linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86: sgx_vepc: extract sgx_vepc_remove

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Message-ID: <734abf89-8be2-dd13-b649-fde5744ba465@redhat.com>
Date:   Tue, 14 Sep 2021 07:36:44 +0200
From:   Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
        dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, yang.zhong@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86: sgx_vepc: extract sgx_vepc_remove_page

On 13/09/21 23:13, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>> Apart from reclaiming, /dev/sgx_vepc might disappear between the first
>> open() and subsequent ones.
>
> If /dev/sgx_vepc disappears, why is it a problem *for the software*, and
> not a sysadmin problem?

Rather than disappearing, it could be that a program first gets all the 
resources it needs before it gets malicious input, and then enter a 
restrictive sandbox.  In this case open() could be completely forbidden.

I will improve the documentation and changelogs when I post the non-RFC 
version; that could have been done better, sorry.

Paolo