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Message-ID: <CAPcyv4i8YXo=xOL2vO67KLABQRDNAxzrzT=a1xtwtrts5pVPKw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 2021 11:58:05 -0700
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>,
Linux Security Module list
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James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
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Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
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Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux
lockdown checks
On Tue, Aug 31, 2021 at 6:53 AM Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Aug 31, 2021 at 5:09 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com> wrote:
> > On Sat, Jun 19, 2021 at 12:18 AM Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 1:51 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> ...
>
> > > > diff --git a/drivers/cxl/mem.c b/drivers/cxl/mem.c
> > > > index 2acc6173da36..c1747b6555c7 100644
> > > > --- a/drivers/cxl/mem.c
> > > > +++ b/drivers/cxl/mem.c
> > > > @@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ static bool cxl_mem_raw_command_allowed(u16 opcode)
> > > > if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS))
> > > > return false;
> > > >
> > > > - if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_NONE))
> > > > + if (security_locked_down(current_cred(), LOCKDOWN_NONE))
> > >
> > > Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
> > >
> > > ...however that usage looks wrong. The expectation is that if kernel
> > > integrity protections are enabled then raw command access should be
> > > disabled. So I think that should be equivalent to LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS
> > > in terms of the command capabilities to filter.
> >
> > Yes, the LOCKDOWN_NONE seems wrong here... but it's a pre-existing bug
> > and I didn't want to go down yet another rabbit hole trying to fix it.
> > I'll look at this again once this patch is settled - it may indeed be
> > as simple as replacing LOCKDOWN_NONE with LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS.
>
> At this point you should be well aware of my distaste for merging
> patches that have known bugs in them. Yes, this is a pre-existing
> condition, but it seems well within the scope of this work to address
> it as well.
>
> This isn't something that is going to get merged while the merge
> window is open, so at the very least you've got almost two weeks to
> sort this out - please do that.
Yes, apologies, I should have sent the fix shortly after noticing the
problem. I'll get the CXL bug fix out of the way so Ondrej can move
this along.
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