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Message-ID: <YTCZAjdci5yx+n6l@suse.de>
Date:   Thu, 2 Sep 2021 11:27:30 +0200
From:   Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc:     Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Varad Gautam <varad.gautam@...e.com>,
        Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@...e.com>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest
 private memory

On Wed, Sep 01, 2021 at 09:07:59AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> In principle, you could actually initialize a TDX guest with all of its
> memory shared and all of it mapped in the host IOMMU.

Not sure how this works in TDX, but in SEV code fetches are always
treated as encrypted. So this approach would not work with SEV, not to
speak about attestation, which will not work with this approach either
:)

Regards,

	Joerg

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