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Message-Id: <20210820181201.31490-32-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2021 11:12:00 -0700
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To: x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>,
Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...el.com>,
Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v29 31/32] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous
When newer VM flags are being created, such as VM_MTE, it becomes necessary
for mmap/mprotect to verify if certain flags are being applied to an
anonymous VMA.
To solve this, one approach is adding a VM flag to track that MAP_ANONYMOUS
is specified [1], and then using the flag in arch_validate_flags().
Another approach is passing the VMA to arch_validate_flags(), and check
vma_is_anonymous().
To prepare the introduction of PROT_SHADOW_STACK, which creates a shadow
stack mapping and can be applied only to an anonymous VMA, update
arch_validate_flags() to pass in the VMA.
[1] commit 9f3419315f3c ("arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect()"),
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 4 ++--
arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/mman.h | 2 +-
mm/mmap.c | 2 +-
mm/mprotect.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
index e3e28f7daf62..7c45e7578f78 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot,
}
#define arch_validate_prot(prot, addr) arch_validate_prot(prot, addr)
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags)
{
if (!system_supports_mte())
return true;
@@ -82,6 +82,6 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
/* only allow VM_MTE if VM_MTE_ALLOWED has been set previously */
return !(vm_flags & VM_MTE) || (vm_flags & VM_MTE_ALLOWED);
}
-#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags)
+#define arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags)
#endif /* ! __ASM_MMAN_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
index 274217e7ed70..0ec4975f167d 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ static inline int sparc_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
return 1;
}
-#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags)
+#define arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags)
/* arch_validate_flags() - Ensure combination of flags is valid for a
* VMA.
*/
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags)
{
/* If ADI is being enabled on this VMA, check for ADI
* capability on the platform and ensure VMA is suitable
diff --git a/include/linux/mman.h b/include/linux/mman.h
index ebb09a964272..b6a9414e806c 100644
--- a/include/linux/mman.h
+++ b/include/linux/mman.h
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
*
* Returns true if the VM_* flags are valid.
*/
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long flags)
{
return true;
}
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 100db6e46831..fe7afd968087 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1853,7 +1853,7 @@ unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
}
/* Allow architectures to sanity-check the vm_flags */
- if (!arch_validate_flags(vma->vm_flags)) {
+ if (!arch_validate_flags(vma, vma->vm_flags)) {
error = -EINVAL;
if (file)
goto unmap_and_free_vma;
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 94cb799216ec..e826ecb68e3a 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
}
/* Allow architectures to sanity-check the new flags */
- if (!arch_validate_flags(newflags)) {
+ if (!arch_validate_flags(vma, newflags)) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
--
2.21.0
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