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Date: Thu, 09 Sep 2021 16:49:58 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, zohar@...ux.ibm.com,
dhowells@...hat.com, dwmw2@...radead.org,
herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, davem@...emloft.net,
jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com
Cc: keescook@...omium.org, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, scott.branden@...adcom.com,
weiyongjun1@...wei.com, nayna@...ux.ibm.com, ebiggers@...gle.com,
ardb@...nel.org, nramas@...ux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@...hat.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com, pjones@...hat.com,
konrad.wilk@...cle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 04/12] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE
to restrict_link_by_ca
On Tue, 2021-09-07 at 12:01 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Set the restriction check for INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE keys to
> restrict_link_by_ca. This will only allow CA keys into the machine
> keyring.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
> ---
> v1: Initial version
> v2: Added !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING check so mok
> keyring gets created even when it isn't enabled
> v3: Rename restrict_link_by_system_trusted_or_ca to restrict_link_by_ca
> v4: removed unnecessary restriction->check set
> v5: Rename to machine keyring
> ---
> security/integrity/digsig.c | 8 ++++++--
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> index 5a75ac2c4dbe..2b75bbbd9e0e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> @@ -132,14 +132,18 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
> goto out;
> }
>
> - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING))
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) && id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
> return 0;
>
> restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!restriction)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> - restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
> + if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
> + restriction->check = restrict_link_by_ca;
> + else
> + restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
> +
> if (id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
> perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
>
03 and 04 look sane. As said, the patches seem to be already in nice shape.
/Jarkko
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