linux-kernel - [PATCH] Fix prctl(PR_GET_NAME) to not leak random trailing bytes

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <YSiwLuE17BwRlI/d@ls3530>
Date:   Fri, 27 Aug 2021 11:28:14 +0200
From:   Helge Deller <deller@....de>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org,
        James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
        John David Anglin <dave.anglin@...l.net>
Subject: [PATCH] Fix prctl(PR_GET_NAME) to not leak random trailing bytes

The prctl(PR_GET_NAME) and prctl(PR_SET_NAME) syscalls are used to set and
retrieve the process name. Those kernel functions are currently implemented to
always copy the full array of 16-bytes back and forth between kernel and
userspace instead of just copying the relevant bytes of the string.

This patch changes the prctl(PR_GET_NAME) to only copy back the null-terminated
string (with max. up to 16 chars including the trailing zero) to userspace and
thus avoids copying and leaking random trailing chars behind the process name.

Background:
The newest glibc testsuite includes a test which is implemented similiar to
this:
   prctl(PR_SET_NAME, "thread name", 0, 0, 0);
   char buffer[16] = { 0, };
   prctl(PR_GET_NAME, buffer, 0, 0, 0);
   char expected[16] = "thread name";
   fail if memcmp(buffer, expected, 16) != 0;

The compiler may put the "thread name" string given in the PR_SET_NAME call
somewhere into memory and it's not guaranteed that trailing (up to a total of
16) chars behind that string has zeroes.
As such on the parisc architecture I've seen that the buffer[] array gets
filled on return of prctl(PR_GET_NAME) with such additional random bytes, e.g.:
       "thread name\000@\032i\000"
       74 68 72 65 61 64 20 6E 61 6D 65 00 40 1A 69 00

Unfortunatly the glibc testuite tests the full memory block of 16 bytes
and fails because it expects zeroed characters behind the process name.

In addition to fix the glibc testsuite, I suggest to fix the kernel function of
prctl(PR_GET_NAME) to just return the null-terminated process name.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@....de>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org

diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index ef1a78f5d71c..af71412760be 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2367,7 +2367,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
 		break;
 	case PR_GET_NAME:
 		get_task_comm(comm, me);
-		if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, sizeof(comm)))
+		if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, strlen(comm) + 1))
 			return -EFAULT;
 		break;
 	case PR_GET_ENDIAN: