linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory

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Date:   Tue, 31 Aug 2021 13:39:31 -0700
From:   Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
To:     David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
        Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Varad Gautam <varad.gautam@...e.com>,
        Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@...e.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private
 memory


On 8/31/2021 1:15 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 31.08.21 22:01, Andi Kleen wrote:
>>
>>>> Thanks a lot for this summary. A question about the requirement: do
>>>> we or
>>>> do we not have plan to support assigned device to the protected VM?
>>>
>>> Good question, I assume that is stuff for the far far future.
>>
>> It is in principle possible with the current TDX, but not secure. But
>> someone might decide to do it. So it would be good to have basic support
>> at least.
>
> Can you elaborate the "not secure" part? Do you mean, making the 
> device only access "shared" memory, not secure/encrypted/whatsoever?


Yes that's right. It can only access shared areas.


-Andi