[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20210829112105-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 2021 11:27:42 -0400
From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
To: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
"Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan"
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@...gle.com>,
Richard Henderson <rth@...ddle.net>,
Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@...ha.franken.de>,
James E J Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@....de>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Peter H Anvin <hpa@...or.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@...nel.org>,
X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux PCI <linux-pci@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-alpha@...r.kernel.org, linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org, sparclinux@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 11/15] pci: Add pci_iomap_shared{,_range}
On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 10:20:44AM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote:
>
> > I see. Hmm. It's a bit of a random thing to do it at the map time
> > though. E.g. DMA is all handled transparently behind the DMA API.
> > Hardening is much more than just replacing map with map_shared
> > and I suspect what you will end up with is basically
> > vendors replacing map with map shared to make things work
> > for their users and washing their hands.
>
> That concept exists too. There is a separate allow list for the drivers. So
> just adding shared to a driver is not enough, until it's also added to the
> allowlist
>
> Users can of course chose to disable the allowlist, but they need to
> understand the security implications.
Right. So given that, why do we need to tweak a random API like the map?
If you just make all maps be shared then the user is in control.
Seems sensible to me.
>
> >
> > I would say an explicit flag in the driver that says "hardened"
> > and refusing to init a non hardened one would be better.
>
>
> We have that too (that's the device filtering)
>
> But the problem is that device filtering just stops the probe functions, not
> the initcalls, and lot of legacy drivers do MMIO interactions before going
> into probe. In some cases it's unavoidable because of the device doesn't
> have a separate enumeration mechanism it needs some kind of probing to even
> check for its existence And since we don't want to change all of them it's
> far safer to make the ioremap opt-in.
>
>
> -Andi
Let's be frank, even without encryption disabling most drivers -
especially weird ones that poke at hardware before probe -
is far safer than keeping them, but one loses a bunch of features.
IOW all this hardening is nice but which security/feature tradeoff
to take it a policy decision, not something kernel should do
imho.
--
MST
Powered by blists - more mailing lists