overlaps whatever address ends up being used.
+	 */
+#if CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
+	asm volatile("movl %%eax, %%gs\n" : : "a"(__KERNEL_DS) : "memory");
+	native_wrmsr(MSR_GS_BASE, gs_area, gs_area >> 32);
+#endif
+
 	startup_64_load_idt(physbase);
 }
-- 
2.17.1

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