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Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2021 11:53:14 -0600 From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> Cc: keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>, Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, keescook@...omium.org, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, scott.branden@...adcom.com, weiyongjun1@...wei.com, nayna@...ux.ibm.com, ebiggers@...gle.com, ardb@...nel.org, nramas@...ux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@...hat.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com, pjones@...hat.com, "konrad.wilk@...cle.com" <konrad.wilk@...cle.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 04/12] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by_ca > On Sep 9, 2021, at 11:25 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote: > > On Tue, 2021-09-07 at 12:01 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote: >> Set the restriction check for INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE keys to >> restrict_link_by_ca. This will only allow CA keys into the machine >> keyring. >> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com> > > Normally the new function, in this case the restriction, and usage > should be defined together. Any reason why 3/12 and 4/12 are two > separate patches? I split them since they cross subsystems. > I would squash them together. But I can squash them together in the next round. > >> --- >> v1: Initial version >> v2: Added !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING check so mok >> keyring gets created even when it isn't enabled >> v3: Rename restrict_link_by_system_trusted_or_ca to restrict_link_by_ca >> v4: removed unnecessary restriction->check set >> v5: Rename to machine keyring >> --- >> security/integrity/digsig.c | 8 ++++++-- >> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c >> index 5a75ac2c4dbe..2b75bbbd9e0e 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c >> @@ -132,14 +132,18 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) >> goto out; >> } >> >> - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)) >> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) && id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE) > > Over 80 chars, please split the line I thought the 80 char limit was relaxed? But if it hasn’t I can change this too. Thanks.
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