| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-Id: <20210830181528.1569-24-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 11:15:19 -0700
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To: x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>,
Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...el.com>,
Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v30 23/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
Introduce basic shadow stack enabling/disabling/allocation routines.
A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHADOW_STACK flag
and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
v30:
- Remove superfluous comments for struct thread_shstk.
- Replace 'populate' with 'unused'.
v28:
- Update shstk_setup() with wrmsrl_safe(), returns success when shadow
stack feature is not present (since this is a setup function).
v27:
- Change 'struct cet_status' to 'struct thread_shstk', and change member
types from unsigned long to u64.
- Re-order local variables in reverse order of length.
- WARN_ON_ONCE() when vm_munmap() fails.
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 27 +++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 ++
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 134 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 167 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9dce4914d03d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
+#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct task_struct;
+
+struct thread_shstk {
+ u64 base;
+ u64 size;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+int shstk_setup(void);
+void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
+void shstk_disable(void);
+#else
+static inline int shstk_setup(void) { return 0; }
+static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
+static inline void shstk_disable(void) {}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index f3020c54e2cb..10497634b7a4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ struct vm86;
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
#include <asm/vmxfeatures.h>
#include <asm/vdso/processor.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
@@ -527,6 +528,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
*/
u32 pkru;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+ struct thread_shstk shstk;
+#endif
+
/* Floating point and extended processor state */
struct fpu fpu;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 3e625c61f008..9e064845e497 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sev.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK) += shstk.o
###
# 64 bit specific files
ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..583dd3fa8c3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * shstk.c - Intel shadow stack support
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, Intel Corporation.
+ * Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
+#include <linux/user.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
+
+static void start_update_msrs(void)
+{
+ fpregs_lock();
+ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+ fpregs_restore_userregs();
+}
+
+static void end_update_msrs(void)
+{
+ fpregs_unlock();
+}
+
+static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size)
+{
+ int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ unsigned long addr, unused;
+
+ mmap_write_lock(mm);
+ addr = do_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ, flags, VM_SHADOW_STACK, 0,
+ &unused, NULL);
+ mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+
+ return addr;
+}
+
+int shstk_setup(void)
+{
+ struct thread_shstk *shstk = ¤t->thread.shstk;
+ unsigned long addr, size;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return 0;
+
+ size = round_up(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G), PAGE_SIZE);
+ addr = alloc_shstk(size);
+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+ return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
+
+ start_update_msrs();
+ err = wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
+ if (!err)
+ wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN);
+ end_update_msrs();
+
+ if (!err) {
+ shstk->base = addr;
+ shstk->size = size;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ struct thread_shstk *shstk = &tsk->thread.shstk;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+ !shstk->size ||
+ !shstk->base)
+ return;
+
+ if (!tsk->mm)
+ return;
+
+ while (1) {
+ int r;
+
+ r = vm_munmap(shstk->base, shstk->size);
+
+ /*
+ * vm_munmap() returns -EINTR when mmap_lock is held by
+ * something else, and that lock should not be held for a
+ * long time. Retry it for the case.
+ */
+ if (r == -EINTR) {
+ cond_resched();
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For all other types of vm_munmap() failure, either the
+ * system is out of memory or there is bug.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(r);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ shstk->base = 0;
+ shstk->size = 0;
+}
+
+void shstk_disable(void)
+{
+ struct thread_shstk *shstk = ¤t->thread.shstk;
+ u64 msr_val;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+ !shstk->size ||
+ !shstk->base)
+ return;
+
+ start_update_msrs();
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val & ~CET_SHSTK_EN);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
+ end_update_msrs();
+
+ shstk_free(current);
+}
--
2.21.0
Powered by blists - more mailing lists