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Date:   Wed, 1 Sep 2021 10:52:56 +0800
From:   Oliver Sang <oliver.sang@...el.com>
To:     Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Cc:     Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, lkp@...ts.01.org,
        lkp@...el.com, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [mm] f9ce0be71d:
 BUG:KCSAN:data-race_in_next_uptodate_page/next_uptodate_page

Hi Marco,

On Tue, Aug 31, 2021 at 05:47:37PM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 31, 2021 at 03:07PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 31, 2021 at 03:38:17PM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > On Tue, 31 Aug 2021 at 15:13, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org> wrote:
> > > > > > [  184.717904][ T1873] ==================================================================
> > > > > > [  184.718938][ T1873] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in next_uptodate_page / unlock_page
> > > > > > [  184.719828][ T1873]
> > > > > > [  184.720103][ T1873] write (marked) to 0xffffea00050f37c0 of 8 bytes by task 1872 on cpu 1:
> > > > > > [  184.721024][ T1873]  unlock_page+0x102/0x1b0
> > > > > > [  184.721533][ T1873]  filemap_map_pages+0x6c6/0x890
> > > > > > [  184.722102][ T1873]  handle_mm_fault+0x179c/0x27f0
> > > > > > [  184.722672][ T1873]  do_user_addr_fault+0x3fb/0x830
> > > > > > [  184.723263][ T1873]  exc_page_fault+0xc3/0x1a0
> > > > > > [  184.723845][ T1873]  asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
> > > > > > [  184.724427][ T1873]
> > > > > > [  184.724720][ T1873] read to 0xffffea00050f37c0 of 8 bytes by task 1873 on cpu 0:
> > > > > > [  184.725575][ T1873]  next_uptodate_page+0x456/0x830
> > > > > > [  184.726161][ T1873]  filemap_map_pages+0x728/0x890
> > > > > > [  184.726747][ T1873]  handle_mm_fault+0x179c/0x27f0
> > > > > > [  184.727332][ T1873]  do_user_addr_fault+0x3fb/0x830
> > > > > > [  184.727905][ T1873]  exc_page_fault+0xc3/0x1a0
> > > > > > [  184.728440][ T1873]  asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
> > > > > > [  184.729027][ T1873]
> > > > > > [  184.729313][ T1873] Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
> > > > > > [  184.730019][ T1873] CPU: 0 PID: 1873 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.11.0-rc4-00001-gf9ce0be71d1f #1
> > > > > > [  184.731103][ T1873] ==================================================================
> > > > >
> > > > > Line annotation would be helpful.
> [...]
> > > Thoughts?
> > 
> > I wasn't complaining about the report! It's more that without line numbers
> > we're struggling a bit to figure out where the race is. All the page-flag
> > tests on the reader side should be using test_bit(), but the report above
> > doesn't seem to think that the read is marked. Given your series adding
> > CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE and the fact that you try to triage these things, I
> > thought maybe you've seen this before and might be able to point at the race
> > (which is hopefully benign, but it's annoying when you can't spot it!).
> 
> Hmm, I was sure I could find it in either closed or still open syzbot
> reports, but sadly I couldn't find anything. :-/
> 
> The next best thing was to take the same kernel version, same Clang
> version, and same config in the hopes the generated functions of
> interest are identical. If I take the report and symbolize it with what
> I've built, I get:
> 
> | ==================================================================
> | BUG: KCSAN: data-race in next_uptodate_page / unlock_page
> |
> | write (marked) to 0xffffea00050f37c0 of 8 bytes by task 1872 on cpu 1:
> |  instrument_atomic_write include/linux/instrumented.h:87 [inline]
> |  clear_bit_unlock_is_negative_byte include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-lock.h:74 [inline]
> |  unlock_page+0x102/0x1b0 mm/filemap.c:1465
> |  filemap_map_pages+0x6c6/0x890 mm/filemap.c:3057
> |  do_fault_around mm/memory.c:3904 [inline]
> |  do_read_fault mm/memory.c:3918 [inline]
> |  do_fault mm/memory.c:4051 [inline]
> |  handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:4302 [inline]
> |  __handle_mm_fault mm/memory.c:4437 [inline]
> |  handle_mm_fault+0x179c/0x27f0 mm/memory.c:4535
> |  do_user_addr_fault+0x3fb/0x830 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1393
> |  handle_page_fault arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1450 [inline]
> |  exc_page_fault+0xc3/0x1a0 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1506
> |  asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:580
> |
> | read to 0xffffea00050f37c0 of 8 bytes by task 1873 on cpu 0:
> |  PagePoisoned include/linux/page-flags.h:204 [inline]
> |  PageReadahead include/linux/page-flags.h:382 [inline]
> |  next_uptodate_page+0x456/0x830 mm/filemap.c:2975
> |  next_map_page mm/filemap.c:3010 [inline]
> |  filemap_map_pages+0x728/0x890 mm/filemap.c:3066
> |  do_fault_around mm/memory.c:3904 [inline]
> |  do_read_fault mm/memory.c:3918 [inline]
> |  do_fault mm/memory.c:4051 [inline]
> |  handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:4302 [inline]
> |  __handle_mm_fault mm/memory.c:4437 [inline]
> |  handle_mm_fault+0x179c/0x27f0 mm/memory.c:4535
> |  do_user_addr_fault+0x3fb/0x830 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1393
> |  handle_page_fault arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1450 [inline]
> |  exc_page_fault+0xc3/0x1a0 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1506
> |  asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:580
> |
> | Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
> | CPU: 0 PID: 1873 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.11.0-rc4-00001-gf9ce0be71d1f #1
> | ==================================================================
> 
> And looking at the preprocessed source, this makes sense, because
> PageReadahead clearly includes a call to PagePoisoned with the given
> config.
> 
> My guess is that the below patch would be appropriate here?
> 
> (LKP folks: I'd still like bots to enable CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE=y,
>  just to keep the volume of reports down for now.)

Thanks a lot for all information so far and suggestions!

currently, we do human check and only when the parent is very clean
and the KCSAN issue is very clearly related with code change, we will
send out the report.

And we will follow up to enable CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE=y

> 
> Thanks,
> -- Marco
> 
> ------ >8 ------
> 
> From: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
> Date: Tue, 31 Aug 2021 17:27:27 +0200
> Subject: [PATCH] mm: fix data race in PagePoisoned()
> 
> PagePoisoned() accesses page->flags which can be updated concurrently:
> 
>   | BUG: KCSAN: data-race in next_uptodate_page / unlock_page
>   |
>   | write (marked) to 0xffffea00050f37c0 of 8 bytes by task 1872 on cpu 1:
>   |  instrument_atomic_write           include/linux/instrumented.h:87 [inline]
>   |  clear_bit_unlock_is_negative_byte include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-lock.h:74 [inline]
>   |  unlock_page+0x102/0x1b0           mm/filemap.c:1465
>   |  filemap_map_pages+0x6c6/0x890     mm/filemap.c:3057
>   |  ...
>   | read to 0xffffea00050f37c0 of 8 bytes by task 1873 on cpu 0:
>   |  PagePoisoned                   include/linux/page-flags.h:204 [inline]
>   |  PageReadahead                  include/linux/page-flags.h:382 [inline]
>   |  next_uptodate_page+0x456/0x830 mm/filemap.c:2975
>   |  ...
>   | CPU: 0 PID: 1873 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.11.0-rc4-00001-gf9ce0be71d1f #1
> 
> To avoid the compiler tearing or otherwise optimizing the access, use
> READ_ONCE() to access flags.
> 
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/page-flags.h | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/page-flags.h b/include/linux/page-flags.h
> index a68af80649a4..70bf0ec29ee3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/page-flags.h
> +++ b/include/linux/page-flags.h
> @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static __always_inline int PageCompound(struct page *page)
>  #define	PAGE_POISON_PATTERN	-1l
>  static inline int PagePoisoned(const struct page *page)
>  {
> -	return page->flags == PAGE_POISON_PATTERN;
> +	return READ_ONCE(page->flags) == PAGE_POISON_PATTERN;
>  }
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
> -- 
> 2.33.0.259.gc128427fd7-goog
> 

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