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Message-Id: <20210914154825.104886-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 18:48:16 +0300
From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
To: kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Bandan Das <bsd@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org (open list),
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Wei Huang <wei.huang2@....com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org (open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK),
Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
x86@...nel.org (maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)),
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>
Subject: [PATCH 05/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: don't copy virt_ext from vmcb12
These field correspond to features that we don't expose yet to L2
While currently there are no CVE worthy features in this field,
if AMD adds more features to this field, that could allow guest
escapes similar to CVE-2021-3653 and CVE-2021-3656.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index 476e01f98035..4df59d9795b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -545,7 +545,6 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
(svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & int_ctl_vmcb12_bits) |
(svm->vmcb01.ptr->control.int_ctl & int_ctl_vmcb01_bits);
- svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext = svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext;
svm->vmcb->control.int_vector = svm->nested.ctl.int_vector;
svm->vmcb->control.int_state = svm->nested.ctl.int_state;
svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = svm->nested.ctl.event_inj;
--
2.26.3
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