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Message-ID: <cedc77fefdf22b2cec086f3e0dd9cc698db9bca2.camel@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 2021 20:51:39 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, keescook@...omium.org,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
scott.branden@...adcom.com, weiyongjun1@...wei.com,
nayna@...ux.ibm.com, ebiggers@...gle.com, ardb@...nel.org,
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
lszubowi@...hat.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>,
pjones@...hat.com,
"konrad.wilk@...cle.com" <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Patrick Uiterwijk <patrick@...terwijk.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
On Thu, 2021-08-19 at 13:32 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2021-08-19 at 09:23 -0600, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > > On Aug 19, 2021, at 7:10 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Thu, 2021-08-19 at 14:38 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > On Wed, 2021-08-18 at 20:20 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > > > > Downstream Linux distros try to have a single signed kernel for each
> > > > > architecture. Each end-user may use this kernel in entirely different
> > > > > ways. Some downstream kernels have chosen to always trust platform keys
> > > > > within the Linux trust boundary for kernel module signing. These
> > > > > kernels have no way of using digital signature base IMA appraisal.
> > > > >
> > > > > This series introduces a new Linux kernel keyring containing the Machine
> > > > > Owner Keys (MOK) called .mok. It also adds a new MOK variable to shim.
> > > >
> > > > I would name it as ".machine" because it is more "re-usable" name, e.g.
> > > > could be used for similar things as MOK. ".mok" is a bad name because
> > > > it binds directly to a single piece of user space software.
> > >
> > > Nayna previously said,
> > > "I believe the underlying source from where CA keys are loaded might vary
> > > based on the architecture (".mok" is UEFI specific.). The key part is
> > > that this new keyring should contain only CA keys which can be later
> > > used to vouch for user keys loaded onto IMA or secondary keyring at
> > > runtime. It would be good to have a "ca" in the name, like .xxxx-ca,
> > > where xxxx can be machine, owner, or system. I prefer .system-ca."
> > >
> > > The CA keys on the MOK db is simply the first root of trust being
> > > defined, but other roots of trust are sure to follow. For this reason,
> > > I agree naming the new keyring "mok" should be avoided.
> >
> > As I said previously, I’m open to renaming, I just would like to have an
> > agreement on the new name before changing everything. The current proposed
> > names I have heard are “.machine" and ".system-ca". Is there a preference
> > the maintainers feel is appropriate? If so, please let me know and I’ll
> > rename it. Thanks.
> >
>
> Jarkko, I think the emphasis should not be on "machine" from Machine
> Owner Key (MOK), but on "owner". Whereas Nayna is focusing more on the
> "_ca" aspect of the name. Perhaps consider naming it
> "system_owner_ca" or something along those lines.
What do you gain such overly long identifier? Makes no sense. What
is "ca aspect of the name" anyway?
/Jarkko
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